

ASPECTS OF INDIAN THOUGHT

MAHĀMAHOPADHYAYA

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FOREWORD

It is a great privilege for us to have been entrusted with the publication of this book by the eminent savant, Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Gopināth Kavirāj, the first Honorary Fellow of our young University. It contains nearly all the writings in English which my revered teacher had contributed to different journals and anthologies at different periods of his glorious academic life, covering more than half a century. In his very lifetime Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Kavirāj has passed into a legendary figure for his amazing scholarship, wide erudition and deep intuitive insight. In the vast sweep of his gigantic intellect he comprises the entire field of Indian philosophy with its innumerable branches as is reflected in the articles compiled in this book.

The evolution of Indian thought owes its origin to the genius or 'pratibhā' of the Ṛṣis or Seers who actually saw or realised the Truth or Reality. We have put at the very beginning an illuminating article by MM. Kaviraj in which the nature of that 'pratibhā' which gives birth to creative thought has been discussed at length from the view-points of all the different schools of thought. We feel that it is the ground as it were from which springs all the systems of Indian thought, as both the orthodox and heterodox schools equally hold their tenets as revealed by intuition.

In the subsequent articles MM. Kavirāj throws a flood of light on many obscure topics and little known schools of thought. From very slender materials he has tried to reconstruct by the genius that is his own what the different types of Theism happened to be like in ancient India. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy gets a new treatment in his hands and we get a clear conception of the problem of causality as dealt with in this system in sharp contrast to the views of Sāṅkhya-

Yoga, which has also been elaborated at length in a separate article.

To MM. Kavirāj philosophy has not been a mere intellectual pursuit but a way of self-realisation. So in the treatment of Yoga and Tantra he has been acclaimed as the highest authority. Tāntric philosophy has been his *forté* in the late years of his life and we are happy to have been able to include some articles on this most profound but highly neglected branch of Indian philosophy. We sincerely hope that the publication of this book will give some incentive to younger scholars to probe this field and cover fresh grounds in Tāntric philosophy.

We are thankful to the Ministry of Education, Govt. of India for their kind permission to reproduce the article entitled "Śākta Philosophy" which was contributed by MM. Kavirāj to the "History of Philosophy—Eastern and Western" published by them. My thanks are due to my two young research scholars, Sri Viswanāth Mukhopādhyāya and Sri Gopīnāth Nandi and especially to Srimati Bhakti Bandyopādhyāya for helping me in various ways to get the matter ready for the press. I must also thank Sri Sures C. Das, M.A. of the General Printers & Publishers Pvt. Ltd. for his ungrudging help in getting the matter through the press neatly. Lastly, I must express my heartfelt gratitude to our Vice-Chancellor, Dr. D. M. Sen for his enthusiastic encouragement and patronage for the publication of this book.

The University of Burdwan
15th August 1966

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INTRODUCTION

The following pages embody a few selected papers of mine on some aspects of ancient Indian thought. Of these papers, one (pages 1-44) was originally published in 1923-24 in the Annals of Bhandarkar Research Institute, Poona, another (pages 175-215) formed a part of the work entitled 'Philosophy—Eastern and Western' sponsored by the Government of India Education Ministry and published under its auspices in the year 1950, and the rest came out from time to time between 1920 and 1938 in the pages of the Sarasvati Bhavan's Studies edited mostly by myself on behalf of the U. P. Government as a Research Journal of the Government Sanskrit College, Benares. It will appear from a look at the contents that the papers published within 1920 and 1938 deal with ancient Indian thought in its varied aspects covering a wide field including its different schools, philosophical, religious or cultural and spiritual.

After the papers had been written and published I took no further notice of them, for I had no idea in my mind at that time that they would ever appear in the form of a book. The entire credit of bringing out these papers lie with my 'devoted young friend Dr. Govinda Gopal Mukhopadhyaya, who has done everything in this connection—collecting the papers, preparing transcripts of the selected pieces for the press, arranging them in order, going through the arduous task of reading the proofs and editing the whole work. What can I render him in return for all these labours of love? Really I have nothing for him but a sense of mute gratefulness mixed with an outpouring of the heart in the shape of sincere blessings. May God grant him a long life of health and happiness.

I am also grateful to the authorities of the University of Burdwan for undertaking this publication.

2A, Sigrā,
Varanasi.
23-7-1966

Gopinath Kaviraj

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THE DOCTRINE OF PRATIBHĀ IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Introduction

In the history of philosophical thought in India one very often meets with the problem which starts from a sense of the inadequacy of intellectual powers and points to the necessity of recognising a distinct faculty for the explanation of phenomena beyond the range of these powers. It was in attempting to offer a solution of this problem that the doctrine of Pratibhā, or as it is somewhere called, Prajñā, had its origin.

The word Pratibhā, which literally means a flash of light, a revelation, is usually found in literature in the sense of wisdom characterised by immediacy and freshness. It might be called the supersensuous and supra-rational apperception, grasping truth directly, and would, therefore, seem to have the same value, both as a faculty and as an act in Indian Philosophy, as Intuition has in some of the Western systems. From a general survey of the literature concerned and a careful analysis of its contents it would appear that the word is used in two distinct but allied senses :

(i) To indicate any kind of knowledge which is not sense-born nor of the nature of an inference. But as such knowledge may range over a wide variety of subjects, it is possible to distinguish it again as lower and higher. The phenomena of ordinary clairvoyance and telepathy are instances of the former, while the latter kind is represented in the supreme wisdom of the saint.

(ii) In the latter sense, however, the use of the term is restricted to the Āgamic literature, where it stands for the Highest Divinity, understood as Principle of

Intelligence and conceived as female. In other words, Pratibhā, otherwise known as Parā Samvit or Citi Śakti, means in the Āgama, especially in the Tripurā and Trika sections of it, the power of self-revelation or self-illumination of the Supreme Spirit, with which it is essentially and eternally identical. The employment of the word in the sense of 'guru' (as in Abhinavagupta, *Tantrasāra*, p. 120) comes under this second head.

The prime characteristic of this super-sensuous knowledge is, as we have observed, its immediacy and intense clarity. According to all the systems such knowledge is considered transcendental, being held to be free from the time and space limitations, which are imposed as a matter of necessity on all inferior knowledge and from the indispensable conditions which govern the origin or manifestation of the latter. Consequently we find in every respect a strongly marked contrast between the two. This higher knowledge dispenses, in its rise, with the need of sense-organs and unlike reflective judgement, with that of the rational faculty. It reveals the past and the future as in a single flash, and also the absent and the remote. Nothing escapes its searching light. It is aptly described as simultaneously illuminating everything in every aspect and as eternal (*Yoga Sūtra* III, 84.)

In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and occasionally in Vedānta the term Pratibhā and sometimes Ārṣa Jñāna is employed to express this supreme knowledge, a term which has the sanction of usage in Yoga literature. The word Prajñā too is sometimes used in Yoga works as a synonym of Pratibhā. In Vyākaraṇa both Prajñā and Pratibhā are to be found and these are declared identical in sense with the Paśyanti stage of the fourfold Vāk. The Āgamas retain all these terms and add Samveda to the list of synonyms. The Buddhists are familiar with the name Prajñā even in their oldest canonical literature, but do not seem to know anything of Pratibhā or the other terms. But the Jainas have, curiously enough, not a

single one of these words in their philosophical vocabulary, though they have fully treated of the subject in their works. They have discussed the question in their own way and under their own technical appellations e.g., avadhijñāna, kevalajñāna and so forth. From a survey of the entire field it will be evident that the problem has recurred everywhere and has everywhere, to all appearances, been similarly dealt with.

History of the Doctrine in the Schools

I

NYAYA VAIŚEṢIKA

In early Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya literature we find not only indications of the existence of the doctrine, but even the very term Pratibhā used in its technical sense. But since these systems busied themselves particularly with the empirical forms of reality and more or less with dialectic, they could not give the subject the same fulness and precision in its treatment as its nature demanded. The little, however, that has been left on record by these philosophers is highly interesting and would enable us, following along their lines, to have an idea of what they really meant.

While mentioning the various kinds of knowledge derived from ordinary sources, Kaṇāda confines himself to sense-perception, inference and verbal cognition, of which the first two he conceives as really independent and the last one as only a form of the second. This shows that, according to Kaṇāda, the senses, aided by the natural light of reason, constitute for the average man the only valid source of knowledge. The testimony of

the senses is sometimes deceptive, and so, when a doubt arises as to its correctness, it has to be verified either by an appeal to Reason or by *pravṛttisāmarthyā* and the certitude which the verification thus results in establishing must be regarded for all practical purposes as sufficient and final. And consequently the Reality which such a certitude discloses is only empirical. Further the scope of the natural faculties is very limited; they cannot operate except under definite physical and physiological conditions. Absolute knowledge, in every sense unlimited and revealing the heart of Reality, is therefore not within the reach of ordinary humanity.

But such knowledge is declared to exist and is said to be attainable by every man who develops within himself, by continued effort, the faculty of immediate vision and becomes in this way a Rṣi or Seer. And for this reason it is known as *Ārṣa*. The *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*, 9.2.13 mentions this, in association with what it calls *Siddhadarśana*, and explains its supersensuous character¹.

The process of the genesis of this knowledge may be easily explained. It is assumed in this system that no knowledge can arise except through the contact of the *manas*, the atomic intra-organic faculty of attention, with the self, this contact being an invariable causal antecedent to the phenomena of conscious life in general. The character of the resulting knowledge is determined

¹ Śaṅkara Miśra points out that both this *Ārṣajñāna* and *Siddhadarśana*, referred to in the *sūtra*, have for their objects things which are not accessible to the ordinary means of knowledge, but while the former reveals the past and the future, the latter which is artificially induced clairvoyance, makes known what is hidden or distant (spatially) from the senses. This distinction is evidently unfounded. For if *Ārṣajñāna* is held to be identical with *Pratibhā*, as certainly it is (cf. the statement of *Padārthapraveśa* quoted by Śaṅkara Miśra), there is no reason for setting limits to its power. It illuminates the distant in *space* with as much perspicuity as it does the distant in *time*, and moreover it is not restricted by the conditions which are found to be indispensable for the origin of ordinary knowledge. Pañcānana Tarkaratna, in his commentary on the *Upaskāra*, takes *Ārṣa* (as an alternate explanation) as equivalent to the unobstructed illumination of *Yuktayogin* and *Siddhadarśana* as the reflective omniscience of *Yujñāyogin* (Bangabasi edition of *Vaiśeṣika Darśana*, p. 462).

by the state of the manas, viz., whether it is at rest or in motion. If it is moving—and all movement is ultimately due to the action of prior dispositions (traces etc.) and of adṛṣṭa—it comes of necessity into relation with the senses which may (as in waking) or may not, as in dream, somnambulism etc.) be in touch with the objects, and the ensuing consciousness is either jāgrat or svapna. But if the manas be absolutely motionless, two states may follow according as this motionlessness is consequent merely upon Nature's demand for rest or on intense concentration. In the former case, consciousness will be in total abeyance until it emerges again, along with the renewal of motion in manas, under a Vital Impulse (*jīvanayoniprayatna*) acting from beyond. This is the state known as Susupti (dreamless sleep). The second state is called Yoga or Samādhi, in which consciousness, far from subsiding, is exalted into an extraordinary clarity of Immediate Intuition. Time, space and other limitations having vanished, the manas stands face to face, as it were, not only with the pure self but with the realities of all things. This vision is Pratibhā or Ārśajñāna.¹

This is Yogipratyakṣa, pure and simple.² But Jayanta, in his *Nyāyamañjarī*, does not seem to be inclined to accept it as identical with Pratibhā. He distinguishes between two kinds of intuition, viz. the one which arises in the manner of a sudden flash even in the life of an ordinary individual (usually female) at some rare lucid moment and the other which appears when the mind has gone through a process of regular discipline and purification by Yoga. Jayanta would restrict the use of the term Pratibhā to the former kind of intuition alone.

But this restriction is apparently arbitrary. The term being really a coinage of the Yoga system it is un-

¹ One to whom such a vision reveals itself is called a Rṣi, the word Rṣi etymologically meaning a 'seer'.

² Cf. Kālīvara Vedāntanāgīśa, *Sāṅkhya Darśana*, p. 147.

reasonable why it should be narrowed down so as to exclude the vision of the Yogins and to signify merely the sporadic intuitions of average humanity. It would be simpler therefore and more consistent with the general laws of argumentation to maintain that Prātibhajñāna is one in its essence but differing in kind according as it is developed by a steady and continuous effort or produced automatically by virtue of bare adṛṣṭa.

In both cases, however, the essential characteristics of Prātibhā are to be observed and it is these which differentiate it from sense-perception and other forms of inferior knowledge. What Jayanta says of Yogipratyakṣa holds good of Prātibhā in all its aspect, of course with varying degrees of applicability. Though simple and indivisible in its unity it comprehends the entire objective world in a single moment, i.e., simultaneously.¹

The usual conditions of knowledge which preclude the possibility of two cognitions rising simultaneously in the field do not avail in the case of Prātibhā, for the simple reason that it is a single act, and does not consist of a series of separate states. So long as it endures it is a continuum, and it endures till there is no break in its unity. But as soon as this unity is dissolved Prātibhā also disappears, being superseded by the ordinary life with its chain of successive and mutually exclusive mental states.

Thus understood Prātibhā would seem to be an approximation to the wisdom of the supreme being. It is distinguished from the divine wisdom only in this that it is a product which the manas brings occasionally into existence through a certain process of self-immobilisation, whereas the latter is eternal and stands eternally adjoined to Him in which the necessity of an organ is out of question (cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 178⁶⁻⁹).

¹ Yugaṇpad ckyaiṇa budhlyā drakṣyanti sarvaṣtra sarvān arthān yogināḥ, *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 107.

In the *Bhāṣāpariccheda* (verse 66) Viśvanātha Nyāya Pañcānana describes the Yoga intuition as of a two-fold character, viz., that of the Yogin *en rapport* (*Yukta yogī*) and the other of one just a degree below (*Yuñjana yogī*). The former is the mirror of Eternal Light in which the totality of things remains perpetually in manifestation (*yuktasya sarvadā mānam*) but the latter requires the aid of reflection and contemplation for such manifestation.

II

YOGA

In the Yoga system, especially in that represented by Patañjali, Pratibhā is synonymous with an aspect of Prajñā. It is said to be the supreme faculty of omniscience which is evolved through a continued practice of concentration on the self, not in its absolute and transcendent nature, but as appearing in the form of the phenomenal ego (*vyavahārika grahītā*). The Pure Self is not an object of contemplation. It is said that as practice continues, and before the glory of the final illumination yet breaks forth, there dawns on the zone, in the fashion of the effulgence of the morning sun before the actual rise of the orb above the horizon, an unspeakable splendour in which the entire universe stands fully revealed. It is a vision in Eternity, *sub specie aeternitatis*—simultaneous (*akrama*), truthful, all-comprehending and serene. It is, so to speak, the vision of the many as reflected in the mirror of the one, and although there is still predominance of multiplicity it is at this stage so thoroughly infused with the unity that it is in a sense identical with it. In view of this multiplicity in the object of this vision it is held to be an impediment to Kaivalya and to the highest wisdom which leads through the cessation of all mental

life to that supreme state. And when in course of *sādhana* this multiplicity disappears from the field of vision, and the one, the Pure Self begins to shine upon itself, there being nothing left external to it, the highest wisdom takes its rise as an Immediate Consciousness of Pure Being with reference to the self. To know itself as pure is, for the self, to know itself as distinct from the objective phenomena. Such knowledge is called *Vivekakhyaṭi* and is the immediate antecedent of *Kaivalya*. For to *know* oneself as pure is verily to *be* pure.

From the above it would follow that in Yoga though a slight distinction is made between *Pratibhā* and the highest kind of *Prajñā* called *Tāraakajñāna*, *Pratibhā* in its ultimate nature is nevertheless nothing but the Light of the *Prajñā* falling upon the many instead of the one. That it is an *anaupadeśika jñāna*, as much as the *Prajñā* itself and is, therefore, to be differentiated from the ordinary kinds of knowledge, more or less conceptual, is recognised; but how such a knowledge is gained and how it embraces as its object the entire universe (*sarvam*) on which the *citta* was not concentrated are questions which present themselves in this connection.

To answer the questions properly we must inquire into *Patañjali's* theory of intuitive knowledge and study the cognate notions of his school. It is assumed that the word (*śabda*), idea (*jñāna*) and object (*artha*) are really distinct entities, and that though in ordinary experience they are found to be inter-related they may be separated from one another by a process of abstraction. It is indeed true, the *Yogin* would say, that thinking is impossible without some kind of language; in other words, it is admitted to be a fact that except through the use of a series of symbols with a certain conceptual value attached to them no mediate knowledge can possibly arise. But it does not imply that the symbol is in truth identical with the object for which it stands or with the idea to

which it is correlated. The *cow* as an *idea* is certainly distinct from the cow as an external *object* visible to the eye and both from the cow as the *name*, which expresses this idea and this object. The very nature of discursive thought is based on the non-recognition of this distinction and on the consequent assumption of a real identity among these three things. In the technical language of Yoga, such thought, thus confused and indiscriminate, is said to be dominated by *vikalpa*.

But a discrimination is possible. It is by the exigencies of our practical life founded on convention (*sanketa*) that this identity of reference is established, so that the presence of one thing (e.g. the word) revives the memory of another (e.g. the object) and vice versa. Practice in meditating upon the object without any conscious verbal reference is, therefore, supposed in course of time to succeed in breaking this false notion of identity (*smrtisānkarya*) and illumining the object *qua* object, pure and simple. In this system an object is held to possess a two-fold aspect of reality, one universal (*sāmānya*) and the other individual (*viśeṣa*), of which the former is amenable particularly to those forms of knowledge in which the conceptual element (*śabdaja vikalpa*) predominates, viz., āgama and anumāna, but the latter aspect, i.e. the object as an individual with a nature of its own and as such distinguished from other individuals belonging to the same or to a different class, can not be made known except by direct perception. But in ordinary perception, which for practical purposes is equivalent to *savikalpa jñāna*, the conceptual element is not wholly removed. When, however, this element is eliminated and the purity of the intention ensured, the *prajñā* becomes intensely clear and reveals the object wholly and faithfully until at last it sinks altogether and the object shines by itself. It sounds absurd to say that the object alone remains, without the *citta* or *jñāna* to take cognisance of it, but what is meant seem to be that the *citta*,

through extreme purity, becomes at this stage so tenuous as to be in fact a luminous void; it does not exist and it must do so until kaivalya is reached,¹ though identified in a sense with the object. And when there is a falling off from this state of *ekstasis* and a subsequent recoil from the object, it retains a dim *saṁskāra* of that supreme experience which it formulates in terms already familiar to it. It is needless to add that this is an intellectual act in the making of which the concepts known to the mind play an important part. The freshness of the original intuition is then gone; and thought and language grope about in vain to seize and express a truth beyond their farthest reach.

It is then clear that as soon as the mind, by gradual training, is freed from the invading influence of the concepts and the 'memory images of the past' (*vikalpas*), it acquires the power of merging itself in unity with any object (*dhyeya*) which may be presented to it—of indeed being filled with it and pervaded by it (*samādhi*). No matter what this object may be it is then fully illumined and its real nature perfectly brought out. This illumination (the act and the power both) is called by the name of *Prajñā* and is characterised as *Ṛtambharā* because it reveals the whole truth and is never falsified. But even at this stage it cannot make known everything—the All; it discloses that alone,—whether a concrete whole (*avayavī*) as in *nirvitarka samādhi* or the *infrā-atomic particles (tanmātvā)* as in *nirvicāra*, from the contemplation of which it arose. But with continued practice this limitation is transcended. It is explained in the *Yoga Sūtras* that when the aspirant steps beyond the first two stadia of ecstasy, viz., *grāhya* and *grahaṇa samāpatti* and concentrates his *citta* on its

¹ I have elsewhere tried to show at some length what is meant by saying that in *kaivalya* the *citta* is non-existent. The whole question turns upon the admissibility and meaning of what is technically designated *Suddhasattva*, i.e. *sattva* absolutely free from *rajas* and *tamas*.

own self (i.e. *asmitā* or phenomenal ego, the subject of relative consciousness, as illumined by the light of the Spirit above), he becomes self-conscious. This is *grahīṛsamāpatti* (*sāsmītasamādhi*) or what we might loosely describe as a subjective intuition, and the consciousness is self-consciousness in its utmost purity. But it must be remembered that this self-consciousness, which is the last term of our phenomenal life, consists in the relative unity of subject and object, and equivalent to the *so'hamjñāna* of Vedānta. It is the pointed apex of a broad-based pyramid-like edifice, beyond which is Eternity.

But how is it that concentration on *asmitā* (i.e., *grahīṛsamāpatti*) leads to omniscience? How does concentration on *one* thing result in knowledge of *all*? The question is rather perplexing, but it becomes very much simplified if we remember that the one here referred to is a composite unity—a unity holding in its bosom the germs of plurality, so that the vision of one is also, at this stage, the vision of all. The *asmitā* is the essence of *citta* and is the empirical subject. The *Yogabhāṣya* remarks that when the Yogin succeeds in realising himself as *subject* by means of *grahīṛsamāpatti*, the objective phenomena, infinite as they are, and their knowledge become simultaneously present to his cosmic consciousness: *sarvātmano guṇā vyavasāyāvvyavasāyātmakā svāminam ksetrajñam praty aśeṣadrśyātmatveno'patisthante* (*Yoga Bhāṣya* 3.49). The Self-consciousness, which is All-consciousness, is *Pratibhā* in the light of which all things are simultaneously (*akramam*) and in all their aspects (*sarvathāviśayam*) revealed. It constitutes the highest mystic acquisition of the Yogin, next only to his self-realisation.

A question may here be asked: what is the moral value of such a consciousness, however exalted? Does it serve any practical purpose in the way of restoring the soul to its lost glory? To this question it is replied by

pointing out that it does, because Pratibhā merges ultimately in Tāraka or Saving Knowledge, which leads to deliverance. The soul on its way to liberation needs must pass through this stage of omniscience. For without the direct knowledge of all there can be no absolute detachment i.e. detachment from *everything* alien or external to the self—(*paravairāgya*), which is a precondition of Kaivalya. In other words, detachment from everything presupposes a knowledge of everything. This detachment of jñāna or citta from everything is held to be its highest purity and is immediately followed by Kaivalya. It is called the dharmamegha samādhi representing the highest form of Prajñā, in which the citta (*sattva*) attains in purity to the likeness (*śuddhisāmya*) of the Self, so that the subject and the object are now eternally and *absolutely* lost in unity, and the din of phenomenal existence is forever hushed in the calm of sweet repose.

But before the actualisation of Kaivalya, when the citta still stands at the crest of the universe, ready to sink, the Yogin feels within him, as it were, a fresh emotional stir. For it is said that the rise of Prajñā is accompanied by the awakening of a deep compassion on suffering humanity. In the *Yogabhāṣya* the sage (*prājñā*) is likened to one standing on the hill-top and looking down from his tower of glory on the toiling-moiling multitude below.¹ This infinite compassion is the only justification of his abstention from a plunge into the Kaivalya which is immediately to follow. Under deep compassion he then builds up a new citta, the so-called *nirmāna citta*, from the stuff of *asmitā*, and a new body called *nirmānakāya*, from the *tanmātrās*, and having assumed these, teaches wisdom to the world sunk in ignorance.² The only motive for him is philanthropy

¹ Prajñāprāsadam ūruhya nśocyah śocato janān/bhūmiṣṭhān iva śailasthah sarvān prajñō'nupaśyati.

² It was thus that Kapila is said to have taught Āsuri: ādividvān nirmāṇa-

(*bhūtānugraha*). According to Yoga, as to Mahāyāna Buddhism, the sage owes it as a duty to his less fortunate brethren to inspire them with hope and courage and to point out to them the way to final release.

III

VYĀKARAṆA

Having given an outline of the views of the Yoga school in regard to Pratibhā, I now pass on to consider at some length what the Vaiyākaraṇas have to say on this question. I may take liberty to suggest here that the philosophy of grammar built upon the basis of Pātañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* by the great savant Bhartrhari was affiliated to the Āgama literature akin to the Śaiva and Śākta Āgamas of Kashmir.¹ With this in our mind we shall be able to follow its conclusions without any difficulty.

The grammarian's doctrine of Pratibhā is intimately bound up with his view regarding the origin of knowledge and of the objective world, and as this subject has not yet been dealt with elsewhere it would be well to furnish a short account of it here.

It is the fundamental thesis of the Śābdika that the source of all phenomena is the Eternal Verbum, called Śabda Brahman or Parā Vāk. This is of the nature of simple unity, Pure Being (*mahāsattā*), Great Universal (*mahāsāmanya*). To it belongs an infinite number of Śaktis mutually exclusive, but in essence identical with

cittam adhsthāya kārūnyād bhagavān pāramarsir āsuraye jīñāsamānāya tantram provāca (Yogabhāṣya under I, 25).

¹ Bhartrhari complains that this āgama had been practically lost for long ages when it was recovered and proclaimed by Candrācārya. Pūnyarāja according to the tradition, attributes the original Vyākaraṇāgama to Rāveṇa and ascribes its recovery through a Brahmarākṣasa to Candrācārya, Vasurāta (the teacher of Bhartrhari) and others. For Candrācārya see *Rājatarangīnī*. I.176.

it (*ekatvāvirodhinyaḥ, avibhaktāḥ, ātmabhūtāḥ*). Of these Avidyā, viz., the power not only of veiling the Essence but of exhibiting the many, and Kāla, viz., the power of projecting the eternal kalās of Śabda Brahman in succession,¹ may be regarded as the chief. These two śaktis are closely associated. But even of these two, Kāla śakti is held to be the Supreme Power (*svātantrya*) to which all other śaktis are subordinate and under the influence of which the eternal kalās within the śabda (*avyāhatāḥ kalāḥ*), though many, yet so long mysteriously identified with it, are apparently sundered from it and become the sources of the manifoldness of the phenomenal world (*bhāvabhedasya yonayaḥ*).

The world of phenomena, when analysed, exhibits a perpetual flux, which may be said in some sense to be cyclic. Motion begins from the Unmanifest and ends in the Unmanifest—and the two moments of appearance and disappearance of a phenomenon represent only the two opposite directions, anuloma and pratiloma, of the same wheel of movement (*parināma*).

The Primal Being (*sattā*), though in itself one and immutable, yet appears as many and in motion by virtue of its own inalienable Power (*māhātmyāt*), as already pointed out. This appearance of one as many constitutes its division, by which what is comprehensible and unnameable becomes subjective and objective, so that herein we have a distinction between jñāna (knowledge) and jñeya (knowable) on one hand and vācaka (name) and vācya (nameable) on the other. The Kālaśakti being conceived as an eternal and innate power of the Pure Being, we may assume that to the Śābdika, as to the Tāntrika elsewhere, the Godhead has a two-fold aspect—as *Transcendent beyond Time* in which it is above all predication

¹ The Śābdika, indeed every exponent of āgamic philosophy, rejects the Vaiśeṣika view of Kāla as an independent and supersensible substance, but conceives it as a Power, really indivisible, but appearing as discrete (*pravibhakta*), i.e. prior and posterior, on account of what might be called movement-particles or units of movement

in thought and language, and as *Immanent in Time* in which it is the subject, as well as predicate, of all judgements.

Now it is assumed that knowledge as a mode¹ (*vr̥tti-jñāna*) is never free from verbal associations (*śabdānugama*), evidently for the reason that it originates from Śabda. Hence an object (*artha*) which is knowable (*jñeya*) is also nameable (*abhidheya* λεξιτον); and the relation between the name and the nameable, as between knowledge and knowable, is an eternal relation (*anādiyogyatā*), which the Supreme Being simply manifests in the beginning of each aeon. The manifestation of this relation is co-eval with the origin of the objective world. In other words, in the womb of the Supreme Word or the Highest Universal, after its seeming self-division or self-multiplication, there appears an infinite number of eternal Kālās (=Śaktis, potencies) or Universals (*aparasāmānya*)—hierarchy of ideas—each of which has its appropriate name and thought through which it is revealed. It is through this name² and this thought that the Universal is manifested, i.e., creation in

¹ I say knowledge as a mode (वृत्ति) only to exclude Eternal Jñāna or Brahman, which is no other than the Supreme Word in the system. In the expression *na so'sti pratyayo loke* (*Vākya-pad* 1 124), the word *loke* implies modal consciousness. This consciousness is discursive and relative. It must be borne in mind that the grammarian does not admit what is ordinarily known as *nrvikalpaka vr̥tījñāna*, of the Stoic view on the connection between language and thought (Janet and Séales. *History of the problems of Philosophy*, Vol I p 208)

² The subject is as complicated as it is interesting. A detailed study of the issues involved will appear in the writer's forthcoming work on Yoga and ancient Indian Mysticism. It may just be noted here that creation following from 'name' is a conception very old in India, of the Vyāhrti theory of creation *Vedānta Sūtra* 1. 3, 28, *Manu-Saṃhitā* 1.21. That it follows from 'thought' is illustrated in the operation of the so-called icchā-śakti of the Yogin, in which a idea or thought-image, as soon as formed, may be externalised into a real material object; cf in *Yoga Vāsistha* (Nirvāna Prakaraṇa I. 82, 24) *viditātmano bhāvayanti yathaiiva yat/tat tathaiivaśu paśyanti dr̥dhabhāvanayā tayā//* To the grammarian the thought is the same as the object, with this difference that the former is an internal, while the latter is only an external aspect of one and the same Reality. The *thought* relates to the Universal in itself (abstract) as well as to the Universal revealed in the Individual (concrete) So with the *name*.

time (=production of individuals) follows. Naming and thinking being virtually an identical process, this manifestation of the Universals is the same as the revelation of Veda, which is nothing but the body of the eternal names and thoughts in eternal relation to the Universals.

The Veda, as thus understood, is really synonymous with Pratibhā. It is the self-revelation of the supreme Śabda, which in revealing itself reveals everything within it at the same time. Puṇyarāja (under *Vākyapadīya* 2.493) describes it as the purest form of Prajñā (*bhagavatī vidyā viśuddhaprajñā pratibhākhya*) and identifies it (1.14) with the Paśyanti stage of Vāk (*paśyantyaśkyā pratibhā*). It is eternal (*anapāyini*), undivided (*avibhāgā*) and devoid of succession (*akrama*), i.e., is of the nature of an intuition continuum. The supreme transcendent Śabda is as it were the dark back-ground of all manifestations and forms the Absolute of the grammarians. But the Paśyanti stage, though also eternal like Parā, differs from it in being, as its name indicates, luminous. Having realised this light by mode of spiritual culture to which the grammarian applies the term Vāgyoga, the self attains peace and may be said to have fulfilled its highest destiny. There is nothing left for it to strive after.¹ Indeed Paśyanti or Pratibhā represents the very essence of the self—the Inner Light of its Nature (*svarūpajyotirevāntah*). It is of an infinite variety according as it reveals the object as one with it or as distinct from but related to it or as it stands alone in its own glory.² In any way it is above

¹ avibhāgā tu paśyanti sarvataḥ sanhrtakramū/svarūpajyotire'vāntah sai'sā vāg anapāyini// sai'sā sañkīryamānū'pi mītvam āgantukairmalah/antya kale'va somasya nā'tyantam abhibhūyate/tasyām dṛṣtasvarūpūyām adhikāro nivartate/puruṣe sodāśakale tāmā'hur amṛtām kalām// (Quoted from comm. on *Vākyapadīya* under I. 145).

² paśyanti tu sū calācnapratibaddhasamāclhūnā sanniviṣṭajñeyākārū pravilīnākārā nrākārā ca paricchinnūrthapratyavabhāsū samṛstār'hapratyavabhāsū ca praśāntasarvūrthapratyavabhāsū ce'ty aparimitabhedā. (Comm. on *Vākyapadīya* I 145)

ceaseless flux of the phenomenal world, and whether conceived as the Pure One or as the One with the eternal and infinite Kalās held within, it is the highest end of human aspirations.

Puṅyarāja quotes a passage, apparently from an old Trika Āgama in which the Paśyanti or the Divine Pratibhā is described as the sixteenth (ṣoḍaśī) or the Immortal (Amṛtā) Kalā of the Moon, (i.e. the Self, Puruṣa). This Immortal Kalā is elsewhere known as daivī vāk.¹

Helārāja in introducing his commentary on the third *kāṇḍa* of *Vākyapadīya*, gives a beautiful description of Pratibhā. He says there that as soon as this celestial light dawns on the soul, the heart begins to taste of an ineffable joy that is not born of the senses and knows no fading, and the consciousness of divine majesty wells up from within in ever newer forms.² It is a state of beatitude in which the soul is wrapped in the veil of the supreme glory of the Highest.

This Pratibhā viz. Paśyanti, which is Veda proper, is subtle, eternal and supersensuous. On realisation of this, the Rṣiṣ, desirous of communicating it to the world, are said to have expressed it in the form of the so-called 'Vedas' and 'Vedāṅgas' (*bilma*), that is of articulate language.³ Hence it is declared to be the source of all sciences and arts. It is clear, therefore, and so it is asserted, that to the grammarian the term Pratibhā has the same connotation as the mystic Pranava which is

¹ cf. Bhavabhūti's benedictory line at the beginning of his *Uttararāmacarita* vandema devatām vācam amṛtām ātmānah kalām If this, the Paśyanti is the 16th or Pūrva (full) kalā as the extract cited by Puṅyarāja shows, the Parā of the grammarians would correspond to the 17th or Amā (Void) Kalā of the Tāntrikas.

² yasmin sanmukhatām prayāti ruciram ko'pyantarujrmbhate
nedīyan mahimā manasy abhinavaḥ pumsaḥ prakāśātmanah/
trptuḥ yat paramām tanoti visayāsvādam vinā śāśvatim
dhāmānandasudhāmāyorjitavapus tat prātibhaḥ samstumah//

³ yām sūksmām nityām atīndriyām vācam ṛṣayah sāksātkṛtadharmāno
mantrārṣaḥ paśyanti tām asāksātkṛtadharmābhyah parebhyah pratedayīṣyamāpāh
bilmam samāmananti. (Comm. on *Vākyapadīya* 1.5)

the essence of revealed literature and of human sciences¹ (*pravādāh*), which is the creator (*vidhātā*) of the worlds, the fount of all vidyās and mantras, and the matrix of all names and forms.² But as Pratibhā and Parā are the two eternal aspects of the same Vāk it is also intelligible why the Praṇava is sometimes, though rarely, used as synonym of the Parā.

It may be of interest to note here that the Vāk *qua* vācaka is the Sphoṭa and *qua* vācya is the Mahāsattā. Bhartṛhari says plainly that there is only One Supreme Object (*artha*), viz., Universal Being which is the true vācya of all words and which though indivisible and undivided appears as many (*bahurūpaḥ prakāśate*) by reason of the differentiation of its power (*śaktivibhāgena*). It is on this object as the background that the vikalpas of seer, seen and light are being constantly manifested. And similarly, he points out, there is one indivisible vācaka viz., the Eternal Light of Sphoṭas³ which reveals every vācya. Just as inspite of multiplicity in appearance the object (*artha*) is ultimately one, viz. Brahman conceived as Sattā,⁴ so the word (*śabda*) too is really one in the end viz. Brahman as Sphoṭa, and thus the two are identical in essence.⁵ Although we are employ-

¹ The word pravādāh means systems of thought devised by human intellect on the basis of, or independently of, revealed scriptures. These do not proceed from personal intuition on the part of their authors.

² *sa* (i.e. pranavaḥ) hi sarvaśabdārthaprakṛtiḥ.

³ The vācakatā of individual letters is denied. The real vācaka is either pada (according to Kaiyaṣa) or more properly vākya. Sphoṭa is essentially an indivisible vākya (*akhaṇḍavākya*) with a unity of its own.

⁴ cf. vācyā sā (i.e. sattā) sarvaśabdānām śabdāc ca na prthaktvataḥ/
aprthaktve'pi sambandhas tayor nānatmanor iva//

Also: ekasyaivā'tmano bhedo śabdārthāva'prthaksthitau//

⁵ The words sphoṭa and sattā refer obviously to the cit and sat aspects of the Supreme Lord, and mean the same thing as applied to the Lord. But they appear as distinct to the eye of Ignorance, the one as vācaka (or jñāna) and the other as vācya (or jñeya). This vācya-vācakabhāva of the One constitutes its multiplication. But we must bear in mind that this Many is eternal and simultaneously shining on the One in Paśyanti, but it is successive and subject to appearance and disappearance in Saṁsāra after its fall from the Paśyanti stage.

ing the terms *vācya* and *vācaka* in reference to one and the same Reality they convey here no sense, except that there is only one Reality which reveals Itself by means of Itself (for Śakti too is nothing distinct from this Reality). This self-revelation is *Pratibhā*.

Besides this primary meaning of *Pratibhā*, viz., Intuition or Revelation (as used in the mystic sense), there is another, a secondary one, which is also found in this literature. In this sense *Pratibhā* may be supposed to agree in its main features with the conception of instinct. Thus it is said that when we come in contact with an object which is felt to be pleasurable or painful something from within impels to go out towards the object in search of it or else to withdraw from it. Now this impulse is said to be due to *Pratibhā*, which stands, therefore, at the bottom of all our activities (*pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti*) and is the main-spring of our practical life (*sarvavyavahārayonih*). It is this flash from within which, revealing the truth (though perhaps subconsciously and in a dark mysterious way not analysable by the intellect), spontaneously determines the *itikartavyatā* of all creatures, so that even the movements of the beasts (*tiraścām api samārambhāh*) are ultimately traceable to its guiding influence. The class-instincts of certain animals which are so varied and so marvellous, are instances of the multifarious manifestations of *Pratibhā*. Being an innate unerring faculty, it does not require to be trained from outside. Though incommunicable and inexpressible in language, its existence and even its working is justified by the inner experience of every man (*pratyātmavṛttisiddhāh*). It rises spontaneously (*ayatnaja*) in the mind and would appear to the superficial observer to be quite of an accident. But

We should also remember that in the *Paśyanti* stage there is no *vibhāga* (actual split) or *krama* (succession) in *Vāk*. This stage is distinguished from the *Parā* in this only that It is aware of Itself,—whereas the *Parā* is beyond such self-awareness. To put the matter a little differently we may say that it is the self-awareness of *Parā* which is known as *Paśyanti*.

on closer examination it is found to be, so far as its manifestation in a definite manner is concerned, a result of continued effort (*abhyāsa*) in the past.

This explanation of our practical life by the principle of an innate sense named *Pratibhā* is opposed to the rationalistic view of Maṇḍana Mīśra, who, in his *Vidhiviveka*, lays down the principle that the only impetus to all conscious action is the *upāyajñāna* (adaptation of means to ends), without which no action would be possible.

But this objection of the *Mīmāṃsaka* is brushed aside by the grammarian on the ground that the principle of *upāyajñāna* can not be maintained in all the cases. Thus even when the right means to the accomplishment of an end are unknown and under circumstances unknowable even by the wise (*durjñānopāyeṣu ca prājñair api*), the end in question is observed to be successfully realised through the instincts of the animals. Even the learned man, for instance, with his accumulated experience, does not know the means whereby he may be able to modulate his voice exactly as the cuckoo does, so easily and gracefully on the advent of spring. The wonderful instincts of bees and ants are well-known. The *Vaiyākaraṇa* points these out as illustrations of his thesis that instinct and intuition are really far more potent faculties than the intellect or even the senses (*pramāṇebhyo'pi sāmāthyātīśayam pratibhāyāḥ*). Besides, these never err while the accredited means of right (?) knowledge are known to be deceptive on occasions. It is further added, in repudiation of the *Mīmāṃsaka's* theory, that the *upāyajñāna*, which arises directly from repeated personal observation (*asakṛddarśana*) and indirectly from the testimony of others (*upadeśa*), is not capable of explaining what the instincts actually accomplish.

Regarding the origin, or rather the manifestation of instinct, the grammarian accepts the conclusion of the *Yoga* system and connects it with the question of ante-

natal dispositions. It is well-known that every karman or experience leaves behind it a definite samskāra, a trace which remains impressed in a subtle state on the citta. The saṃsāra being without beginning, these saṃskāras are numerically infinite and exist from eternity in the citta. Some of these are known as vāsanās and serve, when awakened by a stimulus, as psychological antecedents to memory and recognition. But there are others called karmāśayas which determine the formation of a particular kind of corporeal existence, i.e., rebirth, as a particular being fitted with a particular organic vehicle. Thus the karmāśaya, as a bundle of similar samskāras grouped together, appears at the dying moment of the individual under the influence of his predominant thought of the moment; this is the so-called prārabdha, the seed which explains the nature of the next birth, with the joy and sorrows of that life and the term of its continuation. Instincts peculiar to the particular species are also evolved out of the stock from which prārabdha originates. Prior karma being the determinant of both birth and instincts, it is easy to see how certain saṃskāras are intimately associated with certain forms of existence.

IV

THE ĀGAMAS : ŚAIVA ŚAKTA SCHOOLS

In the Tāntrika literature, however, the doctrine of Pratibhā finds a brilliant and elaborate treatment. The whole of Mantraśāstra is indeed full of interesting matter bearing upon this question. But as we cannot fully examine, within the narrow limits of this paper, the various currents and cross-currents of thought with which the history of the doctrine is closely interwoven, we consider it more expedient to attempt only a brief exposition of the salient features of the doctrine, avoiding the

quicksands of controversy as far as possible. And this we shall do on the basis of the Trika and Tripurā literatures. But as these two literatures are very intimately connected and present very few points of difference (except in rituals) we may take them together.

As in the Vyākaraṇa, so in Tantra proper, the doctrine of Vāk plays a very important part and the study of Pratibhā is really the study of this Vāk, so far as its place in this literature is concerned.

But we must bear in mind at the outset the fundamental distinction between the two rival systems of thought in order that no confusion may arise. The Supreme Reality is conceived in Vyākaraṇa in terms of Śabda or Vāk (cf. *anādimidhanam brahma śabdatattvam yad akṣaram*), so that to the Vaiyākaraṇa the difference between Śabda Brahman and Para Brahman is in reality a difference without any distinction. To him the two represent the two aspects of the same Supreme Śabda: accordingly, the so-called Śabda Brahman is synonymous with Paśyanti and Para Brahman with Parā. But in Āgama the Parā Vāk occupies a subordinate position, being conceived as the Power of the Supreme Reality or Parama Śiva, and would thus seem to correspond to Śabda-Brahman while Parama Śiva and Para Brahman would be identical. Though there is admittedly no essential difference between Paśyanti and Parā in Vyākaraṇa or between Parā Vāk and Parama Śiva in Āgama, there is no denying the fact that there is some slight difference between the two systems regarding the character of Vāk, in so far as one holds it to be independent and self-subsistent, while the other makes it a power subordinate to the substance with which it is identical.

In other words, Vāk, according to Āgama is the Supreme Power of Parama Śiva—the Power, ever in association with Him, of His eternal self-contemplation and self-revelation. Though identical in essence with the Godhead and not separable from it, it is nevertheless

distinguishable and is real. It is the Power whereby the Divine Self knows Itself and enjoys Itself eternally, without restraints and without limitations. It is the will of the Absolute and the personality of the Impersonal, if we may use these expressions. The Āgamas speak of it under various aspects, viz., Vimarśa (Word, Logos), Sphurattā (Self-illumination), Aiśvarya (Lordship) Svātantrya (Freedom), and Parā'hantā¹ (Supreme Personality).

This Vāk is said to be two-fold according as it relates to the primary object (*mukhya artha*), viz., the Pure Light of Cit or the Absolute Unity, free from all kinds of limitations or to the contingent object, viz., the Universe (*viśva*), which is multiple and is limited by various conditions, such as universal, quality, action, name &c. The first is called *pratyavamarśa* or *vimarśa* proper and the second *vikalpa*.²

The usual classification of Vāk as fourfold is also recognised. The Parā seems to me to stand really for that aspect of the Vāk when it is one with Parama Śiva and is transcendent. The Paśyanti represents the Vimarśa, and the remaining two, viz. *madhyamā* and *vaikharī* are only cases of *vikalpa*.

As Vimarśa means the self-revelation of the Lord (*prakāśasyā'tmaviśrūntih*) it is intelligible that it is another name of Pratibhā, with which, in the system of grammatical philosophy, Paśyanti has been shown to be synonymous. And this is borne out by the description of Pratibhā found in the literature.

Thus in the *Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya* (p. 52) Kṣemarāja quotes a verse³ in which Pratibhā is identified with the supreme subject, whose nature is infinite intelligence

¹ cf. *Vivṛpāksapañcāśikā* isvaratā kartṛtvam svatantratā citsvarūpatā ce'ti/
ete cā'hantāyāḥ paryāyāḥ sambhuno'cyante//

See also *Nāgānandasūtra* as cited by Bhaskarāya in the *Guptāvati*.

² See Rāmakanthācārya's *Vivṛti* on the *Spandakārikā*, p 141.

³ yā ca'ṣṭhā pratibhā tattatpadārthakramarūpāt/
akramānantacidrūpaḥ pramātā sa maheśvaraḥ//

(*anantacidrūpa*), indivisible and void of time-limitations (*akrama*). It is unalterably and everywhere One, being the one Light whose reflection shines through every state of modal consciousness. The Yogin reaches this plane of Divine Vāk when he succeeds in shaking off the fetters of bondage. Omniscience and Omnipotence, among other divine attributes, are manifested in him as matters of course. His will becomes paramount and invincible. The *Spandakārikā* (4-7) says that everything, however remote in time and removed in space, presents itself to such a Yogin in any aspect in which he wants to see it present. During the period of *ekstasis*, and even afterwards (if the Yogin happens to have reached perfection), the self loses its limitations and becomes unified with the entire universe, so that the mere rise of the will with reference to a particular object suffices to bring it into manifestation (cf. *Rāmakaṇṭha* pp. 107-8). The state of the Yogin, thus abiding in the Reality and pervading All, is technically known as *rahasyamudrā*—a state, in which he enjoys rest, freedom and joy, with all his desires fulfilled; and the solitude in which he lives is the supreme solitude of union with Reality.

The *Tripurā Rahasya*, the *magnum opus* of the Tripurā system of philosophical thought, speak exactly in the same strain. It describes *Pratibhā* as the supreme form of the Ultimate Reality (*parā sā pratibhā devyāḥ param rūpam mame'ritam*)¹ and says that it is on this, as on a mirror, that the Universe is shining like a reflection. It appears to the ignorant as the objective world and to the Yogin it reveals itself in the form of the eternal and indeterminate consciousness of the Pure Self. The lover turns to it as to his beloved and finds the inmost cravings of his heart satisfied.²

¹ *Tripurā Rahasya Jñānakhaṇḍa*, ch. xx, verse 86.

² *Ibid.*, ch. xx 81-86.

V

VEDĀNTA

The word Pratibhā seldom occurs in Vedāntic literature but the doctrine was certainly recognised. In the ninth *anuvāka* of his *Vārttika* on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (the only instance in which the term Pratibhā is found in Vedānta), Sureśvara mentions it by name (*prātibhajñāna*) and calls it *ārṣa*, thereby implying that this knowledge, by nature transcendent, is the characteristic of ṛṣis or seers,¹ and it is further stated there that it comes into manifestation only to that seeking soul, who, by means of constant repetition of mantra and of prolonged meditation, is able to throw off the veil of Māyā and enter into conscious communion with the Supreme Being.² By way of illustration it is pointed out that such an intuition dawned upon Triśanku (*triśankor brahmabhūtasya hy'ārṣam sandarśanam param*) to whom the mantra viz. *aham vṛkṣasya rerivā* (*Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* 7-10-1. p. 732 of the Bib. Ind. Edition) was revealed. And in consequence of this manifestation of Pratibhā, Triśanku was converted into a ṛṣi.

A proper understanding of this conversion is not possible without consideration of the general theory of Divine Omniscience in this system. It is asserted that human omniscience is accidental, being the result of a *rapport* with the Divine substance which is all-knowing and all-powerful. But what is the nature of this Divine Wisdom?

Here we are confronted with a wide divergence of views among scholars. Even in the system of Śaṅkara

¹ Acyutarāya Modaka, in his commentary on the *Jivanmuktiviveka* (p. 52.) explains the word *ārṣa* as meaning 'proceeding from Veda, which is self-illuminated' (*svayamprabhāta veda*)¹. This meaning is derived from the equation $\text{rṣi} = \text{Veda}$

² Cf. also *mumukṣoḥ tatparasya'iva śrautasmarṭesu karmasu./*

apī ca prātibham jñānam āvīrbhavatī mokṣadam//

(*Vārttika*, verse 160 *anuvāka* IX)

there is hardly any unanimity; and the exponents of orthodox Vedānta who are presumed to represent Śankara are very largely divided in their opinions. Thus in the *Siddhāntaleśa*, Appayadīkṣita quotes no less than five different theories on the question of Divine Omniscience, viz., the theories associated with the names of the authors of *Prakaṣārtha*, *Tattva-Śuddhi* and *Kaṁmudī* and of Bhāratī-tirtha and Vācaspati Mīśra.

Among these, the view of *Tattva Śuddhi* is opposed to the traditional teaching of all the mystics and may be dismissed as untenable. The Divine knowledge being everywhere recognised as immediate, the author of *Tattvaśuddhi* stands by himself when he asserts it to be of the nature of memory in the case of the past and of *Uha* (as it is named in the *Vedāntasiddhāntasūktimañjari*) in that of the future. He fails to see that the knowledge of a Being which is *ex hypothesi* eternal¹ and omnipresent can hardly be characterised as anything but immediate. But the view of *Prakaṣārthavivaraṇa* is more plausible in this respect. It states that God's immediate knowledge of the multiple phenomena of all times is explicable through the reflection of Pure Consciousness received into the infinite modifications of Māyā. This Māyā, like the inner organ of jīva, is the limiting condition of Īśvara; in other words, it is through association with Māyā that Īśvara, himself identical with consciousness (*jñānātmaka*), is capable of becoming the subject of consciousness (*jñātā*). This view is alright, so far as immediacy is concerned. But it loses sight of the fact,

¹ It is curious to find that even in scholastic Vedānta the eternity of Divine omniscience is sometimes impugned. Advaitānanda, for instance, in the *Brahma-vidyābharana* (p. 148) explicitly affirms that during pralaya there is a total lapse of such omniscience, apparently for the reason that it is only a mode and therefore a product which is by nature occasional. But how are we to understand Śankara's own lines: *Yatprasādād'hi yogināmapy atitānāgataviṣayaṁ pratyaksam jñānam-icchanti yogasāstravidāḥ kṁu vaktavyam tasya nityasiddhasye'śvarasya spṣtisthiti-samhrtviṣayam nityajñānam bhavattī* (under *Ved. Sūtr.* 1.1.5)? If the nityajñāna be taken as svarūpajñāna why should it be characterised as saviṣayaka? It is only a vṛtti which can be saviṣayaka.

as pointed out by the author of *Vedāntakaumudī*, that God's omniscience is *not* a case of relative and adventitious consciousness which ceases during pralaya. It is rather due to His Essence which is consciousness itself. He knows all because, says the author of *Kaumudī*, He illumines all in relation with Himself. But does this All embrace the past and future? To this it is replied that it does. The past and the future exists in Avidyā in the form of bare, immaterial samskāras and are knowable. This reply of the *Kaumudī* would remind one of the theory of satkārya of Sāṅkhya-Yoga school and especially of the *Sūtra* of Patañjali. IV. 12. But in its general setting it seems to be somewhat of a graft upon the system. And one great defect from which this theory suffers is that it interprets omniscience as impersonal (*sarvajñātrtva* = *sarvajñānātmakatva*)—an interpretation, however plausible, is not supported by the tradition of Śāṅkara Vedānta. Vācaspati is right, therefore, when he says that omniscience must be personal and explains that even Absolute Consciousness may be personal, when thought of under relation of causality. The theory of Bhāratī-tīrtha, on the other hand, seeks to explain the omniscience of God on the assumption of His being the witness of the infinite vāsanās of jīvas as inhering in and modifying the Primitive Nescience (*ajñāna*).

All these views are centred on the fundamental thesis of Śāṅkarācārya, viz., that omniscience, omnipotence, etc. are not *really* predicable of the Supreme Being. It is after and through the operation of Cosmic Nescience that these are attributed to Him. Since His essence is knowledge itself, it is only by a metaphor that He may be called all-knowing. Omniscience and omnipotence are, therefore, pseudo-real concepts and not real. Śāṅkara plainly says: *tad evam avidyātmakopādhiparicchedāpekṣam evēśvarasyeśvaratvam sarvajñatvam sarvasaktitvañ ca, na paramārthato vidyayā'pāstasarvopādhisvarupa ātmani-ṣītrīṣitavyasarvajñatvādīvyavahāra upapadyate.* (under

Ved. Sūtra 2.1.14.) This is the central teaching of Śaṅkarācārya, viz., the denial of the reality of Śakti (Power) and with it of personality and self-consciousness in the Absolute. The Saguṇa Brahman, of course, is admitted to be personal, and consequently omniscience and omnipotence belong to Him, but then it must be remembered that the Reality, in the highest sense of the word (*pāramārthikatva*), of the saguṇa aspect is not conceded. In the system of Śaṅkara, there appears to be an impassable chasm between the two aspects of Brahman. But in regard to the question whether human omniscience, viz., that of the Yogins, has its origin in the divine omniscience, Śaṅkara emphatically answers in the affirmative (cf. *yatprasādādḍhi yogināmapy'atītānāgataviṣayaṃ pratyakṣam icchanti* etc. under *Ved. Sūtra* 1.1.5).¹

Śrīkantha and the subsequent host of commentators on Vedānta have not felt any such difficulty in interpreting the doctrine of divine (and human) omniscience. Their position is more clear on this point. They admit the existence of a *real* Śakti in Brahman and affirm that knowledge is as much the essence (*svarūpa*) of Brahman as its power or predicate (*śaktidharma*). Śrīkantha observes that the omniscience of Brahman consists in its eternal, immediate and faultless awareness of everything independently of external sense-organs² and notes that this is possible by virtue of the supreme Jñāna Śakti (called *Umā* or *Cidambarā*) associated with it. It is to this Jñāna Śakti that the word *manas*, as used in the expression *mana ānandam*, (an epithet of Brahman) is said to refer, so that it means the faculty by which God as well as the liberated souls eternally enjoy the infinite (*niratiśaya*) joy of their beatified nature (*svarūpā-*

¹ This passage shows plainly that according to Śaṅkara the knowledge of God, like that of the Yogin, is *immediate, pratyakṣa*. The theory of *Tattvasūddhi* therefore is not only erroneous, but positively opposed to the teaching of Śaṅkara.

² *nityāparokṣānepekṣita vāhyakarananiskalankānubhavanikhilavastutvam idam sarvajñātvam* (under *Ved Sūt.*, 1.1.2).

nandānubhavasādhana) and which is indeed no other than the Sabda Brahman or Pranava.¹ From this it is obvious that in the opinion of Śrīkantha the divine omniscience is synonymous with the eternal self-illumination and self-revelation of the Supreme Being, for the All (*sarva, nikhilavastu*) which such omniscience is stated to comprehend and illuminate is not external to, but forms an integral aspect of, this Being.

The theory of Rāmānuja and of his immediate predecessors in the field is not substantially very different from the above.² He employs the term Puruṣottama as a special name of Brahman, thereby implying personality and will in Him. He describes Brahman as the all-knowing subject whose essence is intelligence and whose eternal power of knowledge (known as Lakṣmī) is intimately related to Him. This power (*śakti*) or attribute (*dharma*) of God is sometimes spoken of as His Mind by which everything is always revealed to Him immediately (*dharmabhūtajñanena sarvām sadā sākṣātkurvata īśvarasya. etc.*)³ and sometimes as His consort.

Like Śrīkantha and Rāmānuja all the subsequent commentators posit an eternal real Śakti in the Supreme Being and explain the facts of omniscience and omnipotence by means of this Śakti.

¹ Śrīkantha in the plainest language, asserts the identity of Umā or the Supreme Power of Divine Knowledge with the mystic Onkāra pranavaparyāyeno'-māśabdena paraprakṛtirūpā parāśaktir ucyate (*Ved Sūt 4422*).

² jñānasya rūpasyai'va tasya jñānāśrayatvam manidyumanidīpādīvaḍ yuktam eva (p 53 of *Śrībhāṣya* Srīrangam Edition)

³ Varavara's commentary on *Tattvatraya*, p 44 This is śuddha, pure sattva and is to be distinguished from the natural sattva, which even in its purest condition is bound to have an admixture, however slight, of the two lower qualities. The pure sattva constitutes the Divine Mind just as the mixed sattva forms the lower mind, with this difference that it is, unlike the latter, eternal and infinite. It is this which under God's will evolves into an infinite variety of forms,

VI

MIMĀMSĀ (PŪRVA)

From the foregoing summary of the orthodox views on intuition and omniscience (human and divine) as well as from the Buddhist and Jaina accounts of the same to which we shall advert in the following pages, it would seem that the doctrine of Pratibhā, in some form or other, has ever been an article of universal acceptance in this country. It is an anomaly, therefore, that we find the Mīmāṃsakas alone maintaining an attitude of bitter opposition to this doctrine. They deny the possibility of omniscience of any kind, either eternal as of God or what is due to contemplation as in the case of the Yogins.¹ The arguments adduced by them in support of their denial² seem to be no more than the stale stock-in-trade arguments with which the common empirical sense of man seeks to overthrow the dictates of the higher mystic consciousness. There must be some deeper reason for the denial. The philosophical position of Mīmāṃsā in relation to the other systems must be determined in order to see if we can discover some rationale of this denial. It is evident that the doctrine of omniscience does not

¹ See *Śloka-vārttika*, pp. 79-82.

² For Jayanta's refutation of some of these arguments, see *Nyāyamañjarī* pp. 103-106. Kumārila is very hard upon those mystics who hold that in the gradual exaltation of consciousness there comes a moment when the restriction of senses to their corresponding objects (*visayananyama*) is no longer applicable. He plainly denies not only the power of sense-organ to apprehend an object which is not relevant to it (*na rūpe śrotavṛttitā*), but even the possibility of there being a central faculty capable of cognising all objects (*ekena tu pramāṇena sarvajñāḥ*, etc. *Śloka-vārttika* p. 80). This is nothing but the common-sense view. But it is not tenable for the mystic consciousness cf. the Śruti *ghrānataḥ śabdān śmṛvanti prsthato rūpāni paśyanti*. With this Vedic passage may be compared the statement of Saint Martin. "I heard bowers that sounded and saw notes that shone". In regard to Kumārila's objection to the assumption of a central faculty one is reminded of Edward Carpenter's own experience of the mystic consciousness in which as he says "All the senses unite into one sense" (See Underhill's *Mysticism*, p. 8).

somehow fit in with the fundamental assumptions with which the system as a whole starts.

It seems to me that the conception of Śabda or Veda as eternal and impersonal lies at the bottom of the Mīmāṃsaka's whole tenor of thought. From this may be deduced as corollaries many of the views which the system sets forth. The unbroken continuity of world-cycles, the doctrine of self-validity of knowledge, the theory of its causality etc., all these will be found, when closely analysed, to follow from this central conception. The rejection of omniscience may also have something to do with this very fact. According to Mīmāṃsā, it would appear, omniscience is not compatible with personality which is held to be a limitation. The very fact of being a subject involves the inevitable relativity of consciousness, fatal to omniscience; and moreover, when Veda is already assumed to be the eternal source of all knowledge, impersonal and self-revealed, it would be superfluous to posit a Personal All-knowing Being, either human or divine (cf. *āgamaśya ca nityatve siddhe tatkalpanā vr̥thā. Ślokavārttika* p. 82.).

But what are we to understand by the first benedictory verse of *Ślokavārttika*, where Kumārila speaks of the Supreme Being under the name of Mahādeva and describes Him as furnished with the Divine Eye (*divyacakṣus*) in the form of the three Vedas? The meaning of the verse is obvious and even Pārthasārathi who suggested an explanation in consonance with the Mīmāṃsā position could not deny that it really referred to Mahādeva (*viśveśvaram mahādevam*) and therefore to a personal God. The identification of Divyacakṣus with Veda is quite in keeping with the mystical explanation of Veda which is in its essence equivalent to Praṇava and therefore to Pratibhā which is the Divine Eye in the highest sense of the word. The śloka, therefore, as coming from an orthodox Mīmāṃsaka teacher, remains unintelligible.

VII

BUDDHISM

In the Buddhist philosophical literature, so far as I am aware, the term *Pratibhā* is not generally found. But the word *Prajñā* is most frequent, and it occurs there with many of the associations which attach to the word in Patañjali's system.

It is asserted that the ultimate Truth (*paramārtha satya*), the realisation of which is an essential condition for freedom from pain, is not amenable to any of the human sources of knowledge—to the senses or even to reason; but it reveals itself in the light of Supreme Wisdom which arises from contemplation and quietude (*samādhi*, *śamatha*). Contemplation is declared to be the only means for gaining *Prajñā*, i.e., knowledge of things as they are in themselves as distinguished from what they appear to us.¹ Though the world (*loka*) has little concern with such knowledge, it is considered to be the only way to Deliverance. As in Yoga, so in Buddhism, *Prajñā* is supposed to consist of a series of successive stages, in the last of which it becomes absolutely spotless and calm.

The *Prajñā* is sometimes conceived as an eye (*prajñācakṣus*), which is said to develop itself when the mind is purified by *samādhi*.² In the technical phraseology of the Buddhist literature, the term *prajñācakṣus* does not seem to represent *prajñā* in its entirety but only in one of its aspects, and in this way the different stages of *prajñā* are found represented by corresponding supernatural eyes, viz., (i) *dharmacakṣus*, (ii) *divyacakṣus*, (iii) *Prajñācakṣus* and (iv) *buddhacakṣus*.³

¹ *Yathāvasthitapratītyasamutpannavastutattvaparcayalaksanā prajñā*, *Boddhicaryāvatārapañcikā*, p. 348

² *Śamathapariśodhitacittasantāne prajñāyāḥ prādurbhāvāt suprasodhitakṣetre śasyaṅspattivat loc. cit.*, of the Yoga view which is similar. (*Yoga Sūtra*, 1.90).

³ In the list of the five eyes as given by Childers (S V. Pañcacakṣu) we read

In Pāli literature, the word *dhammacakkhu* (spiritual insight), also known as *vipassanā*, is used for the dawn-ing of the spiritual sense in man on conversion. When this is fully developed, the convert is established in the fruit of '*soṭāpatti*' and the first stage comes to an end. This eye is characterised as a faculty of true knowledge, undisturbed by *rajas* (*virajam*) and free from obscurity (*vītamalam*). How this faculty is to be distinguished from the so-called divine eye—(*divvacakkhu*) does not seem to be quite clear (cf. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues*, p. 95 footnote). That both are supernormal is, of course, plain. But it is sometimes asserted that *divvacakkhu* is able to see visible objects only, though such objects may not be ordinarily within the scope of our faculty of vision (cf. *Kathāvatthu*). In the *Abhidhammāvatāra* also it is said that *divvacakkhu* has *rūpa* for its object¹ as *divvasota* has sound (*śabda*). The fit objects of the celestial sight are held to be of four kinds, viz. things present (*paccuppanna*) as well as absent (*paritta*), external and internal (*loc. cit.* p. 110 verse 1153). This eye is defined as the knowledge (and its faculty) which rises on the *citta* when, in the fourth stage of *jhāna*, it is identified with the object.²

Besides these two faculties there is the *paññācakkhu* (*prajñācakṣus*) which is held in the *Itivuttaka* (p. 52, § 61) to be higher than the *divvacakkhu*.

Buddhadatta, however, divides *cakkhus* first into two classes, viz., *māmsa* (physical) and *paññā* (super-

samantā cakkhu instead of Dhamma, but the name *dhammacakkhu* is sometimes retained. It is there described as the power of knowing general things possessed by the Buddha. In the *Nyāyaratnākara*, (p. 80) Pārthasārathi Mīśra refers to the view according to which *divvacakkhu* is the faculty of Buddha's omniscience. *buddhapratyaksam divyacaksurjanitam sarvavisayam bhaviṣyati*.

² In this sense it corresponds to the *avadhi-jñāna* and *darśana* of Jaina Philosophy.

³ *atthasādhakacittam tam catutthajjhānikam matam/tam cittasāmyutañ jñānam divyacakkhūti buccati* (*Abhidhammāvatāra*, p. 107, verse 1100). For the manner how this eye is developed see *Ibid.* pp. 106-107 and Shwe Zam Aung in his *Introductory Essay to the Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 63.

natural), of which the latter is fivefold: (i) *Buddha*, (ii) *Dhamma*, (iii) *Samanta*, (iv) *Nāna* and (v) *Divva*. From what he says of these powers of supernatural knowledge it seems that it (i) consists in the realisation of *āśayas* and *anusāyas* which are supersensible, (ii) means knowledge of the three-fold path, (iii) stands for omniscience, (iv) indicates the Eye that is evolved (after conversion?) and (v) *divvacakkhu* is synonymous with the Supreme Wisdom or *Prajñā* which arises from *abhiññā-citta* (p. 65 chap. X, 635-639).

In the Sanskrit Buddhist literature also, the same fivefold division is to be met with.¹ And in the *Mahāvastu* it is pointed out that in vision by the physical eye (*māmsa*) light is needed; but in the function of the other eyes it is not necessary.² *Divyacaksus* is said to be better than that of the gods etc. *Dharmacaksus* is characterised by the development of ten psychic powers (including the purity of the *Divyacaksus*). But all these powers pale before the Buddha Eye which is equivalent to Absolute and Unconditional Omniscience.

There is of course much confusion on the exact significance of the terms in Buddhist literature, for, in course of time and for various reasons, imports have gradually changed. But one thing is certain, viz., that we find everywhere recognised the existence of a higher faculty than the physical sense and that it is resorted to for explaining facts otherwise inexplicable. The physical sense is often erroneous and subject to various limitations; its reports are unreliable. But this higher faculty, call it *prajñācaksus* or by any other name, is infallible and sees things in their light.

¹ See *Vaṅgachhedikā* XVIII; *Dharmasaṅgraha* LXVII, p. 14, *Lalitavistara* Mitra's translation, p. 15; *Mahāvastu*, Vol. I.

² Swami Hanharānanda Ārya, in his *Śvadhyaṅga Brahmācārī'r apūva bhāṣana vṛttānta*, (p. 80) points out that there are two ways of having supernatural vision, viz. in the solar or in the lunar light. The former is the light of *suṣumnā* and the latter the manifestation of sense-power. In the first case also physical light is not needed.

Here a curious parallelism presents itself between the Buddhist philosophy and the Yoga system of Patañjali. Thus it is said that Prajñā as a means (*hetubhūta*) viz. the realisation of the noble eight-fold path, leads to Prajñā which may be considered as the End (*phalabhūta*), viz., Nirvāṇa. The former is the result of continued practice of the preliminary Prajñā consisting in śruta, cintā and bhāvanā.¹ This śruta, cintā and bhāvanā are really nothing but the Buddhist counterparts of śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana of the Upanisadic literature and of āgama, anumāna and dhyānābhyāsa of *Yoga-bhāṣya*² and the Prajñā or realisation of the path (*mārgajñāna*) of Buddhism corresponds to the realisation (*sāksātkāra*, *darśana*) of Vedānta and to the Yoga of the Yoga system.

Now the question is: how is omniscience compatible in Buddhism with its doctrine of flux on the one hand (Realism and Idealism) and of Void on the other (Nihilism)? The Yoga system advocates the *sat-kāryavāda* and is consequently able to explain the rationale of its intuitive experience on the ground that in its view all the products, however widely separated by time and space, are eternally co-existing in the *Primum Materia* (*mūlā prakṛtiḥ*). They are manifested as soon as the barriers, which stands in the way of their manifestation before consciousness, are withdrawn. Patañjali, in most unequivocal terms, expresses his belief that the past and the future are essentially existent.³ That they are not usually *seen* is due to some defect in the seer (viz. *āvarana*) and not to their non-existence. But in the doctrine of Universal Flux, such as that of Buddhism, in which a permanent substrate of change is not admitted,

¹ Cf. *Bodhicaryāvatārapañcīkā*, pp. 349-350; Takakusu, *It-sing*, p. 163

² āgamenā'numānena dhyānābhyāsarasena ca/

tridhā prakalpāyan prajñām labhate yogam uttamam.//

under *Yoga Sūtra* I 48.

³ aṭītanāgatam svarūpato'sty adhvabhedād dharmānām. Ibid, IV. 12.

there is logically no room for the past or for the future. And as a matter of fact we find that the advocates of the orthodox Theravāda School actually reject the theories of the seceders (e.g. Sarvāstivādins), holding that the past and the future exist and (cf. Andhakas) that the future may be known.²

Still the fact has to be explained that the Buddha, if none else, was believed to be able to make predictions and to know anything however remote in time, if only he willed so.

Thus the *Milinda Pañho* expressly declares in an interesting passage;³ that the Buddha was verily omniscient, in the sense that nothing stood in the way of his knowledge, so that whenever he wanted to know any object he used to reflect upon it (*āvajjitvā*) and at once the object revealed itself to his mind. It is the mysterious power of the Buddha Eye that it can penetrate into any time.⁴ Nothing can obscure its vision. In this connection one is also reminded of the interesting description (in Āsvaghosa's *Buddhacarita*, chap. XIV) of the Divine Eye (*divyacakṣus*) which the Buddha is said to have gained in course of contemplation during the second watch of the memorable night on his overthrow of

¹ Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, 1-6.

² For the orthodox view cf. footnote 4 of the translation of the *Kathāvatthu* p. 182—(V.8)

³ āma mahārāja bhagavā sabbaññu na ca bhagavato sataṃ samitam nānadassanāṃ paccupatthitam, āvajjanaparibaddha bhagavato savvannutañānam, āvajjitvā yadicchakam jānāti (Therckser's Edition of *Milinda-pañho*, p. 102).

The two kinds of omniscience as implied in this passage correspond exactly to those of the Yukta and Yujāna Yogins as described in the *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, *kārikā*, 66.

⁴ Knowledge of the past and the future is among the 18 things accruing to a Sādhaka, according to *Mahāvamsa*, when the Buddha eye is opened for him. Even lower down, dhammacakkhu and divvacakkhu are capable of such vision into the past or into the future. The fact of Buddha's *jāti-smarātā* (memory of ante-natal births), so frequently described in the Piṭakas and considered as one of the eight fruits of dhyāna or of the powers arising from the development of dhammacakkhu or as one of the five (or six) abhiññās, lends support to the supposition that the veil of Time did not exist for Buddha.

Māra. By that wonderful faculty of vision, he saw the entire knowledge world (universe), as if reflected in a clear mirror: *tatas tena sa divyena pariśuddhena caksuṣā/ dadarśa nikhilam lokam ādarśa' va nirmale//* (verse 8). Emphasis is here upon the word *nikhilam* which implies freedom from all limitations, temporal as well as spatial, and indicates that the vision was simultaneous.

It is really a difficulty which Buddhism (at least its earlier school) does not seem to have successfully solved. All attempted solutions are but make-shifts and show no way out of the contradictions involved.

VIII

JAINISM

In the Jaina philosophy, however, no such difficulty arises. Here the fact of omniscience, including the lower faculties of bare clairvoyance, thought-reading etc., claimed for the Lord who possesses it eternally and for the *jīvas* who gain it after a striving, lends itself to an easy explanation. For it is admitted that the *jīva* is eternal, that the universe as such is eternal (though subject to change) and that the *jīva*'s knowledge of this universe is also eternal. Even the past and the future objects of knowledge are *existent* (*atītānāgatānām arthūnām vartamānakālasambandhitayā'bhāve'pi atītānāgata-kālasambandhitayā bhāvāt*)¹ Absence of the object from the senses is not a barrier to its being known supernormally; it is the limitation of senses alone that they cannot cognise things not present to them, but in the case of higher perception or intuition, which is not sense-born, the assumption of such limitation is not justified by experience. At any rate, it is admitted that whether present or absent, every object has an existence of its own.

¹ Bhaṭṭa Anantakīrti, *Laghusarvajñāsiddhi*, p 127,

This intuitive experience is said to be two-fold. (i) relative and imperfect (*vikala*), and (ii) absolute and perfect (*sakala*). In the first case the intuition is known as *avadhiññāna* or *avadhidarśana* when its object is a physical substance (*rūpin* or *mūrtadravya*)¹ and as *manahparyāya* when it discerns the thoughts of another mind, and in the second case it is exalted into the supreme level and is called *kevalaññāna* or *kevaladarśana* which is a characteristic of the Arhat. Leaving aside the thought-reading for the present, we may observe that both *avadhiññāna* (*ohināna* in Prākṛt) and *kevalaññāna* are free from the obstructions of time and space, but with this difference that whereas the former is also to cognise only the physical, the latter is directed to both the physical and super-physical (*nikhīladravyaparyāyasākṣāt-kūrisvarūpa*) and is simultaneous (*mūrtāmūrtasamastavastugatasattāsāmānya sakalapratyakṣarūpenai'-kasamaye paśyati*)² It need hardly be added that this *kevalaññāna* and *darśana* are the synonyms of Prati-bhā, Prajñā etc. of the other systems.

According to Jaina philosophy omniscience or the possession of the faculty of Absolute Knowledge and Supreme Vision is an eternal property (being also the essence) of the soul, which it has apparently lost or allowed to be obscured under the influence of a beginningless series of karmas, hence known as a veil of knowledge and vision (*ññānāvaranīya* and *darśanāvaranīya*).³ By means of spiritual culture this veil may be withdrawn,

¹ Devasūri in *Pramāṇanayatatvālokānākāra*, 2.21 says that *avadhiññāna* is *natural* to gods and hell-beings (*bhavapratyaya*) but may be *acquired* by men and beasts (*gunapratyaya*)

² It may be noted that *avadhiññāna* may sometimes be falsified (*vibhañgīvaññ*), and is always relative, but *avadhidarśana*, though equally relative is ever truthful. It is *kevalaññāna* and *kevaladarśana* alone which are in every sense absolute and perfect, the distinction between *ññāna* and *darśana* is emphasised in both the Buddhist and Jaina philosophical literature and it seems that the former corresponds to *savikalpaka* and the latter to the *nirvikalpaka* *ññāna* of the orthodox systems

³ See Brahmadeva's commentary on *Dravyasamgraha*, p. 6,

and in proportion to its withdrawal the soul will regain its lost knowledge until at last, when all the karmas are destroyed, it will become once more omniscient (and omnipotent), being established in its pure and eternal essence.

But what is the nature of this culture which helps in lifting up the veil? To this no definite reply can be given. Different systems, of course, prescribe different methods, but all agree in asserting the paramount importance of Yoga and certain physical austerities. It is said that by these Yogic practices, a tremendous amount of energy, called *tejoleśyāh* (akin to electricity and magnetism) is generated in the body.¹ This is of the nature of a fiery force which, when sufficiently purified by continued practice, burns up the cobwebs of the veiling karmas. In the *Uvāsagadasāo*, for instance, it is narrated that with the gradual purification and intensification of his personal magnetism by penances the *āvaranakarmas* were removed and clairvoyant sight dawned upon Ānanda.² This *āvaranakarma* which conceals reality is referred to in the *Yogasūtra* (II.52) under the name of *prakāśāvarana* and we can understand that the dawning of the intuitive sense is consequent upon the clearing up of these veiling mists. Carried to its utmost extent, this process of purification naturally ends in the establishment of the power of all-knowledge.

IX

ITIHĀSA PURĀNA AND PROSE LITERATURE

In the *Mahābhārata* the word Pratibhā occurs several times; and the context shows that it conveyed

¹ Cf. Hoerule's translation of *Uvāsaga* p. 50 note 140.

² ānandassa lesāhim visujkramāññim tadāvaranijñānam karmānam svaovasameṇam ohnāne samuppanne. (Hoerule's edition p. 33).

the same sense in which we find it used in the Yoga system of Patañjali. Thus in *Sāntiparvan* (chap. 316.14)¹ it is contrasted with Apavarga, thereby implying that it was conceived as an impediment in the way of final release (cf. *Yoga Sūtra*. 3.37). Elsewhere (chap. 239.24)² it is expressly enjoined that it is not an acquisition worth coveting, evidently in view of the possible distractions which it may occasion, so that as soon as this power of all-knowledge begins to manifest itself it has to be checked. But in some places we seem to hit upon passages which tend to show that a slightly different view of Pratibhā was also prevalent. For what can be the true meaning of that remarkable passage which teaches that Pratibhā arises only when the guṇas have been surpassed?³

In the *Śivapurāna*⁴ the term Pratibhā is explained as to be the faultless illumination of things subtle, hidden, remote, past and future. It is said to be one of the supernatural obstacles (*divyā upasargāh*) in the path of realisation, but though an obstacle it is nevertheless supposed to be an indication of the proximity of this realisation (*siddhāsūcaka*) itself.

In the *Kādambari*⁵ we find the word Divyacakṣus, instead of Pratibhā, in use. The Sage Jābāli is described there as possessed of this faculty by which he was able to see the entire universe (even the past and the future) as if verily present before his eyes. He acquired the power of omniscience through the gradual removal of

¹ Bangabasi Edition (p. 1768) Nīlakantha's interpretation of the term by viksepa does not seem to be quite happy

² Ibid (p 1640). In this passage Nīlakantha explains the word as intuitive knowledge of the contents of all Śāstras (sakalāsāstrabhanam). Hopkins renders it by 'faultless illumination'

³ See Hopkins's *The Great Epic of India*, p 181, *Yoga technique in the Great Epic* in *J A O S*. Vol. XXII, p 355.

⁴ *Vāyaviya Samhitā*, chap 29.78 (Bangabasi Edition p 964).

⁵ See (a) anavaratatapahkṣapītamalānām karalalāmalakavad akhilaṁ jagad-ālokatām divyena cakṣusā bhagavatām (Parab's Edition, pp. 86-7). (b) Sa (i.e. Jābāli) hi bhagavān kālātrayadarśi tapahprabhāvād divyena cakṣusā.

impurities from his mind by means of constantly practised penances. The eleventh chapter of the *Gītā* contains the classical example of the working of this faculty. On the eve of that memorable event, the battle of Kurukṣetra, which was to decide the fortunes of India for milleniums to come, Lord Kṛṣṇa graciously awakened this faculty in Arjuna (*divyam dadāmi te cakṣuḥ paśya me yogam aiśvaram*, verse 8) for a short time and thus enabled him to have a glimpse of the supreme vision. Arjuna is said to have seen in Kṛṣṇa's body the whole universe with all its past and future states. It was the vision of many in one (*tatrai'kastham jagat kṛtsnam pravibhaktamanekadhā*, Verse 13) and in this way resembled a similar vision vouchsafed to the Buddha during the period of his contemplation on the bank of the Nirañjanā—a fact to which we have already referred.

DEVELOPMENT OF PRATIBHĀ

RESUMÉ & RETROSPECT

We have seen in the preceding pages that the development of the faculty of omniscience can not be effected unless the mind is purified and freed from the obscuring influence of the dispositions clinging to it from time immemorial. What is known as the 'divine eye' is really the mind in its purified condition as the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (VIII, 12.5) expressly declares: *mano'asya daivam cakṣuḥ*. And the *Vājasaneyya Saṁhitā* of the white Yajus (in the *Śivasāṅkalpa mantra*) also makes a similar statement, referring to the marvellous powers possessed by a purified man. It is apparent, therefore, that every man, in so far as he is gifted with a mind, is gifted with the possibility of omniscience. As soon as

the impurities are removed from it, everything is revealed to it, however distant in time or in space; and even supersensuous objects are rendered accessible to it. This is the process of Yoga by which *tamas* is eliminated by the active *rajas* from *sattva* (=mind, *citta*) which consequently becomes pure, steady and luminous. This is *cittaśuddhi* (or *sattvaśuddhi*) which is invariably followed by the rise of *Prajñā*.

But how are the impurities to be cleared away? The whole question turns upon the practical issues of mystic culture and we can do no more than briefly touch upon the matter in this place. It is intimately connected with what is technically known as the "rousing of the *Kuṇḍalinī* or the Serpentine Power" in man. This power represents the combined *Jñāna Śakti* and *Kriyā Śakti* of God and exists in a latent form in every individual man. In the ordinary state it is said to be lying asleep and has its centre, according to the usual opinion, at the base of the spinal column. The awakening of *Kuṇḍalinī* is the actualisation of the infinite latent power. It is described as a very arduous process and is supposed to be practically impossible without help from outside. This help comes from the Guru, a spiritually awake person, in the form of an influx of spiritual energy from him. And it is held that this "infusion of energy", usually called *Kṛpā* (grace) or *Śaktipāta* in Tantrik Literature, acts as a dynamic and releases, more or less quickly (according to the spiritual constitution of the subject), the infinite possibilities of the soul by burning up its veiling *karmas*. This is the process of purification and concentration of mind (*cittaśuddhi*), known as purging of the soul in mystical literature. As soon as the process comes to an end the Light of *Prajñā* (*Prajñājyotiḥ*) or *Pratibhā* begins to shine forth in the manner of a Luminous Eye in the middle of the forehead, just between the two eyebrows, and the man is then said to be converted or regenerated into a god-man. This is the so-called 'Divine

Eye' (*Divyacaksuh*) or the third eye of Śiva, otherwise known as the Eye of Wisdom (*Prajñācaksuh*) or the Eye of Rṣi (*Ārṣacaksuh*). Since this eye is opened by the grace of Guru (*cakṣur unmlītam yena in Gurustava*), the latter is usually called the 'giver of the eye'. The Eye itself is sometimes spoken of as the Guru.

The centre of this faculty of vision is thus found to be the middle of the two eye-brows, above the root of the nose, where the so-called *ājñācakra* (the sixth member of the sixfold group of psychic centres within the *suṣumnā*) is located. And this squares with the fact that this is also the seat of the mind.

Concurrently with the opening of this vision to the Yogin he begins to hear the eternal and unbroken sound of *Nāda* (i.e. *Omkāra*), the sweet and all-obliterating Divine Harmony. Like the sweeping current of a rushing flood, this mighty sound carries everything before it and drowns all in its music, until, at last, it ceases itself to be heard and there is Absolute Silence of the *nirvikalpa samādhi*.

When this light and sound are fully realised, but before plunging into Absolute, the Yogin is elevated into the highest plane of cosmic life. The siddhas, rṣis and gods are seen and their voices (which are all aspects of "*dāivī vāk*" or *ākāśavānī*) are heard. There exists nothing between him and the rest of the universe. And indeed his whole life is then one continuous *Brahmavihāra*.

Being himself saved, he now becomes, if he so desires it, the saviour of humanity; and he may also participate in the government of the world or else he may live in eternal and blissful communion with the Lord, forgetful of all besides Him. He may even merge forever (or for a definite time) his self-identity in the Absolute and obtain the peace of *Nirvāna*. There are infinite possibilities of the trans-natural life, and no two souls need be exactly alike in their destiny, though all may be said to have reached *in one sense* the same Beatific Goal. So long as

he is in earthly life either before the falling off of the body or on the voluntary resumption of such life subsequent to his physical death, the virtues of Love and Faith are exemplified in him in their noblest aspects. He is the Ideal of Perfect Humanity which is Divinity itself in a concrete shape and is the source of light and life and joy to the world, deep in darkness and sorrow. It is from him that the 'Scriptures' proceed and the world receives guidance and inspiration.

THEISM IN ANCIENT INDIA.

I

Introduction

As a brief introduction to the study of theistic philosophy in ancient India it is desirable to take a short survey of the old controversy over the causal (efficient) problem and the kindred questions centred round it. It is an interesting question—one which inevitably presents itself in the study of all ancient philosophy, and we cannot well afford to leave out a short discussion of it here.

It may be said, broadly speaking, that the doctrine of *Īśvara* is as old in its systematised formulation as the age of the *Mahābhārata* and the Upanisads. The *Śvetāśvatara Upanisad* contains a nominal enunciation of some of the most popular theories current in its time in explanation of the origin of the universe, and *Īśvaravāda* forms one of this number. Thus we read:

kālah svabhāvo niyatir yadrchā
bhūtāni yonih puruṣa iti cintyam/
saṁyoga eṣām na tv'ātmabhāvād
ātmā'py anīśah sukhadukkhahetoḥ//

In the second half of this famous passage, suffering though from a slight ambiguity of expression, the doctrine of *Īśvara*, I believe, is undoubtedly indicated.¹ A more pronounced statement however appears in *Suśruta* (1.7) where six diverse views are mentioned. Punyarāja in his commentary on the *Vākyapadīya* (1.28), Sarvajñātma Muni in the *Samksepasāhīraka* (1.528), Gunaratna in the *Saddarśanasamuccayavṛtti* (pp. 10-19),

¹ Cf. The well-known verse *ātmā jantur anīśo'yam* etc, which forms the nucleus, as it were, of the whole subsequent literature on *Īśvaravāda*. The *locus classicus* of this śloka is *Mahābhārata*, Vanaparvan, 30.28

Māṭhara (Chowkh, Sk. S. pp. 75-76) and Gauḍapāda (Ben. Sk. S. 37-38) on *Sāṅkhyakārikā* no. 61, Bhaṭṭa Utpala on *Brhat Samhitā* (1.7) Ācārya Nemicandra in *Gommatasāra*, verses 788-883, and Gotama in *Nyāya Sūtras*, IV. 1.14-43, speak of various rival theories about the origin of the world (cf. *Śivapurāṇa*, *Vāyavīya Samhitā*, Uttara Bhāga VIII, 14). Many of these had been in vogue in independent forms, and as interrelated, long before the rise of Buddhism. And there seems to be good reason to believe that in course of centuries, with the systematisation of the schools, some of these doctrines lost their independence altogether and came to be affiliated to the systems *newly built up*. The inevitable consequence of this gradual assimilation would appear to have been a blending of thoughts which sometimes seriously hinders historical discrimination. I am, however, trying to append below a short note on each of these doctrines, taking special care to keep up its integrity as closely as feasible.¹ And it will be evident from a glance at this description that theistic studies were very intimately connected in early times with the study of the fundamental causal problem with which all the theories had endeavoured to deal, and that they are traceable to a great antiquity in the past.

II

SVABHĀVAVĀDA

Under the name of Svabhāvavāda we may comprise almost² all those modes of thinking which deny the

¹ Dr Schrader, in his excellent tract (*Über den stand der indischen philosophie Zur Zeit Mahāvras und Buddhas*) (Strassburg 1902) has attempted to sum up the views of some of these theories.

² I say *almost*, as some of the other vādas also (e.g., Yadrechā etc.) reject the principle of causality altogether.

principle of causality, more particularly *efficient* causality, and assert the supremacy of the inherent or immanent nature of a thing. Theoretically it may be thought of under a twofold aspect—extreme and moderate :

A. *The Extreme View.*

It repudiates the possibility of discovering the cause of a thing at the very outset of the enquiry and sets up, in explanation of the *why* of an event or product, the doctrine of Svabhāva. This is Svabhāvavāda *par excellence*.

B. *The Moderate View.*

It allows causal analysis as possible and even as legitimate, within certain limits, but holds that this discursive process of seeking for a sufficient reason cannot be carried out very far. At the last stage, however, where no adequate explanation is forthcoming, an appeal must be made to “the nature of the thing”; and this is Svabhāva. This is practically a confession of the impotence of human reason in regard to all first principles, on which some assumptions have necessarily to be made.

From the above it would appear that the former kind of Svabhāvavāda is inimical to scientific progress in that it puts a stop to the initiative of all researches by denying the existence and knowledge of the principle of efficient causation, while the latter view is quite sane and sound.

The earliest representatives of the extreme form of Svabhāvavāda seem to have been a set of free thinkers in ancient India who were originally called Lokāyatikas,¹

¹Cf. Bhatta Utpala (on *Brhāt Saṁhitā*, I. 7); *apare anye lokāyatikāḥ svabhāvam jagataḥ kāraṇam āhuh svabhāvād eva jagad vicitram utpadyate svabhāvato vilayam yāti* See also Schrader, pp. 30-32; Kern, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 134.

but subsequently came to be more widely known under the name of Cārvākas.¹ Rank materialism, an absence of belief in the unseen and of regard for Authority and an uncompromising rationalism—more correctly casuistry (*vitandā*)², were their general characteristics.

There are evidences in the Pāli literature as to the existence, during the age of Buddhism or even earlier, of a class of persons, Brahmins by caste, who spent all their wits in the subtleties of futile controversies. What the nature of these controversies was in which they found so much pleasure and showed such skill we do not exactly know. But one thing stands out certain. They did not believe in the Vedas nor even in the Dharma Śāstras—the canonical works—of the Buddhists and the Jainas. Hence their arguments did not appeal to any of those religious communities in which, in spite of mutual differences, there was unanimity in an unquestioning and unquestionable obedience to Authority (in the form of Veda or Buddha Vacana or Jina Śāsana).

Thus we find that the Brahmins, the Buddhists and the Jainas were all equally ill-disposed towards the Lokāyatikas on whom they looked down with contempt as their common enemies :

(a) In the *Rāmāyana* (11, 100, 38.39) Rāmacandra is said to have spoken to Bharata—

kvacinna lokāyatikān brāhmaṇāms tāta sevase/
anarthakuśalā hy'ete bālāḥ paṇḍitamāninaḥ//
dharmaśastresu mukhyeṣu vidyamāneṣu durbūdhāḥ/
buddhim ānvikṣikīm prāpya nirartham pravadanti
te//

¹ As to the reason and the circumstances under which the name Lokāyata went out of popular use and was superseded by the term Cārvāka nothing is definitely known. But it is interesting to note that the meaning of the two terms is virtually the same. Cf Nilakantha's comm. on *Mahābhārata* I.91.48; (Mādhava's *Sarvadarśana Samgraha*, Poona Ed., p. 1)

² The word Lokāyata is explained as casuistry (*vitandavādasatya vitandasatya*) by Buddhaghosa and in the *Abhidhāna Padīpikā*, cf. *Nyāyamañjarī* V.12.

Here the commentator Rāma explains the word Lokāyatikas as cārvakamatānusārīṇah, or as śuṣkatarka-vāvadūkāḥ. There is little doubt that Manu II. 11 refers to these Lokāyatika Brahmins given to casuistry by the expression Nāstika.

(b) Pāli works abound in references to this sect. The Buddha did not allow his Bhikṣus to learn or teach the Lokāyata system (*Vinaya Piṭaka, Culla Vagga, V. 33.2.*). The notorious Chhabbaggiya monks whose names occur so often as mischief-makers in the *Vinaya Piṭaka* were adepts in this branch of learning. It is condemned among other low arts in the *Mahāśīla, 5.* The Nepalese Buddhists refer to it as one of those things with which a Boddhisattva should not occupy himself or in which good disciples should not take any pleasure (*Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka, Ch. XIII.*).

(c) The attitude of the Jainas may be best evidenced by their describing it as a form of micchādītthi or heresy (Weber, *Bhagavatī* 11. 248).

Ed, p. 270—:

nahī lokāyate kiñcit kartavyam upadīsyate/
vaitandikakatha'vā'sau na punah kaścid āgamah//

In the *Vādhura Paṇḍita Jātaka* (Fausboll, the *Jātaka, VI p 286*) Vidhura declaims against it (na seve lokāyatikam), where the commentator expounds the word as vitandasallāpam lokāyatikavādam.

But cf. *Anguttaramāyā, III. 581 III. 591, Kūṭadanta sutta 14, Assalāyan sutta* (beginning), *Mūhnda Pañho* (p 10, Trenockner's Ed) where the word Lokāyata stands for a branch of learning distinctive of well-educated Brahmins. It is clear, therefore, from a glance at the testimonies of these literary usages that the word meant originally vitandā or casuistry and nothing else, and that its adherents brooked no authority other than their own. That vitandā too has a recognized place in a well-organised system of debate seems evident from *Nyāya Sūtra 4.2 50.* What makes it repugnant to the orthodox community, therefore, is its impatience of all authority. In Nyāya, the function of Vitandā is destructive, negative, (parapaksaprātṣedha) and is necessarily subordinate, whereas in Lokāyata it is essential, and we know that without a constructive element, without a positive theory to propound (*svapaksasthāpanā*), a Śāstra ceases to have any great interest and value. It is this negative element in general, characteristic of the Lokāyata school, which has earned for it the opprobrious nickname of Nāstika.

(For some interesting notes regarding this sect as bearing on the *Mahābhārata* see Hopkins, *The Great Epic*, pp. 86-90).

The extreme form of Svabhāvavāda may be thus illustrated: It has already been noted that in this view the rejection of causal principle forms the most important feature.¹ It is averred that neither sensuous perception nor inference is an evidence in support of its existence. For mere perception of two events is not sufficient to establish between them a causal nexus, the reason being that even when a thing is observed by the senses, doubt may still arise as to its being a cause. To ascertain whether a given antecedent condition has the character of a true cause it is really necessary to find out with certainty the elements of invariability (*niyama*) and the relevancy (*ananyathāsiddhi*) involved in such a notion. But this certitude can never be arrived at. As for inference being possibly a means of the ascertainment of causality, the Lokāyatika contests its evidentiary value. The problem of induction is to him insoluble. The conviction of universal concomitance or of the absence of a condition limiting the universality of the relation on which all inference is based is inaccessible to human resources. The result is that to the Lokāyatika there is no order revealed in the world, either of sense or of intellect. Everything stands isolated and self-contained.

In this state of intellectual confusion the fact of contingency observable in phenomenal creation appears to be very hard to explain; but an explanation may be suggested. Contingency means that a product comes into existence at one particular moment rather than another. But how is this particular time to be determined? The usual reply of the causalists consists in referring this time-determination to the co-operation of the antecedent conditions. But the Svabhāvavādin staves off this diffi-

¹ In the commentary on *Samkṣepa-Śāstrīka* (1528) where the Svabhāvavāda is alluded to, Rāmatīrtha attributes the view to the nāstikas and Madhusūdana explains it, saying that it consists in holding that the product comes into existence without any cause: *kāranam vinal'va kāryam bhavātīti svabhāvavādināḥ*. Agnicit Purusottama adds *svabhāva eva hetur iti cārvākāḥ*.

culty by an appeal to svabhāva, remarking that no further question on this point is relevant.

Let us try to understand the situation. It is well-known that even the doctrine of causality fails to explain the ultimate principles; it is then simpler, so it is affirmed, to assume at the very start that causes, known or unknown (*adrsta*), are all superfluous. Varieties and inequalities remain after all unexplained facts and no amount of analysis will ever furnish us with the right solution. The only reasonable conclusion, therefore, in such cases is to say that it is the nature of the thing to happen at such and such a time, and that is all. The only law here is the law of svabhāva. Just as a piece of cloth occupies the same space as its material cause, the threads (*tantu*), and not the shuttle etc, although the threads and the shuttles are both equally causes; in the same way, a product, though destitute of a cause, may appear at one time and not at another. As in the former case space-association (*deśanīyama*) is due to svabhāva and not to a cause, so in the latter time-relation (*kālanīyama*) too is similarly to be explained. This being so, the contingency of the visible phenomena need not be in opposition to the fact of their being self-sufficient (*nirapeksa*) and uncaused (*ahetuka*).¹ The position of the Lokāyatika on this point is thus summed up by Madhusūdana Saraswati:

adrstāngikāre'pi kvacid gatvā svabhāve paryavasānāt svābhāvīkam eva jagadvaicitryam astu drṣṭe sambhavaty'adrṣṭa-kalpanānavakāśāt. atah kāma eva prāṇinām kāraṇaṃ nā'nyad adrsteśvārādī'ty'āhur'iti lokāyatikadrstir iyam. (Comm. on *Gītā* 16.8)

From what we have seen of Svabhāvavāda we can well understand that it is a doctrine of unmitigated automatism, in the sense that all movements, within the orga-

¹ See *Nyāya-Kusumāñjali* I 5, Guṇaratna in the Introduction on his commentary on the *Saddarśanasamuccaya*, p 13, gives also a report on the views of these svabhāvavādins on causation.

nism and outside it, are held to proceed from the inherent necessity of the body rather than from an extrinsic principle of efficiency, such as Personal Will or Adrṣṭa.¹ The power and freedom of will being thus totally disavowed, the theory commits itself to the awkward position of a queer sort of Determinism.

The literature of the Svabhāvavādins is now entirely lost except what has reached us in fragments. Here is a verse which appears to have originally belonged to a standard work of this literature, describing in outline the three main thesis of this doctrine, viz. (1) varieties due to svabhāva, (2) movement (*pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti*) due to svabhāva, and (3) denial of free will:

kaḥ kantakānām prakaroti taikṣṇyam
vicitrabhāvam mrgapaksinañ ca/
mādhuryam ikṣoh katutāñ ca nimbe
svabhāvataḥ sarvam idam pravṛttam//

I quote this from Bhaṭṭa Utpala's commentary on *Brhat-Samhitā* (under 1.7), but it also occurs in the *Saddarśana-samuccayavṛtti* (p. 13), in Dallana's commentary on

¹ (a) While denying the effectuation-power of nimittakāraṇa and conceiving matter as moved into action of its own nature (parināmasvabhāva) the Sāṅkhya too approaches the position of a Svabhāvavādin. [Cf. the identification proposed by Nilakantha in his comm on *Mahābhārata Śāntiparva* 231-53, p. 1635. But this is historically untenable]. But it has this difference from the above that the necessity of a nimitta is not here entirely dispensed with.

(i) The Purusa, though exercising no volition, is still a nimitta by virtue of its presence merely. This presence is indispensable to set into motion all varieties of existence which lie eternally embosomed in the primordial unmanifest Matter.

(ii) And the efficiency of adrṣṭa is also accepted, in so far as it determines the precise nature of the product, by removing the obstructions which stand between the cause and its manifestation as (i.e. transformation into) the product.

(iii) In addition to this, the efficiency of puruṣārtha viz bhoga and apavarga is admitted, though as a final cause (uddeśyatvena). The aim and purpose of all natural evolution is either one or the other, according as the Self is on the path of enjoyment or of renunciation. All movement is governed by purpose.

(b) Of the four Buddhist systems in Nepal, of which Hodgson gave a brief sketch in his famous essay on the subject (*Asiatic Researches*, Vol. XVI pp. 435-440), I feel disposed to identify the Svabhāvikas, the Yātṅikas and the Kārmikas with sects which held svabhāva, prayatna (will) and karma (adrṣṭa) respectively as the sole principle of efficiency. The Aśvarikas, of course, are the well-known Īśvaravādins,

Suśruta (*Śārīra*, Ch. I), and among other ślokas of a similar nature, in Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacarita* (IX. 47-52).¹ In the last, there is a slight variation in the reading of the verse in the second half: thus—Line 3—svabhāvataḥ sarvaṃ idaṃ pravṛttaṃ, Line 4=na kāmakāro'sti kutaḥ prayatnaḥ. Probably the view is referred to as nirṇimittavāda in *Nyāya Sūtra*, 4.1. 22-24.

Udayana in his *Kusumāñjali* (1.5.), appears to make Svabhāvavāda one of the five forms of ākasmikatvavāda, the remaining four forms being: (1) ahetuvāda, (2) abhūti-vāda, (3) svata utpādavāda, (4) anupākhyotpādavāda. A brief note on these tenets is, I believe, necessary to make the discussion complete.

(1) The first view is apparently a formal denial of causality, but not of production. This much is common with Svabhāvavāda, but it does not accept the elaborate explanation of svabhāva as offered by the latter. This ahetuvāda seems to me identical with the famous *adhiccasamuppannavāda* so often met in Pāli literature. (cf. *Brahmajālasutta*, 1.30.34=*Dīgha Nikāya* Vol. I, pp. 28-30, *Mill Pañ.* 1.443.). Adhicca=fortuitous, opposed to abhinha=habitual, (*Mil. Pañ.* 1.442) or paṭicca=having a cause. As for the meaning of the term Adhicca, (cf. *Udāna* VI. 5.) the word from its context seems to mean neither svata utpanna nor parata utpanna. Buddhaghosa (*Sumaṅgala* I.118) explains it as ahetuta utpanna. This is really the so-called ahetuvāda. Buddhaghosa explains its form as ahutvā sattattāya parinatam (i.e. abhūtāvabhavanam). There is reference to the Ahetuvāda in the *Mahābodhi-Jātaka* (Fausboll, *The Jātaka*, VI, pp. 228-237), but the doctrine appears to have a slightly different shade of meaning there

¹ Cf. *Gommatasātra* verse 888, where the reading is slightly different
The verse—

agnirusno jalam śītam samasparśas tathā'nilah/
kenc'dam citritam tasmāt svabhāvāt tad vavasthitiḥ//

quoted in *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* (Poona Ed p 4) and Varadarāja and Vardhamāna on *Kusumāñjali* may also be compared.

(2) The second view is a downright rejection of production (*bhavana*) itself. I cannot say anything about the historical setting of this vāda. Could it be an extreme form of Śāśvatavāda which in later times entered into Vedānta and Sāṅkhya-Yoga?

(3) The third view is a strange doctrine in which the duality usually set up between an effect and its cause is denied. This view is referred to in (1) above, and in Nāgārjuna's *Mādhyamaka Kārikā*.

(4) The last doctrine is evidently some form of Śūnyavāda in which a product is said to appear from a pre-existing Void or Nothing. In this view of Causality the reality of both upādāna and nimitta is denied.

Ujvaladatta divides Svabhāva as two-fold, viz. (1) nisarga, (2) svabhāva proper. The former is explained as habit and the latter as nature. Habit has its origin in conscious and repeated effort in the past, but nature is spontaneous and has no extrinsic source of origin at all. He says:

bahir hetvanapekṣī tu svabhāvo'tha prakīrtitaḥ/
 nisargaś ca svabhāvaś ca ity eva bhavati dvidhā//
 nisargah sudrdhābhyāsa anyah samskāra ucyate/
 ajanyas tu svataḥ siddhaḥ svarūpo bhāva ucyate//
 (quoted in *Nyāya-Kośa*, 2nd Ed. p. 971.)

III

NIYATIVĀDA

The views of the Niyativādins are thus stated in Dallana's commentary: purvajanmārjitaḥ dharmadharmaḥ niyatīḥ, sarva sarvasya kāraṇam iti niyatīvādinah. As thus expressed the doctrine appears to be practically identical in sense with the karmavāda to which Varāha Mihira refers in the *Bṛhat Saṃhitā* (I.7). Nīlakaṇṭha makes it the special feature of the Mīmāṃsā

philosophy (on *M. Bh. Śānti Parva* Ch. 231, 53.),¹ but the reason is not given. The word *niyati* according to the above definition stands undoubtedly either for the whole body of stored karmic forces which are waiting for the right time or proper season to be realised into action or only for the part of it which has commenced to fructify. In any sense it is a doctrine held in common by all the systems of India, and not by Mīmāṃsā in particular. Nīlakanṭha's justification seems, however, to be thus possible: in all the systems karma has a subordinate rank, in that it has to work in subjection to the Divine Will or at any rate to the transcendental influence of Puruṣa, but in Mīmāṃsā alone the restrictive condition laying down that an insentient object can not move into action of itself is totally rejected and in consequence of this, karma has in Mīmāṃsā a unique position. Mīmāṃsā is *par excellence* a karmavādin.

But to me it seems as if the original significance of Niyativāda were somewhat different. In all probability the original vādas known as Svabhāvavāda, Kālavāda, Yadṛcchāvāda, Niyativāda, etc. were collateral and had a community of origin. They were all non-theistic assumptions, which had arisen in attempting to find out an explanation of the appearance and disappearance of phenomena. All were more or less of a determinist cast. The reality of Kṛti-Puruṣakāra (Kāmakāra) or Freedom of the Will is denied everywhere, and with this the agency of the Self. Naturally therefore Niyati would seem to stand for the blind driving impulse of a Power from behind, without indeed the redeeming capacity of an initiative Will. It is, so to speak, the determining power of the past asserting itself over

¹ Cf. Bhatta Utpala *pare anye mīmāṃsākā jagataḥ karmakāraṇam jagur uktavantah.* The following verse is quoted—

purvajānmārjītam yac ca karma puruṣāṃ śubhāśubham/
tad eva sarvajantūnām sṛṣṭisambhārakāraṇam//

Comm. on *Bṛh. Sam.*, (1.7).

against the vacuity of the present. Thus viewed Niyati answers in a large measure to the ancient classical notions of Necessity (*necessiteo ineluctabilis*) or Fate (*fatum*). It is altogether a different conception from Adrṣṭa, in so far as it is an inexorable and inevitable destiny, in every manner blind and purposeless. Adrṣṭavāda allows for the freedom of will and the consequent possibility of fresh actions, with the result that Adrṣṭa and Puruṣakāra are held to be capable of acting and reacting on each other. Adrṣṭa is never an implacable necessity, for its power, however intense, may be neutralised by an act of the Will, provided that it is sufficiently strong.

The doctrine known as *Pubbekata-vāda* (pūrvakrtavāda), of which we find an account in the Pāli literature, approaches the philosophical position of Niyati in so far as it denies the freedom of the will and the existence of the present karma capable of modifying the past. In the *Mahābodhi-jātaka* (Fauboll, *The Jātaka*, Vol. V, pp. 228, 238-9) where this view is described, it is plainly stated that pleasure and pain are due *entirely* to the past karma and that the act of rendering pleasure to or inflicting pain upon others means really a discharge of old debts and involves *no fresh moral responsibility*. The two doctrines are not therefore exactly identical.

Nemicandrācārya explicitly says that Niyativāda consists in holding that the time, instrumentality, manner and the subject of an action are all pre-determined and invariable: *jattu jadā jena jahā jasya ca niyameṇa hodi jattu tadāptena tahā tasya have idi vādo niyadivādo du.* (verse 882).

(i) In the *Yogavāsīṣṭha Rāmāyana*, (ii) in the ancient Pañcarātra and (iii) in the Śaiva systems the conception of Niyati is of course greatly modified. There is none of that rigid and inflexible determinism, that blank fatalism, which prevailed in the old extremist school.

(i) In the former, for instance (*Vairāgya* Sec. 26

chap.), it stands, stripped of metaphor, as equivalent to, what I consider to be, the Cosmic Law (*samaṣṭikarma*) or the combined adṛṣṭas of a particular system of the world. Ānandabodhendra, in his comm. on the above (verse 6. Nir. Sag. Ed., Vol. I. p. 54), explains the word simply as: *ḥṛtasya karmaṇaḥ phalāvaśyambhāvaniyamaḥ*, but the context hardly leaves any doubt as to the exact nature of its connotation. And again the brilliant metaphor conceiving Niyati as the consort of Time-spirit with whom it dances in union¹ and sets up the cosmic movement lends undoubtedly a strong support to my contention about its universality.

I may take this opportunity of pointing out that this Cosmic Law, including what are generally called the Laws of Nature, is according to *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha*, as in the Purāṇas usually,² the stamp of God's Will set on the forms of creation.

Thus the question turns on the origin of *svabhāva* (*vastusvabhāva*) or of the laws of nature. Why, e.g., is fire hot and ice cold? How are the final differences to be accounted for? The simple answer is—through Niyati. So the *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha* says. But what is Niyati?

To start from, is the state of Universal Dissolution when all phenomenal varieties are believed to sink into the Unity of the Absolute. On the close of this quiescent period, which is indicated by Time, God wakes into activity and wills into manifestation all the entities of the preceding cycle which have not yet completed their

¹ This seems to be a counterpart of the remarkable conception which ascribes all rhythm in the universe—nay, all vibrations in it—to the dancing sports of Hara and Pārvatī.

² In the Pauranic view, Kāla and Niyati are but forms of the Divine Energy, or more properly of the Divine Will, so called when this latter is concerned with the creation, maintenance and disruption of the universe. It is rather a loose employment of the term, characteristic of the popular literature of the Purāṇas, and may be taken for what it may be worth.

Cf.

māhāmayety'avidye'ti niyatir mohanī'ti ca/
prakṛtir vāsane'ty'eva tave'cchā'nanta co'cyate//

(quoted in *Vācaspatya*, p. 4076).

round of worldly journeys. This rise of Will (involving its logical precedents—Knowledge and Desire) in God is tantamount to the maturity or fructification (through Time) of the Universal Karma hitherto lying dormant. God as thus willing forth or projecting the Universe, subject to the past Karmas of the Jivas, is technically known by the name of Brahmā, and the Universe thus brought forth as the expression of His Will (*saṅkalpa-janya*) is really a mental creation. The forms of His Will as expressed in the beginning of creation persist even to-day and will persist till the very end. They are in this sense unalterable. These fixed laws and relations and the properties of things are what is collectively known as Niyati:¹

sargūdan yā yathā rūḍhā saṅvitkathanasantatiḥ/
sā'dyā'py acalitā 'nyena sthitā niyatir ucyate//

(*Yogavāsīṣṭhu Utpatti* Sec. 54.22, Nir. Sag.
Ed. Vol. I. p. 260).

It is interesting to note that this fixity is not absolute, in so far as individual acts of the will are believed, according to their degrees of purity, to be able to influence more or less successfully this pre-destined nature. But what particular karma has the power of acting on a particular aspect of Niyati is already determined by the Will of God, and this remaining inviolable, the fixity of Niyati stands in one way unassailed.

It would be instructive to compare with this the view of Vyāsa in his comm. on *Yoga Sūtra* III. 45, where he notes that the Yogin who has conquered by a process of psychic control (*saṁyama*) the five forms of the bhūtas and can direct them at his will is rewarded *inter alia* with the power of immediately realising his will. The essences of the bhūtas (*bhūtaprakṛtayah*) obey his will, as

¹ Kālidāsa in *Raghuvamśa* (VIII, 40) says that nectar and poison may be converted into each other under God's Will: *viṣam apy amṛtam kvacid bhavet amṛtam vā viṣam āvaseschayā*.

This shows that the properties of physical objects were believed to be the immediate result of God's Will.

soon as it arises. But even such a Yogin, with command over the entire forces of nature, does not act in violation to the established order of the universe, viz. the order already imposed by the Will of a Supreme Self (i.e. God) similarly empowered: *na ca śakto'pi padārthavipaparyāsam karoti. kasmāt ? anyasya yatrakāmāvasāyinaḥ purvasiddhasya tathā bhūtesu saṅkalpāt.*

Vācaspati's comment on the above is of exceeding interest. He observes that a Yogin of the kind described above may indeed alter the *powers* and *properties* of things, since these are variable, being subject to diverse conditions, e.g., time, place, origin and circumstances; but he can in no wise reverse the *nature* of the things themselves.

(ii) In the Pañcarātra works, however, Niyati is conceived as the mother of Time and the immediate product of Māyā Śakti. Probably this is a modification of the early Sāṅkhya in which besides the grosser time, which is declared to be an emanation from Ākāśa (*Sāṅkhya Sūtra*—II. 12), a subtler form of it, perhaps equally eternal with Puruṣa and Prakṛti, was conceded. The question of Puruṣa being left out of account, it seems to me likely that the Prakṛti and Kāla of the ancient Sāṅkhya correspond to Śakti (Māyā) and its time-body (consisting of Niyati and Kāla) in the Pañcarātras (as preserved in the *Ahīrbudhnya Saṃhitā*). The Guna-body of Śakti is of course the same as the disturbed state of Prakṛti's equilibrium brought about by the influence of Time.

(iii) The Śaiva works present a slightly different account from the above. But even here Niyati and Kāla are clearly distinguished in their functions, and have none of that stern fatalistic tinge about them which is the distinctive feature of extremist schools known by those two names. Niyati and Kāla are here two of the five forms of limitation of experience, viz. those in regard to Space and Time, imposed by Māyā Śakti on the experiencing

Self (*pramātā*), Niyati being concerned with the obscuration of the Immanence (*vyāpakatva*) of the Self and Kāla with that of its Eternity (*nityatva*).¹ The main difference of the Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava notions on the point lies in the fact that whereas in the former Niyati and Kāla are supposed to spring simultaneously from Māyā Śakti, in the latter Kāla comes out of Niyati which is the direct offspring of Māyā.²

IV

KĀLAVĀDA

With Niyativāda stands intimately connected the concept of Kāla, a detailed review of which is omitted from this place.³ The original Kālavāda was doubtless a fatalistic creed, much like the notion to which Uddyotakara refers in the *Nyāya Vārttika* (Ben. Ed. p. 459).⁴ But the doctrine of which Dallana speaks is evidently different. The writer quotes a verse from the astronomer Śrīpati, in which Time is described as the Lord Īsvara—the source of the world's efficient causation. From the above as well as from the statements of Rāmatīrtha and Agnicit Purosottama (comm. on *Samk. Śāvīraka*, I. 528) it would seem that this view was that of the astronomers.⁵

¹ See *Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya*, Sūtra 9, pp 21-22 (Śrinagar Ed).

² Cf J. C. Chatterjee's excellent summary of the Śaiva doctrines in the *Kashmir Śaivism*, pp. 51, 75-88, Avalon—*Studies in Mantra-śāstras*, Part I.

³ For a very comprehensive survey of the materials bearing on this theory see Schrader pp. 17-30.

⁴ Cf. Hopkins, *The Great Epic*.

⁵ Cf Nilakantha on *Mahābhārata Śānti Parva* 231, 53. But Jayanta in the *Nyāya Mañjarī* (p. 138, 9-17) gives a different report of the astronomical conception of Time. [In this view, it is urged, time is taken to be a series of movements of the stars and planets on which our notions of succession and simultaneity depend.

I do not see how to reconcile the two accounts except by supposing that they represent two different epochs in the history of astronomical notions.

V

YADRCCHĀVĀDA

Yadrcchā is defined by Śankaracārya (on *Śvetāsvatara Up.*) as ākasmika prāptiḥ or coincidence. The upholders of this doctrine were also deniers of the uniformities of nature (*kāryakāranabhāva*), and asserted that the knowledge of the causal relation was unattainable by any of the accredited means of proof. It is observed that the same product arises from each of the variety of antecedents,¹ and this would not be possible if there were a definite and invariable relation between the cause and the effect. The connection, between an antecedent and the consequent following upon it, is always casual rather than causal.

It is very difficult to distinguish between svabhāva and yadrcchā, as both are identical so far as the rejection of the causal principle is concerned. But the distinction however may be taken to lie in this that whereas in Svabhāvavāda a niyama is formally admitted which is technically known as svabhāvaniyama, in Yadrcchāvāda there is no scope for any such restriction.² With reference to the question—why a jar should be produced from clay and not from threads—the answer of the Svabhāvavādin is a plain statement of the nature of the thing which is unchangeable, but the answer of the Yadrcchāvādin would be a flat denial of the reality of any such *natural principle*. The observed order and regularity in our experience is due to mere chance, they would say. Amalānanda, in his *Vedantā-kalpataru* on 2.1.33, brings out this distinction very clearly in the following remarkable sentence: niyatanimittam

¹ Cf. *Gunaratna*, p. 15.

² Nilakantha attributes evidently this chance-theory to the Ārhatas: yadrcchetya niyatavādmām ārhatānām (on *Mahābhārata Śānti* Ch. 231. 53),

anapekṣya yadā kadācit pravṛttyudayo yadrecchā,
śvabhāvas tu sa eva yāvadvastubhāvī yathā śvāsādau.

VI

The Non-theistic Systems.

THE CĀRVĀKA VIEW

I have given in the foregoing pages a bare outline of the different theories relating to the origin of things. I now propose to deal more particularly with the principal notions of the Cārvāka school of non-theistical philosophy which bear, directly or in a remote way, on the problem of Theism.

First and foremost among the philosophies which deny the existence of a Personal God stands the material school of the Cārvākas. Though this school of thought, owing to its gross sensationalism, had never succeeded in striking its roots deep into the soil of the country, it still possessed an interest, almost unique in character, partly theoretical—in the eyes of controversialists, and partly even practical, though only to a very limited number. Its doctrines, if doctrines they could at all be called, were most mercilessly exposed by all the other systems, orthodox as well as heterodox; and if they have survived to-day they have done so simply as so many ill-formulated theses without any pretention to speculative value.

Tradition ascribes to Brhaspati the foundation of the philosophy of materialism.¹ An adherent of this school

¹ It is hard to say anything conclusively in regard to the identity of this Brhaspati with the scholar of the same name who is associated with the foundation of a school of politics Bhāsa in the *Pratimā* (5th act) and Kautilya in his *Arthasāstra*; and it is interesting to observe that in the *vidyāsamuccaya* section of Kautilya's work (Mysore Ed. p. 6) where the views of different Ācāryas are cited as to the number and names of sciences fit for study, Brhaspati is quoted

of thought is, therefore, usually known as Bārhaspatya (cf. *Vivaraṇa Prameya Samgraha*, pp. 210-18; *Sarva-darśana Saṅgraha* (Poona Ed.) p. 4.) That Bṛhaspati is not a mythical personage is evident from the Sūtras extant in quotation under his name :

- (1) Bhāskara Bhāṣya on the *Vedānta Sūtra*, 3.3.53 :
 - (a) pṛthivy ap tejo vāyur iti tattvāni.¹
 - (b) tatsamudāye śarīrendriyaviśayasamjñā.
 - (c) tebhyaś caitanyam.
 - (d) kiṃvādibhyo madaśaktivad vijñānam.
- (2) Śāṅkara's commentary on *Vedānta Sūtra*, 3.3.53:
 - (a) tebhyaś caitanyam,
 - (b) madaśaktivad vijñānam.
 - (c) caitanyaviśiṣṭaḥ kāyah puruṣaḥ.²
- (3) Nīlakanṭha on the *Gītā*:
 - (a) caitanyaviśiṣṭaḥ kāyah puruṣaḥ.
 - (b) kāma evai'kaḥ puruṣārthaḥ.

(The last two Sūtras are also quoted by Madhusūdana, Nīlakanṭha and Dhanapati in their commentaries on the *Gītā* (16.11).

- (4) Sadānanda in the *Advaita Brahmasiddhi*:
 - (a) caitnyaviśiṣṭaḥ kāyah puruṣaḥ.
 - (b) kāma evai'kaḥ puruṣārthaḥ.
 - (c) maranam evā'pavargaḥ.

We have already dealt at some length with this view in the preceding pages where we observed that it had been one of the main dogmas of the Lokāyatika sect. We now pass on hurriedly to describe some of the other tenets of the school.

as holding that vārttā and danḍanīti are the only branches of knowledge which deserve to be specially cultivated: ānviksikī and trayī—the sciences dealing with the supersensuous—are ignored as of subsidiary importance. May not this be a fact of some historical significance?

¹ Noted in *Bhāmatī*. Nir. Ed. p 707.

² These three sūtras occur elsewhere also, Varadarāja in his *Kusumāñjali-Bodhanī* quotes the sūtra marked (b) in the same form; the sūtra defining the Self appears also in the same form in the *Gītā Bhāṣya* of Śāṅkara (18.50) and Śaiva sūtra and with slight verbal alterations in the *Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya* (under sūtra 8), thus: caitnyaviśiṣṭam śarīram ātmā.

Among these we may mention first of all the doctrine of the four elements. The Cārvākas believed, very much like the Buddhist philosophers, that Ākāśa was not an element at all; it was a Void, an absence of āvarana. Only the four elements in their atomic condition were held to be the basic or root principles in creation. The external world, the sense-organs as well as the physical organisms were supposed to be the products of these primordial types of matter. But how this production comes to be possible is a question left unexplained. All kinds of causes, known or unknown (*adrsta*) being rejected, and the guidance of an Eternal Intelligence being regarded as superfluous, the Materialist is left with the only alternative open to him, viz. to say that this production results from the fortuitous concourse of the blind constitutive particles of matter. Nothing further can be said on this point. It would be illegitimate, so it is urged, to demand an explanation where no explanation can be given.

To the Materialists, life and consciousness are practically equivalent, and are both believed to originate from Matter. Sentience and the phenomena of mental life are material properties and need not imply a distinct un-material substance as the Self. It is admittedly true that consciousness is not observed to inhere in the particles of matter, either severally¹ or even collectively, but this is no argument against the fact that when these particles come to be arranged into a specific form in a manner not yet scientifically explicable, they are found to show signs of life. This peculiar collocation of the atoms results in the formation of the organism (*śarīra*).² This is the Self (*ātmā*).

¹ It appears that some of the older materialists did actually attribute consciousness to each of the atoms. But the view does not seem to have obtained currency.

² As to how this peculiar collocation or organisation results it is answered that the union of parents is the immediate cause, and as a period of Universal

That consciousness is a function of the body may be proved by a process of logical demonstration, e.g. by the joint methods of Agreement and Difference (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*).

(a) Thus we find by observation, and there is no instance to the contrary, that for the manifestation of consciousness, body is an inalienable factor and that discarnate consciousness is not possible. This shows that between organism and consciousness there exists some necessary bond, viz., that of Causality.

(b) Universal experience as expressed in judgements like "I feel hot, I feel tired" seems to vouch for the truth of this view. It is an indisputable fact that sensations and perceptions can arise only in so far as they are conditioned by a bodily mechanism. But it would not be so, were not the body the substrate of consciousness.

(c) Apart from this there is another proof in favour of the causal relation between Matter and Consciousness. This is afforded by the description in medical literature of the properties of particular preparations of food and drink (e.g. *brāhmāghṛta*) conducive to the development of the intellectual powers.¹

(i) First, since the body is declared to be the agent (*karttā*) of all actions, it should, on grounds of logical consistency, be held morally responsible for their natural consequences. But this is scarcely possible: (a) The particles which go to the formation of the body are always in a state of flux, so that the body which performs an action (*karma*) at one moment does no longer persist at the next to feel its reaction (*bhoga*). (b) And even if this *momentary* fluctuation be not admitted it is nevertheless undeniable that the body suffers change: the bodies in two different periods of life are different from each other; for otherwise they could not have different

Dissolution is not admitted the difficulty about the first origin of Life and Consciousness does not arise, Brahmānanda's Comm on *Siddhānta Bindu*, p. 62.

¹ See *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp 439-440.

sizes. The appearance of a different size implies that the former size is destroyed which is possible only when the subject in which it resides (i.e. *pūrvaśarīra*) is also destroyed.

(ii) Secondly, the material theory is incompetent to account for the facts of memory and recognition (*smṛti* and *pratyabhijñā*). Necessity of thought demands that memory and the original experience (*anubhava*) which gives rise to it should be referred to one and the same conscious subject, but this identity of reference would not be possible if the subject were not fundamentally an unchangeable unity.

To these alleged objections the Cārvāka replies that they are more apparent than real. For the second difficulty may be easily got over by supposing that the traces (*samskāra*) left by previous experiences are capable of being transmitted (*samkrama*) from the prior moment to the succeeding moment, i.e. from the material cause (*upādāna*) down to its direct product (*upādeya*).

As to how this may be possible one may consider, the Cārvāka says, the analogous instance of the transference of the odour of musk to the cloth in contact with it. Here the only condition observed to be necessary is the presence of a relation between the two objects. And between a cause and its effect—the case under consideration—such a relation does undoubtedly exist. The unity of reference may also be ensured by the admission that the impressions, though transferable, do pertain to, i.e. are preserved and revived (reproduced) in a single line or causal series.

As regards the first point the position of the Cārvāka prevents him from recognising its cogency as an objection. An inveterate foe of the doctrine of Adṛṣṭa, he finds no justice, natural or moral, in the government of the Universe, so that the very question of the necessity of logically unifying karma with its effect (*phala*) does not appear to him as a problem calling for solution. Bhoga, the ex-

perience of pleasure and pain, is not determined by a previous karma (*pūrvakarma*), but comes by chance (*yadṛcchā*) over which there is no control. This being so, the subjective unity sought for to explain the synthesis of cause and effect needs hardly a ground for establishment.¹

But even if it were needed we could find it in the unity of the organism. Recognition testifies to the identity of the body through all its changing states; and this recognition can not be pronounced false as in the case of nails pared and renewed, for there is no chance here as in the example cited of the body being once destroyed and then substituted by a fresh one of a similar kind. The fact of recognition, which is brought forward as subversive of the alleged momentariness of an object appearing one in consciousness, is fatal also to the mutability of the organism.²

Besides the above there are three more views of the Material school according as the Self is identified with (i) the sense-organs (*indriya*), with (ii) the principle of life (*prāna*), or with (iii) mind (*manah*).

The advocates of the first view set forth that the senses are really the intra-organic conscious agents. This view is based on the facts that consciousness and bodily movements (*ceṣṭā*) follow from the initiation of the senses and that the judgements expressed in "I am blind" etc., showing the identity of the self with the sense-organs are universally accepted as valid. Vātsāyana thus describes the view: *tānī'ndriyānīmāni svasvaviṣaya-grahanāc cetanāni, indriyānām bhāvābhāvayor viṣaya-grahanasya tathā bhāvat. evam sati kim anyena cetanena* (3.1.2)³⁰

¹ This frame of mind will make intelligible the principles of conduct involved in teachings like *mam kṛtvā ghṛtam pivet* etc.

² *Nyāyamānjarī*, p 437 lines 16-19

³ Cf also *Veśāntasāra* (Jiva Ed 1915) pp 95-96, *Sūdhāntabindu*, with *Ratnāvāli* (adv Manj Ed), pp 56-57, 63-64, and more particularly *Vārana Prameya Sangraha*, p 181, lines 13-24.

The second view consists in maintaining that as the senses depend for existence and operation on the Vital Principle, this principle itself is really the source of intelligence. The fact that the presence and absence of the senses involve the origin and non-origin of knowledge does not necessarily point to their agency; the fact may be equally explained on the hypothesis of their instrumentality. Moreover if agency were to be assigned to the senses there would ensure an insurmountable difficulty in consequence of the absence of organs about the origin of action. Again the question arises: which of the senses is the agent—each of them severally or all combined? In the former case, is the agency simultaneous or successive? Now it is absurd to think that the agency belongs to all the senses indifferently, for the object of one sense never becomes cognisable to another and the senses are never known to work concurrently in producing an effect. The alternative of simultaneity is, of course, out of the question. As to the remaining contention that each of the senses may be an agent in *succession*, the reply is: if each of these be an absolutely independent agent, as asserted, it is likely that in case of conflicting movements due to varied resolutions, the balance of the whole bodily organism would be upset, but this is never known to happen. But if the senses were subservient in their functions to the guidance of a Superior Entity it would be reasonable to hold this latter to be the true Self rather than the senses. This Entity is Prāna, the principle of Persistence during sleep and wakeful condition alike.¹

Finally, we may mention the view which claims that consciousness is a quality of the mind.² Brahmānanda,

¹ *Vidvanmanorañjinī* (Jīva Ed 1915, pp 96-97) cf. Brahmānanda's comm on *Sūdhāntabindu*, p 57, lines 13-14

² See *Vedāntasāra*, p 97 *Nyāya Sūtra*, 3.1 16; *Nyāyakandali*, p. 72, 25-26 *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 441, *Vīvartana Prameya Saṅgraha*, pp 181-182. This old materialistic doctrine of *manaścāitanya* was recently revived with fresh vigour by the Late M. Rākhaldās Nyāyaratna, see his *Tattvasāra* with his own commentary as well as its refutation by Pandit Haridāsa Śastri, M.A.

in his commentary on the *Siddhāntabindu* (*Advaita Mañjari Ed.* p. 57), explains the grounds on which this theory is founded, stating that the other organs are only the means of indeterminate sense-knowledge (*nirvikalpa-kajñāna*), but it is mind alone that introduces into such knowledge the element of determinateness. For this reason, as well as because it controls by virtue of its power of volition (*sankalpa*) the outer organs and may persist and function singly even when the latter happen to be absent (e.g. on the plane of existence called *svapna*), the mind is the true Self.

In these different views there is perfect agreement as to the number of *pramāṇas* recognised, for all of them admit that perception is the only way of gaining a right knowledge of things. Inference is not a valid proof, in as much as the universal and necessary relation on which it is based can not be discovered. In other words, it is practically impossible and logically incongruous to ascend, merely by a process of multiplication of individual instances (*bhūyodarśana*) from limited sense-experience to a knowledge of Universal Truths (*sarvopasañhārīṇī vyāpti*). Bare enumeration of facts, however far it may be carried, hardly suffices to find out the element of necessity involved in generalisations. Perception is unable to establish the truth of Induction. For though perception may tell us, for example, that *this* particular A is related to *this* particular B, this knowledge would hardly justify its extension in the form of: 'all "A"s are related to all "B"s'. What right have we, with the limited faculties at our command, to jump into the Unknown and assert a Categorical Universal proposition? Moreover, the assertion of such a proposition would presuppose the elimination of all accidental factors (*upādhi-vidhūnana*). But how is the absence of these factors to be made known? Perception would not avail where these are by nature supersensuous, and the validity of inference as a proof has been already controverted. There would

thus cling an abiding suspicion, not removable by any means accessible to man, as to the truth of every universal judgement.

Thus according to the Cārvāka, perception being the only criterion of existence, whatever is not perceived is held to have no existence at all: *yan no'palabhyate tan nāsti*. This view naturally leads up to scepticism. But for practical purposes probability (*sambhāvanā*) alone is sufficient.¹ Thus at the sight of smoke rising from a certain place there arises in the mind a sense of the *probability* of fire, and not of its *certainty*, and this is enough for all practical purposes. For this end there is no need to assume the existence of a distinct kind of evidence called Inference. The notion of *pramāna* as being the basis of certain knowledge is due to chance-coincidence (*samvāda*) between the knowledge which led to the activity (*pravartakajñāna*) and the attainment of the object in which the activity is fulfilled (*pravrttisāmarthyā*), i.e. harmony between thought and object.

From the above sketch of the philosophical notions of the Materialists it can well be seen why there is no room for God in this system. The usual arguments held out by the theists have not, for them, the force of persuasion. Adrṣta or even the principle of physical causality being denied, it is idle to argue, they would say, that God is the Moral Governor of the world adjusting the karmas of the *jīvas* or that He is the Universal Agent—the author of the contingent phenomena. And to one to whom the Vedas reveal no signs of infallibility, it is equally vain to attempt showing that from them the existence of an Omniscient Spirit could be inferred. And last but not the least, inference itself (*anumāna*) is denied.

¹ So far this view is exactly what Arcesilaus is said to have asserted in reply to the Stoic's objection that scepticism makes life impossible, viz. "Probability is the only rule of practical life" This is the doctrine of Probabilism. The difference, however, lies in this that Arcesilaus doubts all knowledge, including even sense-perception, the Cārvāka leaves margin for it.

The senses do not confessedly reach Him and verbal testimony falls under the category of inference. There is no means of ascertaining, therefore, that an all-knowing all-powerful spirit exists. Nature (*svabhāva*), and not God, is the watch-word of this school.¹

¹The position of Lokāyatikas is thus summarised in the *Vvarāna Prameya Sangraha* (p. 211) *bhūtacatuṣṭayam eva tattvam, pratyaksam evai'kam pramānam, svabhāvavāda eva pāramārthikah.*

THE VIEW-POINT OF NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA PHILOSOPHY

The origin of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools of philosophy, as of all schools in India, is involved in great obscurity. It is not known when and under what circumstances these schools came to assume their present form, but it may be supposed that before they took a definite shape, with a solidity and distinctive character of their own, the ideas and views represented by them, though in wide vogue, had been for a long time in a floating condition. These ideas and theories had not perhaps been the special property of any particular school—and in all likelihood no school had yet existed—but they had been the common patrimony of all thoughtful minds; and it is possible that they were subsequently assimilated and utilised by the various religio-philosophical sects of the pre-Buddhistic and Buddhistic ages. A study of the early Pali and Prakrit literature in general and of Dr. Schrader's learned tract ("über den stand" etc.) in particular, would seem to countenance this conjecture. In the *Kathā Vatthu*, for instance, we find much which we can recognise at once to be in common with the accepted truisms of Sāṅkhya-Yoga, e.g. the germs of Satkārya-vāda etc.

So it is very probable that if we at all allow ourselves in the present state of our ignorance the liberty of seeking for origins we should expect them in a certain measure, so far as the leading ideas are concerned, in the religious speculations of early India. That Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika were in their inception affiliated to (at any rate coloured by) Śaiva cult, as Sāṅkhya to Vaiṣṇavism, seems likely enough.¹ Haribhadra, author of *Ṣaḍdarśana Samuccaya*

¹ Cf. Suali, p. 128, cf. *Liṅgapurāna*, chap. 24, Rajasekhara's—*Saddarśana-samuccaya* (Vaiśeṣika D., 30) p. 12; *Prāśastipādabhāṣya* p. 329.

distinctly says that Śiva was the object of worship among the Naiyāyikas;¹ and Rājaśekhara characterises Nyāya system as "Śaiva darśana" in his own work on the subject. Similarly the Vaiśeṣikas, too, being the worshippers of Paśupati, a form of Śiva, were known as Pāsupatas.² If we remember this fact we shall better understand certain features of these combined systems.

But this religious element was not all. Even in metaphysics, psychology and logic the two systems are closely connected and present a community of form, so much so that it is hard to distinguish, for a modern analyst or pundit, one from the other. Indeed the two may be said to represent two complementary phases of fundamentally one and the same body of thought. What this attitude exactly was it is not possible to determine within the brief compass of the present paper. For, in order to understand a system properly, it is necessary not only to set it in its true perspective but to study it from various points of view and under different relations. Nevertheless it is desirable to say just a few words by way of introduction concerning the aims and methods of this philosophy and the meaning of philosophy in general in India.

In India, philosophy, especially in its earlier and truer form, was intended to serve a practical purpose. Bare speculation is invariably condemned as waste of energy, in as much as it leads nowhere; speculation is deemed blind without the guiding light which Revelation or Higher Perception alone can furnish. Thus the premises from which Reason has to draw its inferences are

¹ aksapādamate śivah srstisambhāraṅkre chivah etc (Bib. Ind Ed., p. 51. Naiyāyikamatam 13) cf. *Guṇaratna*, p. 51.

² See *Guṇaratna*, p. 51. These Pāsupatas are called jatādhāri śaivas or māheśvaras in *Ratnaprabhā* and Anandagiri (under *Ved. Sutra*, 2.2 37 41) cf. *Guṇaratna* pp. 49-50. A detailed exposition and examination of the doctrines of this philosophy together with a discussion as to the place of this system in the history of Indian Thought in general, will appear in my forthcoming monograph on Nyāya Vaiśeṣika Philosophy (Part III).

naturally beyond its own reach and stand outside of itself. Reason is, by nature, impotent and can not in anywise overstep its data. It is not creative nor intuitive; its function is interpretation of facts. Its ultimate resort is, therefore, nothing short of Direct Experience. But as human experience is limited in its scope and is liable to error, the experience on which our reasoning is based must be conceived as infinite and free from all the defects incidental to erring humanity. This infinite experience is embodied in the revealed scriptures. Reason, unaided by the light of this Revelation, would be a groping in the dark and would never be able to discover the truth which is incapable of analysis and synthesis. To the general Indian philosopher, therefore, seeking to build up his individual system of thought on the bed-rock of supra-rational illumination contained in the Vedas or Āgamas, much in the same fashion as to the schoolmen of mediaeval Europe,¹ reason is subservient to faith. "Believe and then Know"—śraddhāvān labhate jñānam—this seems to be the motto of Indian philosophy.

Thus in the general scheme of a man's inner culture the study of philosophy is given a secondary, though a necessary, place:

atmā vā're draṣṭavyaḥ—śrotavyo mantavyo
nididhyāsitavyaḥ.

śrotavyaḥ śrutivākyaebhyaḥ mantavyaś co'papattibhiḥ/
matvā ca satataṁ dhyeya eṭe darśanaḥetavaḥ//

This implies that the ultimate source of true knowledge is revelation, but as the facts of revelation cannot be accepted without any questioning in the present state of our life, we have to study them with the help of our reason. As soon as it is brought home to us that these facts are quite possible and not irrational, the function of reason as a factor of our culture is fulfilled. For this function is simply to beget a notion of *possibility*

¹ Cf. *Non quaero intelligee ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam.*

(*sambhāvanābuddhi*) in regard to a certain proposition, and not of its certainty. Certitude can never be reached by the intellectual faculties (cf. *tarkāprātiṣṭhānāt* etc.). That is, it is the bane of all intellectual processes, however subtle and cautious, that they involve self-contradictions. To be a thinker, without committing oneself to the autonomies of thought, is impossible. It is for this reason that whatever a thesis may be it is not difficult to find a sufficient reason for supporting it. Consequently, the intellectual processes have to be supplemented by processes of personal realisation, viz., concentration and abstraction.

In other words, the general enunciations of the scriptures which are in the form of categorical propositions are sufficient in themselves, as coming from an infallible source, to carry conviction, but if the mind of the hearer be not free from the disturbing factors of doubt (*asambhāvanā*) and perversion (*viparītabhāvanā*) it will not receive the truth. The process of rational demonstration (*manana*), which is implied in all philosophy, aims at removing this element of doubt¹ and producing a belief that the proposition as laid down in the scriptures is likely enough. But even at this stage the seed of uncertainty is not wholly gone; the root of all errors (*viparītabhāvanā*) still remaining, illumination of consciousness resulting in the Vision of Truth cannot of course follow. Yoga (*nīdīdhyāsana*) or the process of psychic discipline has therefore to be resorted to, as capable, by holding in abeyance the phenomena of mental life altogether, of bringing about this transcendental Vision or Intuition (*sākṣātkāra*) of Truth.

Philosophy, if rightly understood, is then only a step

¹ The word for philosophy in India variously appears as *nyāya*, *ānvīksikī*, etc. Cf. *Nyāyavārttikā* p. 13. The statement on page 12, viz. *saṁśayādi bhedanūvidhāyini ānvīksikī*, implies that philosophy is meant for dispelling doubts on the principle that *nānupalabdhe na nirnīte nyāyah pravartate*. A categorical enunciation of the truths is not its province—it deals with reasons of things.

in the cultivation of a man's life. To be at all fruitful it must work in subordination to, i.e. on the data supplied by, Revelation. Else it is apt to run astray.¹

This being so, it is easy to understand how different systems of philosophy, apparently conflicting with and subversive of one another, originate. The Highest Truth, which lends itself to the light of supra-mental Intuition, is indeed one and indivisible, but it appears in diverse forms when looked at from diverse points of view corresponding to the capacities and tastes of the individual Sādhakas. So long as the individualised consciousness asserts itself—so long as we are unable to dispense with "mind" as an organ of knowledge—it is vain to hope for the attainment of the *Absolute Truth*. Relative or partial truth is all that can be reached by human reason. And these relative or fragmentary truths, or aspects of the Absolute Truth, are held to be the immediate ends of the different systems of philosophy. They represent varying stages in the ascending order of the Sādhaka's journey in quest of self-realisation. When pieced together and studied in the light of the resultant whole, they will present a sublime picture of synthesis, fraught with deep significance and interest to humanity. An indirect and veiled picture this; but it is the grandest within reach of our mind.

One thing remains to be noted. The piecing together or co-ordination of the systems is possible, simply because there is at bottom a real Unity. For all the systems pledge unconditional allegiance to Revelation.

¹ Cf. Madhusūdana. śabdāt prathamato aparokṣajñānam jāyate vicāra-prayoḥjam. tadanantaram asambhāvanodaye sati vicāraśāstram pravartāte. tac ca vedāntānām brahmany advītye samanvayapratipādanadvārā parapakṣa-khaṇḍaradvārā co'paujyate pramānagatā'sambhāvanā śravananivartyā, prameyagatā'. sambhāvanā tu mananamivartye'ty anyatra vistarah. tadanantaram api viparītabhāvanā tisthaty'eva, sā nudidhyāsanena nirākriyate tadanantaram punarapi mahāvākyaṃ anusandhīyamānam avidyonmūlanasamartham antahkarana-vrttibhedarūpam muktīphalakaṃ sāksātkāram utpādayati. (*Advaitaratnarakṣā*, Nīrnayasāgara, Ed., pp 44-5).

It is in their mode of interpreting the scriptures, determined by the capacities of the people for whom they are meant, that the systems vary. Even the Buddhist and the Jaina philosophies accept in their own ways the necessity of this.

This Unity, of which Revelation is an expression, is transcendental. The Ṛṣis—the Sages and the Illuminatii—split up, by an apparent process of self-division, this Unity into concepts of symbolical knowledge, arranged them in a certain grade of increasing purity and laid them before the intellectual faculties to play with. If rightly pursued, these will result in a wonderful clarification of the intellect, when the “mind” will cease to work and vanish. On the bare soul, Truth will then dawn as a flash of lightning, dispelling all doubts and uncertainties.

This is the secret of what is technically called *adhikārabheda*, which means that not every man is capable of receiving every form of truth. The faculty of understanding develops gradually, and in the course of this development, truths which once seemed unintelligible and vague begin to assume a depth of meaning and are accepted. It is thus that the folly of one age is turned into wisdom in another. So with countries and individuals. It is believed that the Karmas—the forces and tendencies accumulated from the actions of the past ages and building up the lower personality—stand in the way of a man’s knowledge of Reality. As soon as these impediments are gone, either worked out through their natural reaction on the menial life or destroyed by Knowledge or Yoga, the obscure truths are at once illuminated. Thus there are degrees in the receptivity of the mind which the Teacher has to recognise if he wants his instructions to be understood and acted upon. This idea finds excellent expression in the following statement of the *Bodhicittavivaraṇa*:

deśanā lokanāthānām sattvāśayaavaśānugaḥ/
bhidyante bahudhā loka upāyair bahubhiḥ punaḥ//

gambhīrottānabhedena kvacic co'bhayalakṣaṇā/
bhinnā'pi deśanā'bhinnā śūnyatādvayalakṣaṇā//

This is from a work on Mahāyānic philosophy. The same appears also in an even more precise form, in the words of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī who is rightly reckoned as one of the greatest philosophers of India in the last millenium. Referring to the apparently conflicting views of the different Ācāryas he observes :

nahi te munayo bhrāntāḥ sarvajñatvāt teṣām. kintu bahirviṣayapraṇānām āpātatah paramapurūsārthe praveśo na bhavatrīti nāstikyanivāranāya taih prakārabhedāḥ pradarsītāh.

From what has been said it is apparent that there is a real order in the systems of Indian Philosophy which a close study is able to discover. The synthetic consciousness to which such an order reveals itself has ever been recognised in India. In the *Samkṣepaśārīraka* (II. 60-64), in the *Ātmatattvavivēka* (Jayanārāyana's Ed., pp. 96-97), in the *Prasthānabheda* (pp. 11-23 of *Mahimna-stotra*, N. Sagar) an attempt has already been made in this direction. The *Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya* (p. 16, *sūtra* 8) explicitly states that the different views of Reality, which the different philosophies present, are but fragments of the One Supreme Vision. Vijñānabhikṣu and Nīlakaṇṭha, in several places emphasise, each from his own point of view, on the mutual and supplementary relations existing among the various schools of thought. It is immaterial in this context however to discuss how far the different schemes of synthesis are agreeable among themselves. This is merely to point out that there is a real spirit of unity, of aim as much as of methods, among the diversities of thought and activity according to Indian philosophers.

II

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy is generally conceived by the synthetic critics to stand on the lowest rung of this ladder, so far as the present orthodox systems are concerned. Before proceeding to discuss, in what points the two systems differ from each other it may be well, for purposes of elucidation, to take note of the close affinity existing between them. A brief outline of this combined philosophy, and a statement of the *rationale* of its metaphysics, may therefore be of some use for a proper understanding of the systems *as a whole* and determining their points of view.

In the first place, and at the root of all, we may note the belief that there is a close correspondence between the order of our ideas and the order of extra-mental reality to which it testifies. The two orders stand to each other in a certain relation of causal sequence—whatever is present to consciousness has therefore an objective ground of reality. It is independent of consciousness in so far as its existence is prior to the existence of the phenomena of our mental life and also as a condition of the possibility of such phenomena. It may be an object of immediate perception where such a perception is possible, or else its notion may be arrived at by an indirect process of abstract reasoning or by some other valid sources of knowledge. Idea (*pratīti*) being a symbol of, and verbal usage (*vyavahāra*) being based on reality, it is assumed to be an index of its existence. (cf. *saṃvid eva hi bhagavato vastūpagame naḥ śaraṇam* as quoted in *Upaskāra* under *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*, 7.2.26.)

When we look upon the phenomena of change the question naturally presents itself—whence these changes and how do they come about? The problem is difficult and admits of a variety of solutions according as we approach it from various standpoints, but to the Naiyāyika,

starting from the data of his common consciousness, the question of origin and destruction is involved in deep obscurity. It is believed that the observed contingency of phenomena implies that a product comes into existence which had not existed before and that when destroyed it is reduced to nothing. Before origination and after destruction the product has no entity whatsoever. But the matter is relatively permanent, being the unalterable substance in which the product arises, in which it resides during its term of existence and in which it is destroyed. *Relatively speaking* the cause is *nitya* and the effect is *anitya*.

So the individual product is a mystery in creation—nay, production itself is an inexplicable enigma. The Universal (*sāmānya*) is already there, so is the Matter; but what determines the emergence of a *particular* form in this matter which stands on one hand for the manifestation of the appropriate Universal and on the other for the origin of the individual in which the Universal is apprehended? The Asatkārya theory is supposed to be a reaction on the part of the Naiyāyika against the doctrines of Universal Flux and of Universal Void of the Buddhists. But the Naiyāyika in his turn has not succeeded in avoiding the perils of abrupt recoil.

For clearing up the position I now take up the question of Causality,¹ as it has been discussed in these schools. It is assumed, in opposition to the theories of some of the Buddhist scholars, as a fact of common experience, that nothing comes out of nothing and that pure negation is unproductive. The production of an effect implies a change of condition or movement which presupposes the presence of two factors, one passive which receives and the other active which imparts the transitive movement.

¹ The principle of causality is a self-evident principle. Denial of this would lead to the absurdities of what in technical language would be called *svabhāvavāda* and *yadrechhāvāda*.

The passive element is the material or constitutive cause of the product and is relatively permanent. It is invariably a substance, positive in character. The active factor known as the operative, efficient or instrumental cause acts upon the product either directly or by virtue of its presence. It is in the latter sense only that the causality of Divine Will, Time, Space etc. has to be conceived. In both cases the efficient cause is an extrinsic (*vāhya*) factor in the production and bears no intimate relation to the effect concerned. This formal duality in the causal principle is, of course, everywhere recognised, but the Naiyāyika insists, under the exigencies of his fundamental position, that this analysis is not complete. Besides the two classes mentioned, there is a distinct kind of cause (called *asamavāyī*) which is neither material nor even wholly extrinsic. Thus, for instance, when two parts are brought together resulting in the production of a whole, the conjunction of the parts is as much a cause of the product as the parts themselves. Similarly in making a blue texture the blue colour of the material is a causal antecedent to the blue colour of the product. It is maintained that every positive product comes into existence under the influence of this threefold cause. Negation as a product, i.e., destruction, requires only a *nimitta* and nothing more.

Being an ardent advocate of the doctrine of Asatkāryavāda which is necessitated by his assumption of commonsense view of reality, the Naiyāyika finds it indispensable to maintain an absolute distinction (*atyantabheda*) between the material cause and the effect which is produced from it. The relation which holds between the two is neither abheda nor even tādātmya, but an Intimate Union (inherence, *samavāya*) of one with the other. It is a mysterious relation.

But what is the driving factor which compels the Naiyāyika to assume the doctrine of asatkārya? Does it not do violence to our belief in persistence and con-

tinuity? Why is it found necessary to posit *prāgabhāva* as a precondition (a general *nimitta*) in all production? To this the Naiyāyika replies that to confine ourselves to the records of our *usual* experience, we are bound to assume, by the very laws of our thought, the necessity of *prāgabhāva* as such a condition of production. But this does not amount to a denial of a principle of Persistence altogether, for the doctrine of Conservation of Matter is an essential feature of its philosophy. The Naiyāyika as much as the Sāṅkhya, admits that Primary Matter is eternal. The four kinds of atomic substances, viz. earth etc. and *ākāśa* persist through eternity (like time, space, *manas* and self). Being without any parts or component members, they have neither a beginning nor an end. It is only the compounds of the first four substances (*kāryabhūta*) as well as some qualities and all actions which are produced and destroyed: *bhūtocchedānupapatteḥ* (*Nyāyabhāṣya*, 4.1.29). It is pointed out that though forms (*saṁsthāna*) may change, matter as such remains constant; being eternal it is capable neither of increase nor of diminution. Form, which is nothing but a collocation of parts (*avayavasanniveśa*), is conceived as a quality inhering in matter. The appearance and disappearance of forms is bound up with, being logically considered as antecedents of, the origin and destruction of individuals, for origin and dissolution, so far as the substances are concerned, are synonymous with aggregation and separation of parts.

Thus in this view though the individual is perishable (*dhvaṁsapratīyogī*), the Universal is eternal. What the individual is in Sāṅkhya, the Universal is from this standpoint in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

This Universal is revealed by a definite arrangement of the parts of the body, for though it is by nature eternal and free from spatial limitations, such is the nature of things (*svabhāva*) that it *inheres* and manifests itself in those individuals only whose component parts are

fixed in a particular spatial order. Though present everywhere it is not so perceived. It enters as a predicate in our judgement. No further question is here admissible: we are dealing with an ultimate fact incapable of further analysis.¹ In this system (as much as in Sāṅkhya), it is therefore naturally assumed that before the commencement of the causal operation there is something already given, viz., the Universal (or the individual).²

So then we find that before the appearance of a particular cosmic order we have to presuppose the existence of Primary Matter, (which in this school is understood as partly atomic, e.g. the first four elements and partly ubiquitous e.g. Ākāśa), of the Principles of Time and Space and of the Universals. These atoms, which till now have been in a loose and free state (*pravibhaktāḥ*)³ are set in motion by a certain influence and begin to group themselves into different forms.

But what is this influence which imparts the initial motion to the atomic matter without and to the atomic

¹ The etymological structure of the word *vyakti* (manifestation) shows that the individual is conceived as a *manifestation* only, implying that the Universal (*jāti*), as such is unmanifested.

² The Sāṅkhya-Yoga is an advocate of *satkāryavāda* and denies the necessity of assuming a real independent Universal. The individual is considered to consist of a twofold aspect (cf. the view of the indifferentists, e.g. Adelard of Bath) viz the generic and the specific (*sāmānyavaiśeṣātmaika*), and has an eternal existence *per se*. What is popularly called production is only manifestation (*avirbhāva*) i.e. descent as it were from the Eternal Plane into the realm of Time. And as all manifestation is relative, it means that in an absolute sense, i.e. from the standpoint of God or *yuktayogī* there is nothing like production or creation. In Eternity—on the Divine Plane—there can be no “motion” and consequently no flux. Causality, implying succession, is a category in Time. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, being a representative of *asatkāryavāda* is constrained to admit the non-existence of the individual before its production and after its destruction. But along with this he is bound to ascribe eternal existence to the Universal. Otherwise his position would be like that of the Buddhist, who rejects the reality of both the Concrete Individual (cf. *samghātavāda*) as well as of the Abstract Universal (cf. *apohavāda*).

³ This shows that there is no form in matter during the period of dissolution. In the Sāṅkhya also Matter is described in its primary state as undifferentiated and formless (*avyākṛtā prakṛtiḥ*). According to both it is indeterminate and supersensuous (*aīndriya*).

manas within? The problem is extremely complicated. The atoms and the manas being inert by nature have to be moved from without. The Self in itself can not be a source of motion, for it is a continuum. The only active principle, if there could at all be anything deserving of this name in this system, is adrsta which resides as a specific quality in the Self. It is maintained that when the Self, charged with this adrsta, comes in contact with the atoms the latter are impelled to action. The occasion for such contact is determined by the maturity of adrsta which is effected by the passage of Time. But adrsta in itself, as being a link in the chain of causation, can not be a final and adequate explanation of the origin of motion. The ascription of causality in this case to the human will (*mānuṣīya prayatna*) is out of the point. The human will, in so far as it is a product, is occasional, i.e. an event in time and is itself determined by adrsta. As a result of this analysis, therefore, our system finds compelled to reject both the hypotheses as ultimate solution. We have, it is urged, in the last resort to fall back on the Divine Will (*īśvarīya prayatna*), which being eternal is not determined by anything external to it and requires no further explanation. This is what in the scholastic language we may designate as the doctrine of the Divine Concursus.

The origin of Motion is therefore to be explained by the operation of the Divine Will in the first place and by that of the human will (*mānuṣīya prayatna*) and of mechanical necessity implied in previous karma in the second. All the principles work concurrently though prominence is given in all theistic philosophy to the Will of God without which nothing can be actuated. The process of the formation of organic and inorganic bodies is a question to which we can not advert here¹ but it may just be noted that the same karma which brings about a

¹ Cf. Dr Seal's "*The Positive Sciences of the ancient Hindus*".

contact between the self and the manas is also instrumental in bringing together the atoms so as to form different collocations capable of exhibiting a variety of specific characters. In other words, the manas and the material particles are stirred into activity by one and the same force conceived as a quality present in the self. The external world, including the organism, is held to be a field for the experiences of pleasure and pain resulting by way of natural reaction from the karma-forces of the past, and has only a moral value. Apart from karma, i.e. from the standpoint of the liberated self, wrapped in the glory of its isolation, the existence of the world and of its life is without any significance. Hence the same moral End (viz. *bhoga*) which occasions the rise of subjective phenomena acts also as a motive for the origin of the objective order.

A word or two may be useful in connection with this vexed question of adṛṣṭa or karma. Uniformity of Nature and the Principle of Causality are invariably assumed.¹ That is whatever comes into being is supposed to do so from an adequate cause. Granting this it remains to take note of the facts of pleasure and pain and justify their existence. Evidently they must be traced to distinctive causes which can not be extrinsic or *bhūtanistha* as the materialists (*lokāyatikāh*) would contend. The same external object is the source of pleasure to one and of pain to another, causes pleasure to a man at one time and pain to the same man at another time. These differences of experiences have, therefore, to be explained on intrinsic grounds. That is to say, once assuming that pleasure and pain, which are facts of mental life and belong to the Self, are occasioned by causes also belonging to and existing in the same Self, the question becomes simplified. The conclusion becomes then irresistible that

¹ There is no room for chance (*ākasmikatva-vāda*) in philosophy. The different doctrines of chance viz. Niyativāda, Kālavāda, Yadrachāvāda and Svabhāva vāda have been rejected.

these causes are the nature of tendencies or subconscious forces resulting from conscious efforts in the past and lying dormant in the Self. They lie dormant or unseen for a definite period of time proportionate to the intensity of the strain originally put forth. They are then released so to say, and give rise to pleasure and pain, indeed to the whole panorama of phenomenal existence. For the world itself, as already mentioned, is justifiable only on moral grounds as the field wherein the Self has to work out its destinies. It can have no other meaning.

The materialists, who rejected the efficiencies of karma, explained that a living organism (*śarīra*), just like an inorganic substance (*mūrtti*) is produced from matter under purely mechanical influences. The assumption of karma is declared unnecessary. But the Naiyāyika remarks that while the mechanical causes are indeed admissible they do not go very far; they are subject to the operation of a governing principle of Justice or Moral Retribution in the world. The mechanical theory is open to several objections: (1) The analogy of inorganic substances is ill-founded, for there is no evidence testifying to the fortuitous character of their origin. (2) On the contrary, the origin of organic bodies is known from experience to follow generally (e.g. in the case of sexually-generated bodies) from the fusion of two principles, male and female (viz. *retah* and *lohita*) but this involves previous karma—both of the person to be born and of the parents—capable of bringing about the fusion. And even where such a fusion is not a necessary pre-condition, as in the case of the *ayonija* (a-sexually generated) bodies of (i) Devas, Ṛṣis, on one hand and (ii) of the Infusoria etc. on the other, the action of karma is held to be indispensable. To explain: the immediate material which enters into the constitution of all organisms (whether *ayonija* or *yonija*) is the atomic substance, but the efficient cause, viz. the unseen agency of differentiation or the factor which determines their varieties (i.e. the

different forms of organic structure) is karma. The former is passive, but it yields to the impulse communicated to it by the latter, the active principle, and takes on a corresponding form. Unless the agency of such an unseen principle be admitted it seems hard to explain how the same primordial cells which are uniform in character and do not exhibit the slightest indications of difference either in physical or psychical activities should gradually evolve themselves into different organisms altogether.

Karma is conceived as bringing about a two-fold union—(a) the aggregation of the atoms resulting in the production of the body, and (b) the union of the particular Self, in which it inheres as a quality, with this body. These two actions are indeed not two different actions, but rather two complementary phases of the same action, and are simultaneous. For the body being considered to be the vehicle of bhoga, and bhoga explained as the experience of pleasure and pain (*sukhaduḥkhasamvitti*) it is apparent that its relation to the Self is already implied. To clear up: the same karma which resides in a particular Self creates for it by a process of atomic combination (*anusamghāta*) its vehicle of experiences. If this be not conceded a great difficulty would follow. That is to say, if it be supposed that the efficient cause of body (i.e. karma) does not pertain to the Selves severally i.e. is not *pratyātmaniyata*, the problem arises: why should one individual Self experience his pleasures and pains through one body and through that alone, rather than through any other? Since all the Selves are by nature Omnipresent and related to all bodies alike, what determines the sense of possession (*svasvāmibhāva*, *bhoktr-bhogyabhāva*, *mamatva*) in regard to a particular Self and a particular body as expressed in the judgement—‘this body is mine’? It is a universally admitted fact that such a restriction (*niyama*) of personal experience really exists—one cannot enjoy or suffer in another’s

body.¹ Hence there must be a ground of restriction. This is karma.

From what has been said above it follows that karma is the force which helps to build up a particular body and unite it (and the manas) to the Self to which it attaches, so that it lies at the root of the entire phenomena of mundane existence. The assumption of bodies and senses, not once but through a beginningless series of births, is the only means by which the experience of pleasure and pain is possible, for a disembodied soul is free from pleasure and pain—in fact from every form of mental life, e.g. cognition, desire, volition etc. Now for one who wants to be rid of pain and consequently of mental life, including what is popularly esteemed as pleasure—and pleasure not preceded, succeeded and accompanied by pain is not possible²—the one thing needful is to destroy the accumulated force of karma, this destruction alone being capable of leading to a discarnate state.

But what is it that can destroy karma? To this question one has to answer by asking a cross-question, viz what is it that produces karma or rather makes its origin or possibility? All the systems of Indian philosophy agree *in the main* in replying to both these questions. They hold irrespective of the individual standpoint from which each of them looks at Reality, that Ignorance leads to karma, or makes it productive while Knowledge serves to destroy it or to sterilise its forces. Let us confine ourselves to the special views of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika. Ignorance is said to consist in thinking that the Self is karttā and bhoktā and that it is

¹This excludes the case of the Yogins who are able to experience the pleasure and pain of anybody whatsoever as if they were their own. But then this experience would not be called bhoga at all, and is not the result of his prior karma. Hence bhoga=svasukhaduḥkhasāksātkārah Cf. *Nyāyavārttikatātparyatikā* p. 357 asti hi parakīyasukhaduḥkhasāksātkāro yoginām na hi carite bhogmaḥ

²Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 511 duḥkhasamspāṣe śāsvatikasukhasambhogāsambhavād duḥkhasya cā'vāsyahātavyatvād vivekahānasya cā'sakyatvād visamadhunī ihaktra pātrapatite ubhe api sukhaduḥkhe tyajyatām iti.

identical with the body and senses or at least is their owner. True knowledge enables the Self to realise that in itself, as dissociated from the action of the specific qualities which inhere in it under the influence of Adṛṣṭa during its term of embodied life, it is absolutely pure and indifferent (*svarūpataś cā'ham udāsīnaḥ*). It reveals the truth that all real agency or efficiency belongs to the Lord and that man is, and considers himself, to be an efficient cause in so far as he identifies himself, though falsely and unknowingly, with the Lord. This false sense of efficiency (*kartrtvabodha*) on the part of man, which is necessitated for the working out of his past karma,¹ disappears with the disruption of karma by the fire of Knowledge, so that in reality (*paramārthataḥ*) the human soul is not a free agent (*karttā*) nor even a patient (*bhoktā*) but is neutral (*udāsīna*). The notion that the soul is active or passive springs only from ignorance or misapprehension of its real character.²

¹ Udayana approaches the problem from a slightly different point of view: na cā'kurvataḥ kulālādeḥ kāyasamksobhādisādhyo bhogah siddhyed iti tadartham asya kartrtvam īśvaro' numanyate tadarthamātratvādaśvaryasye'ti (*Nyāya kusumāñjali*, Ben. Ed., Ch. V. p. 47).

² Cf. *Nyāyakanḍāḥ*, p. 281, yah karttā bhoktā'stī'ty ātmānam abhmanyate paramārthato dukkhasādhanam ca bāhyādhyātmikavīsayamsukhasādhanam ity abhmanyate so'avidvān.

THE PROBLEM OF CAUSALITY

SĀNKHYA-YOGA VIEW

In the history of ancient Indian philosophy the controversy over the doctrine of causality is very old indeed. Although the nature of the controversy has varied from time to time, the fundamental problem has persisted. It is this: what is the relation between the cause and the effect? Does the cause contain the effect in its implicit form or is the effect a new thing altogether? What are the presuppositions of the genetic process? Does it imply simply a gradual unfoldment of what lies within, as eternally existing, or is it a creation *ex nihilo*?

We know that various answers can be given to these questions according to the differences of our viewpoint. The Naiyāyika, with his commonsense and realistic assumptions would naturally be inclined to favour the view which maintains an absolute difference (*atyanta-bheda*) between the cause (material) and the effect. To him the cause and the effect are two distinct concepts, though bound together by a mysterious tie of relationship; for it cannot be gainsaid, the Naiyāyika would say, that though the effect is distinct from its cause—indeed from everything else in creation—by virtue of its own apparent individuality, it still inheres in it during its existence, and that even when it does not exist, i.e. before its production and after its destruction, its non-existence, technically known as *prāgabhāva* and *dhvaṃsa*, is predicable of its cause alone. As to what constitutes this bond of affinity nothing is said beyond the fact that it is in the nature of an effect to be thus intimately related to its own material cause. It is an ultimate fact and has to be accepted as such.

This appeal to “the nature of things” on the part of

the Naiyāyika amounts practically to a confession of weakness of his theory. The Yogin, who is an advocate of satkāryavāda, rejects the Naiyāyika hypothesis and affirms that the effect, in so far as its essence is concerned, is identical with the cause from which it comes forth. The so-called production and destruction do not really mean that the product comes into and passes away from existence. Every product being an aspect of the supreme Prakṛti in which it exists somehow involved and identified as an eternal moment, creation out of nothing and annihilation is an absurdity. Production, therefore, is differentiation and dissolution is re-integration. The process of becoming, with which the problem of causality has to deal, does indeed imply a change, but it is a change conceived as the transition of a dharma from an unmanifest to a manifest state and from the manifest back into the unmanifest condition. The substrate of change is everywhere and always an existing unit.

The sum and substance of the Satkāryavādin's contention seems to be this. We all must start from the assumption, under the necessity of our thought, that being comes from *being* and *not from not-being*, and that an absolute void giving rise to being is inconceivable. The denial of this principle would land us in contradictions. We conclude, therefore, that the effect is real (*sat*).

In the text-books of the school we find a set of five arguments brought forward to establish the reality (*sattā*) of the effect (even before its origin):

(1) The fact that what is unreal (*asat*) can not be subject to the causal operation (*kāraṅkavyāpāra*).

(2) The fact that an appropriate material (*upādāna*) is resorted to for bringing about a certain effect; in other words, that every material is not by nature capable of producing every effect. This means that the material cause, which is somehow related to the effect in question, brings about that effect. But if the

effect were not existing, there would be no relation and consequently no production. An unrelated material is no material at all.

(3) And if the necessity of the relation between the material and the effect be not admitted, it would imply that the fitness of the material is not a condition of production and that any effect could result from any cause. This would be subversive of all order and so against our experience.

(4) This difficulty cannot be got over by the assumption of śakti even, as the Mimāṃsakas seem to do. They declare that an effect, before origin, is indeed non-existent (*asat*) and that the cause is therefore indeed unrelated. Still there would be no irregularity, for we admit, they say, that the cause, in so far as it possesses a śakti favourable to a certain effect, does produce that effect. As to the question whether the cause possesses a particular śakti or not, it can only be answered *a fortiori*, for it is inferred by observation of the effect.

(5) The last argument is that the effect is nothing different from the cause (*kāranabhāvāt*). If the cause be existent (*sat*) there is no reason to maintain that the effect, which is only a mode of the cause, should be non-existent (*asat*).

This last argument requires to be expanded. We have already said that according to Sāṅkhya, unlike Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the relation between cause and effect is declared to be identity (*abheda, tādātmya*). The Naiyāyika, with his pragmatic attitude towards reality, makes utility the criterion of existence (*sattā*) and approaches the problem in a semi-Buddhistic fashion. To him, therefore, the effect, say a jar, is altogether a distinct entity from its cause, clay, for both do not serve the self-same purpose. This is arthakriyābheda. Besides this, there are other grounds, which, to a realist philosopher, help to differentiate one object from another. These are buddhi (= *pratīti*), vyapadeśa and arthakriyā-

vyavasthā. On these grounds, too, the Naiyāyika seeks to establish the difference of the effect from the cause. Thus the notion of jar is distinct from that of clay and consequently corresponding to this notional or logical difference, the Naiyāyika would say, there must be a real difference in the objective world. In other words, jar and clay, as objective realities, must be mutually different. So, too, differences of names and functions point to a difference in reality.

These are some of the stock arguments of the Naiyāyika. But they do not appear to have much weight against the Sāṅkhya-Yoga position. They lose their point as soon as they are aimed at a system in which the so-called Realism finds little support. The arthakriyābheda is really no sure test of objective difference, for the same object may have different arthakriyās; nor is arthakriyāvyaavasthā a test, for different collocations of the same cause may serve different purposes. The difference of names, viz. clay and jar, is no proof of difference either, for in that case a forest would have to be postulated as different from the individual trees composing it.

The true relation between the cause and the effect, therefore, is that the effect is a dharma, an aspect of the cause and constitutes a mode of it. The primary Prakṛti being the equilibrium of the three gunas, the effects or vikāras are nothing but various modifications and collocations of it. In essence the cause and the effect are identical, for both consist of gunas and it is in difference of collocation (*saṁsthānabheda*) that the difference between the two, as it reveals itself to our consciousness, consists. And this difference in collocation is a peculiar manifestation. That of which it is a manifestation remains always in the background, unmanifest. In the last resort, the cause, the Prakṛti, the *Materia Prima*, is the unmanifest and the effect, the vikāra, is the manifested world, always held within the bosom of that unmanifest, universal being.

The doctrine of satkārya, therefore implies, as we often find in Indian philosophy, that the universe, with an infinite number of cosmic systems belonging to it, is always existing in Prakṛti as its aspects. The evolution of a universe out of void has no meaning. The Buddhists, together with the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika, believe that the product has no existence prior to its origination and that it loses its existence as soon as it is destroyed. What this really means and how far it is justified we shall try to explain elsewhere. But we may just observe here that the whole doctrine of satkārya is a blow to this position.

To make the Yoga thesis more clear we give here a brief analysis of its concept of substance or dharmin. In the technical nomenclature of Indian philosophy the term dharmin bears the sense of "substrate, subject, that in which something is held, that of which something is predicated" and dharma means the "aspect of dharmin, predicate, content" and so forth. All predication, and therefore all judgment, involves the affirmation (*vidhāna*) or denial (*niṣedha*) of a particular dharma with reference to a particular dharmin. In fact, every proposition, which is an expression of judgment, bears testimony to the fact of predication. Now, though predication is made—and our entire phenomenal existence is necessarily based upon this—the subject of predication remains always, so far as its nature and essence are concerned, a point of controversy. When it is said that "the flower is red" the proposition is certainly intelligible to commonsense, but on closer examination the meaning of the proposition furnishes a topic for discussion. It reveals the same old problem which Nāgasena raised before Menander more than 2000 years ago. What is that to which I am attributing redness? What is meant by flower? Is it a mere bundle (*samīghāta*, *samudāya*) of sensible qualities or is there a real objective ground, a substrate, to which the qualities are attached by some natural relations? We

know that two answers are usually given to this question. The first is that of the Buddhists and in a certain sense of the Vaiyākaranas. The second answer comes from Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The Vedāntic position on this question is one of compromise between Idealism and Realism, but it lends towards the former. And the Yoga view, too, is more or less idealistic, though with an important qualification.

In other words, the Buddhists deny the existence of a substance away from the qualities and a whole as distinct from the parts. But the Realists, to whom the external world has an objective, extra-mental value, are not satisfied with this view. They posit a real substance in which various qualities inhere and which is not a mere collection of guṇas but has an independent existence. So too with the whole (*avayavī*) which results, as a distinct and independent object, from the combination of parts. In Vedānta, also, the former view is favoured. Śankara, in *Brhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya*, plainly denies substantiality to the atoms and describes them as mere guṇas. But the Yoga theory is more clear on the point. It is said indeed that dharma is the guṇa or a set of guṇas by which the dharmin is made known to us and that this guṇa may be any of the sensible qualities, viz., colour, sound, etc. or any of their combinations. But this ought not to imply that there is any fundamental distinction between dharma and dharmin. Both of these are at bottom (*paramārthatah*) one.¹ They are different only in vyavahāra. And since this difference between dharma and dharmin and between one dharma and another is founded on the appearance and disappearance of the dharmas which is due to time-limitation, it is evident that in Eternity, where there is no distinction between

¹ dharmasvarūpamātro hi dharmah. dharmivikriyavaiśeṣā dharmadvārā prapañcyata iti. tatra dharmasya dharmini varttamānasyaiva adbhvasu atitānāgatavarttamānesu bhāvānyathātvam bhavatu na dravyānyathātvam (*Yoga bhāṣya*, III 13).

past and future, all the dharmas are in a sense identical, not only with one another but even with the dharmin to which they are referred. This ultimate dharmin is the unmanifest Prakṛti whose infinite modes (*vikārāḥ*) are the infinite dharmas, of which those which are present to our consciousness are called present and the rest is characterised either as past or as future. The dharmas are, therefore, only the varying manifestations of the gunas of primary Matter. That is, Prakṛti as modified in a particular manner is known as a particular dharma or vikāra.

* * * *

The Yoga philosophy, especially the system propounded by Patañjali and Vyāsa, accepts in the main the views of the rival school of the Sāṅkhyas. The Yoga view of causality is, therefore, in all essential features almost identical with the Sāṅkhya.

From what we have said regarding satkāryavāda it must have been made clear that the Yoga (and Sāṅkhya) notion of causality has a distinct character of its own. The word 'cause' means indeed a necessary pre-condition of a subsequent event; this meaning is common to the other systems; it also accepts the anvaya and vyatireka as the guiding principles for the discovery of causality. But the characteristic doctrine remains to be noted.

If we observe the world of change and analyse it carefully we find that every change involves a double element: (*a*) a transitional one, and (*b*) a permanent one. When clay is moulded into the form of a jar, we are accustomed to speak of this moulding as an instance of change. Evidently here, too, there are two elements present, viz., clay and the forms that appear and disappear in it. The forms are all transitional—they come and go, but the matter, the clay, for instance, is relatively permanent. It is, therefore, said to be the substrate of these changes of forms, through all of which its unity remains unbroken. Before the production of jar, clay

had a definite form viz., 'lump', which disappeared and made room for the appearance of a new form, viz., 'jar', and the destruction of the jar again is nothing but the disappearance of the 'jar' form and the appearance of a fresh one in its place, and so on till Universal Dissolution when Matter will absorb within itself all its forms and regain its pristine formless and blank character. But during creation (*sr̥ṣṭi*) it stands as the background for the play of these countless fleeting forms. From this will be obvious what the relation between Matter, the dharmin, and the form, the dharma is. Every change being a kind of causation, true causal relation must be understood as meaning the relation of the form to the matter, and *not*, as the Buddhists would contend, of one form with another. In the chain of causation, of course, one form may be spoken of as the cause of another,¹ but it is not by virtue of itself but of the matter which is its content. In the technical language of Sāṅkhya-Yoga all causal relation is *praktivikṛtibhāva*, *prakṛti* being the cause and *vikṛti* the effect.

But the meaning of the term *prakṛti* is very often misunderstood. It is generally supposed to stand for the *samavāyi kāraṇa* of the Vaiśeṣika or for the material cause of the Scholastics. There is no doubt that what is meant by *samavāyi kāraṇa* falls under *prakṛti*, but the latter includes the so-called *nimittas* as well. If we leave aside for the present the question of *asamavāyi kāraṇa*, which is a peculiarity of the Vaiśeṣika alone, we may conveniently divide *prakṛti* into a two-fold aspect, viz.: *upādāna* and *nimitta*.

Thus although *prakṛti* is one and the question of causal classification is, therefore, out of place in Sāṅkhya, it becomes intelligible why we find mention of a two-fold division of the causal principle. This division is really a concession to the demands of empiric consciousness,

¹ In popular parlance, however, one dharma may be described as the dharma of another.

and is resorted to just as in Vedānta. Truly speaking, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, as much as Vedānta, is an advocate of the identity of nimitta and upādāna. In other words, the distinction between nimitta and upādāna is a pseudo-distinction, and has no existence on the plane of pure Prakṛti which is universal Being and Essence. It is only when Prakṛti has evolved herself into the first stadium, into the Mahat, that we find this distinction, of nimitta and upādāna, like every other distinction, probably brought out. The function of the nimitta, therefore, is not to serve, as with the Vaiśeṣika, as an external principle of movement, the effectuating factor in the universal Becoming. Prakṛti is self-moved (*svatahparināminī*), motion is inherent in it by nature and does not come to it from without. It (as *rajas*) is an aspect of its Being. The efficiency of the nimitta—and this is all that we mean by causal operation—consists only in the removal of the *prohibens* in the way of Prakṛti (*tamah, āvaraṇa*) and in the consequent liberation of the vikāras, the forms, held so long in confinement within the womb of Prakṛti.

For practical purposes, therefore, we may distinguish in our system between two kinds of causes at work, viz., the material and the efficient. What Aristotle designated as formal causes do not seem to possess here a causal character at all. And we shall find that the so-called final causes of Aristotle fall under the category of nimitta.

Let us try to understand the position more clearly. We have said that the material cause, the Prakṛti *qua* upādāna, possesses an eternal motion inherent in itself and is not an inert substance required to be moved from outside. It possesses *in potentia* infinite forms towards the manifestation of which it has 'a natural proneness; but this manifestation is held in check by a retarding force which, as we shall find later on, is identical with the merit or demerit of jīva with whose personal experi-

ence the manifestation is directly concerned. As soon as this force is counteracted by an opposite force, e.g., merit by demerit and *vice versa*, the path of evolution becomes clear and the material transforms itself into the appropriate effect. The block of stone for instance, contains involved within itself any kind of image, but it is able to manifest a particular image—and this manifestation is called production—only when the particular *āvarana* which stands in the way of its manifestation is removed by the sculptor's chisel. The removal of this *āvarana* constitutes the efficiency of the *nimitta*, and is the sum and substance of all causal operation. The *nimittas* do not lend any impulse to the material nor can they bring out what is not implicitly contained in it. The apt illustration in the *Yogabhāṣya* (4.3) of the water in a reservoir on a higher level flowing of itself into the lower fields when a leakage or an outlet is made in the embankment, will clear up our point. Further, since every subsidiary *prakṛti*—finite cause, is ultimately permeated by and coincident with pure *Prakṛti* it naturally follows that every individual thing in nature contains every other thing potentially.¹

Thus we need not seek for a principle of effectuation in *Prakṛti* outside of its own nature (*svabhāva*). This independence, on the part of the *Prakṛti*, of an extrinsic influence is called her *svātantrya* or freedom. *Vijñāna* Bhikṣu shows (*Yoga vārttika*, pp. 260-1) that the only possible cause of *pravṛtti* is the nature of the *gunas*.² It is universally admitted that the particles of matter (*anu*) are in perpetual motion in space. This motion is

¹ The arguments in *Śāṅkhyakārikā* viz. *upādānaniyamāt* etc. are in consonance with our ordinary experience which justifies this restriction. An effect, to be brought forth, requires an appropriate material (and appropriate subsidiary causes). This is so, because we are dealing with limited *prakṛti* and with limited human resources. But to the *Yogin*, to whom the entire *Prakṛti* is open, it is easy to evolve anything from anything.

² Cf. *Yogabhāṣya* under *Sūtra* III. 18.—*gunasvābhāvyaḥ tu pravṛttikāraṇam uktam guṇānām*.

the vague vibration characteristic of the atoms and is to be distinguished from the definite motion which brings two atoms together (*dravyārambhaka*) so as to form a substance. This motion does not serve any moral purpose, i.e., does not produce bhoga; hence merit and demerit cannot be its cause. Nor is this motion due to a special act of God's will, for it would be assuming too much. It is more reasonable, therefore, to think of it as natural. Vijñāna Bhikṣu further points out that the nimittas are not found to be necessary and indispensable in the manifestation of an effect, for the Yogin, by a mere act of his will, can bring forth anything that he pleases and for creation he does not stand in need of any human instruments. Similarly, in the beginning of creation things, e.g. seeds, are produced by God's will merely, without the help of any positive precedent conditions, e.g. similar other seeds. All this goes to corroborate the view that the nimittas have not a direct causality in the production of an object. They help, each in its own way, to rouse the evolving power of Prakṛti, viz., karma (merit and demerit) by breaking the āvarana which is a dharma opposed to itself, God's will by breaking all kinds of āvarana beginning with the greatest one i.e., state of equilibrium, kāla by rousing karmas etc., and the ordinary instruments, dandas etc., by retarding the possibility of manifestation of other effects.

* * * *

But what is the aim of all this manifestation? What is its end? An answer to this would furnish us with what Aristotle calls final causes of creation. It is admitted that all movement presupposes an end to be realised; without an end there can be no activity (*prayojanam anuddiśya na mando'pi pravartate*). This end is however variously conceived:

(a) Firstly it is pleasure or pain, which the jīva is bound to experience in consequence (i.e., as the

fruits, *phala*) of his previous karma. In common parlance, this experience is known as bhoga and jīva as bhoktā.

(b) The author of *Yogabhāṣya* sets forth that this aim is twofold, pleasure or absence of pain. The former is bhoga and the latter is apavarga. It is either of these two which is the object of a man's striving (*purusārtha*). Pleasure or bhoga, when further analysed, would be found to embrace the three varieties of end, viz. dharma, artha and kāma. But the supreme end is apavarga.

In the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (42), it is clearly stated that the purusārtha actuates the līṅga (*pravartaka*). This artha is (a) experience of pleasure and pain on the ascertainment of viśayas, or (b) denial of viśayas on the ascertainment of distinction between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. In other words, every movement is either towards viśaya-bhoga or towards bhogatyāga i.e. peace. But as bhoga is the necessary precedent of tyāga, and must eventually be followed by it, sooner or later, it may be said with reason that the end of all movement is this tyāga, which in its highest form is dissociation from Prakṛti and self-realisation. It is the "One Event to which the whole creation moves."

The perpetual unrest and agitation which we observe around us will have their close only when this supreme end is attained. The course of evolution, for each individual, will terminate when he realises the essential nature of his own self (*tatah parināmakramasamāptir gumānām*). For apart from the individual for whom it is intended, the evolution of Nature has no other meaning. As to the further question whether Nature as a whole will ever cease to evolve we have nothing to say here. This point will be discussed separately in connection with the doctrine of pralaya.

Without going into further detail at this point we may note that the conception of causality in Sāṅkhya Yoga is as much mechanical as it is teleological. Leav-

ing out the other auxiliary factors and confining ourselves to karman alone we find that it is both efficient (though negatively so as already pointed out) as well as final. Everything in Nature has its end. It will be found that even the objective inequalities in creation are not explicable except on the hypothesis of the determining principle. A thing is what it is, not by chance but, as it were, by necessity. If the external world exists, and has come into being, to serve as the object of experience (pleasure or pain) of a conscious subject and would vanish for him, as soon as that purpose is fulfilled, it is easy to follow that its varieties must be occasioned by that principle, moral in its nature, which governs the varieties of such experience; and consequently all instruments and efficient factors must work in subordination to this Supreme Governor. So far, therefore, the whole scheme of Nature, appears to be teleological.

But karman is not the last word. It is worked off partly in natural course by fruition and is ultimately transcended by the light of supreme wisdom which reveals the Self as it is and as distinct from Prakṛti. This is the final term of the evolutionary series. From this point of view, too, the scheme of Nature would be found to be pervaded by finality.

This analysis of ours leaves out of account what Aristotle calls "formal causes." Though the forms, as conceived in the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and even in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, are not considered to have a causal character strictly, they are not important in the order of creation, so far as the specialities of the individuals are concerned. They will be discussed elsewhere.

* * * *

It is universally admitted that the world of sensible reality is a world of perpetual change, and it is also practically assumed, as we said, that every change involves a twofold element, viz., one that is transient and the other that is relatively permanent. The material,

which is the subject of change, endures, while the effect comes and goes.

A careful and systematic study of this problem of change led in ancient India to the formulation of three broad theories viz., Ārambhavāda, Parināmavāda and Vivarttavāda.

The Ārambhavāda or the doctrine of origination (genesis) is the view of the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika to whom the effect is entirely a different thing from the productive material. It is immaterial whether the effect produced is a substance or a quality or an action; in all cases it is a new thing altogether and is distinct from the substance from which it arises. This view is a necessary corollary from the Asatkāryavāda. That the effect is found to inhere, so long as it continues in existence, in its material cause and is not capable of separation from it, simply proves that there is an intimate relation between the two and not that the two are identical.

A strong argument in favour of Ārambhavāda seems to be furnished from the atomic theory. This theory postulates the existence of an infinite number of eternal particles of matter as the ultimate constituents of all substantial products (*kāryadravya*), that is, every product is explained as due to a peculiar combination resulting in contact (*ārambhakasamyoga*) of these particles. And since it is impossible to consider the product as a mere grouping of the parts—and the reason why this is impossible consists in the disparity between the two, viz., that the particles are imperceptible and many, while their collection is *perceived* as *one*—it is more compatible with commonsense to suppose that the parts, by reason of combination result in the formation of the *whole* which is a *new* entity, pure and simple.

But what is the bearing of this doctrine on the problem of change? The question is whether change is predicable of the whole (*avayavī*) or of the ultimate particles or of both.

The Vaiśeṣika says that the particles change and that the resultant whole also consequently changes. This is of the nature of chemical change and is due to the influence of tejas. The constant change going on in the world is in the end reducible to this type. In other words, if X represents the whole consisting of parts represented by, say, $a, b, c,$ and $d,$ we might say that the change of a, b, c, d into a', b', c', d' by the assumption of new qualities would necessarily involve the destruction of X and of the origin of a new whole, called Y.¹ This theory, therefore, assumes a double series of change—one in the parts and one in the whole. But why does a and c change into $a',$ etc.? It is not natural, of course, for this would violate the postulate that no motion is inherent in a thing. To explain this change the Vaiśeṣika assumes the contact of a and c with the particles of tejas which penetrate into the body by means of pores (according to Vaiśeṣika, every substantial product is porous and pervious), break the contact of the atoms and produce in them a change of qualities. The atoms, as thus changed, are united again and form a fresh whole. This tejas is not only what we ordinarily call fire. It is ultimately the Solar Energy which, therefore, stands at the root of all physical and chemical changes in the world.

But the Naiyāyika does not agree in this. He holds, against the Vaiśeṣika, the solidity of substantial product and its impenetrability by heat-particles which act upon the body as a whole and produce in it change of qualities. Thus, though the substance is constant, from its origin till its destruction, it is subject to change so far as its qualities are concerned.

The Vedāntist does not admit with the Vaiśeṣika that difference of size (*parināma*) is the cause of difference of substance; hence the dharmin, say the jar, remain-

¹ The atoms remain the same, but their qualities change.

ing the same, its former rūpa is destroyed and is replaced by a new rūpa; similarly the animal organism remaining the same, its leanness (*kārśya*) is due to falling off (*apacaya*) of particles and its fatness (*sthanulya*) may be explained as due to accretion (*upacaya*) of new particles. Thus the body of 'A' when one year old would be identical with his body in his eightieth year, although there may be an entire change of particles and difference of size. In other words, it is the same body in different states (*avasthā*).

The problem of change has received a good deal of attention and careful treatment in the hands of Sāṅkhya and especially of Yoga. *Pariṇāma* means disappearance of one dharma, followed by the appearance of another, within the same subject or dharmin.¹ The word is used to indicate the process when it refers to the subject, and the result of this process when it refers to the predicate, dharma. In popular usage and in later literature this word is found synonymous with *vikāra*.²

This *pariṇāma* is threefold, according as it concerns dharma, lakṣaṇa and *avasthā*. The definition of *pariṇāma* given above is that of dharma *pariṇāma*. *Lakṣana-pariṇāma* is the name of the change in regard to lakṣaṇa or time-sequence, i.e. past, present and future. The grammatical tenses correspond to this *pariṇāma* in nature. The lakṣaṇa too is not conceived as an ultimate unit and is further analysable into what we may call *avasthā* or states, viz. new or old. Each such state is supposed to be ultimate and momentary. This kind of *pariṇāma* is not really expressible in language. This being the case the evolution of Nature may be supposed to consist of a series of such successive moments. In this ceaseless stream of *pariṇāma* everything is being carried away from

¹ *avasthitasya dravyasya pūrvadharmanivṛttau dharmāntarotpattih pariṇāmah. Yoga Bhāṣya III 13*

² *upajanāpāyaśāli dharmā eva ca vikāra ity ucyate,*

Brahmavidyābhāṣana, p. 146 (Adv Mañj Ed.)

the future through the present into the past. But the future (*anāgata*) and the past (*atīta*) being nothing but unmanifest Prakṛti, every pariṇāma is a passage from the unmanifest into manifestation and return into the unmanifest. This represents a circle, of which one half, viz., passage from unmanifest into manifestation, i.e. from the future into the present, stands for what is known as viśa-*dr̥sapariṇāma* and another half i.e. return from manifestation into the unmanifest, i.e. from the present to the past for *sadr̥sapariṇāma*. This is true of all the three kinds of pariṇāma.

Thus the triple pariṇāma represents a series of three circles not mutually exclusive but really concentric, dharmapariṇāma being the outermost and the avasthā-pariṇāma the inmost of the group. But dharma and avasthā are relative concepts merely and are identical. The author of *Yogabhāṣya* clearly states (III. 13) that the change of dharma in a dharmin, of lakṣaṇa in a dharma and of avasthā in a lakṣaṇa is the same process, being characterised by modification of the substance and involving a transition of states (*avasthā*).¹

This change is incessant and uncaused. It pervades the whole realm of Nature. It is said that nothing that is made of guṇas is ever, even for a single moment, at rest and this for the simple reason that guṇas are by nature fickle.² Even in the state of dissolution when the manifested universe is resolved into Prakṛti, this change or mutation still continues—this is *sadr̥sapariṇāma*.³ It

¹ dharmino'pi dharmāntaram avasthā, dharmasyā'pi laksanāntaram avasthā ity eka eva dravyaparnāmo bhedeno'padarśita iti. Agam . paramārthastu eka eva parināmah. Bālarāma points out (p. 210, f note 3) that the three parināmas are really cases of avasthāparināma or they are all to be labelled as dharmaparināma, since all the mutations are in the dharmin as their permanent abode

² dharmalakṣaṇāvasthāparināmah śūnyam na ksanam api gunavrttam avasthate. calam ca gunavrttam. *Yogabhāṣya*, III. 13.

³ Brahmānanda Bhārati, in his *Saralāsāṅkhyā*, p 177 seems to deny that in the state of equilibrium (*sāmyāvasthā*) there could be parināma. He says that the admission of pariṇāma, even if *sadr̥sa*, would militate against the theory of Equilibrium of Guṇas in *pralaya*, for pariṇāma (*vasāmya*) and *sāmya* are contra-

is only Purusa or the Self which is truly immutable, being beyond Prakṛti.

Now a dharma or state, unless it is present, must be either past or future; but in all these states the dharmin of which these are affirmed, is constant. A dharma is a particular śakti pertaining to a substance and is inferred to exist in it from its action, viz., from the production of a particular effect. It is subject to mutation, but is never annihilated (cf. conservation of energy). The present (or uḍita i.e. actual) dharma is one which is described as "svavyāpāram anubhavan" and "savyāpāra"; this is the object of our immediate consciousness, and is differentiated, on the one hand, from the past or śāntadharmā which has ceased to be active (*kṛtvā vyāpārān uparatah*) and on the other, from the future (possible or *avyapadeśya*) dharma which has not yet commenced to operate. Of these dharmas the present only is felt as distinct (*viśista*) from Prakṛti by reason of its manifest character, and one might say that this alone exists. And we know that the Buddhists actually denied the others. The past and the future dharmas are not directly known. The truth in the matter seems to be that these dharmas rest in Prakṛti as in union with it and are not distinguishable, not only from one another but even as dharmas. Their essence is the essence of the Dharmin.

Hence it follows that the dharmas are twofold, according as they are manifest (*abhivyakta*) or unmanifest (*anabhivyakta*) and the dharmin is the substance which persists (*anvayi*) in them both and consists of a double nature viz., it is a sāmānya as well as a viśesa i.e., as a sāmānya it persists in and is identical with śānta and avyapadeśya dharma and as a viśesa it persists in and is the same as uḍitadharmā. In other words, every effect or manifest product, in so far as it is a manifestation, is an individual (*viśeṣa*) and considering its past

dictory. Bhārati's objection seems to me unfounded. It rests on a misunderstanding of the meaning of pariṇāma,

and future unmanifest condition is identical with the universal Being or Prakṛti (*sāmānya*). The relation of cause and effect being identity in difference (*tādātmya*) every effect has an individual character (derived from its identity with cause) by virtue of which it is perceived as one with everything else in nature.

The above will suffice to bring out the meaning of the statement that all things are essentially identical and consequently all are in all. The root-principle of Yoga philosophy and practice is thus found to be a recognition of the fact that everything is full of infinite possibilities, and personal exertion is meant simply to give them, by removing the obstructions, actuality. As to how this is done we shall discuss elsewhere.

The perpetuity of flux is thus found to be an established fact in Nature. Our mind as well as the outer world are both equally fluent. Let us now try to discover how these momentary changes contribute to various results. The question is: if the dharmin is one and suffers changes of state moment by moment, it follows that these changes are all uniform, and in that case how are we to account for the varieties of creation? The origin of multiplicity in effects from one or uniform cause is an illegitimate hypothesis. Concerning this it is said that diversity of modification is due to diversity of krama. Krama is the relative sequence between one dharma and another (*dharma* includes *lakṣana* and *avasthā* also) and is ultimately a unit of change. It is the sequence of ksanas (*kṣaṇānantaryātmā*). One dharma may be said to be a krama of another provided that it immediately follows it. The krama of dharma and lakṣana parināmas is sensible, but that of avasthā parināma is extremely subtle and supersensuous. None but a Yogin can perceive the subtle change that a substance is undergoing every moment. But such kramas, though ordinarily imperceptible, are not to be ignored. Their cumulative effect, from which they are inferred, is great. It is their

permutations and combinations, endless in number, which give rise to this manifold of our sensible experience.

Thus understood *krama* is a movement of the *guṇas*. Referring to a *dharma*, we may define *krama* as its movement, from moment to moment, from the *anāgata* state towards manifestation (*varttamānatā*) and then towards *atīta*. In the *atīta* or *śānta* stage of the *dharma*, where all movement comes to a stand-still, there is no *krama*¹ and it is for this reason that it is described as irrevocable. That *krama* belongs to the present *dharma* is universally admitted. But the *Yogin* points out that even the *anāgata dharma*, a *dharma* which has not yet come to be manifested and is yet in the womb of *Prakṛti* as an *avyapadeśyadharmā*, possesses *krama* and is subject to the law of fluctuation. Had it not been so, an *anāgata-dharma* would never have become *varttamāna* at all. An *anāgatadharmā* becoming *varttamāna* is tantamount to the evolution of primordial Nature. A detailed study of this point and the secrets of creation will be furnished elsewhere, when it will also be shown that just as lapse into the past is the final term of the life-history of *dharma*, so the *anāgatāvasthā* of the *dharma* is the initial term of its history. And this *anāgatāvasthā* may be conceived firstly (1) as *Prakṛti* and then (2) as an ideal *dharma* (*bodha*) i.e. the same *dharma* when it is in the *Mahat*. (Cf. the original meaning of the term 'conception').

The philosophy of *krama* is very deep. It is said that the *gunas* being eternal and always in motion by nature, the *krama* of their modification never comes to an end. Their *parināma* is eternal. But their *evolutes* viz. *buddhi* etc. are not permanent. That is, the *krama* of every substantial product ceases one day when it becomes

¹ *Yogabhasya*, III. 14

The question is How, then, can the *Yogin* call back the past, though he does not usually call back, but revokes only a phantom, an exact duplicate, of the past?

dissolved. Every product, buddhi downwards, is meant to serve as an end or a means to an end, of the self (be it *bhoga* or *apavarga*) and is thereby justified in its existence. The realisation of *puruṣārtha* is the *raison d'être* of the existence and continuance of the manifested world, and as soon as this is accomplished (finally by *dharma-megha*) it is resolved into its components, viz., the *guṇa* particles (Cf. *Yoga Sūtra* IV. 32). But this is for one man—for him only who has reached his goal. There are other *jīvas* who may be still in the middle of their journey, some who are still moving outwards in search of *bhoga* or earthly enjoyment and some who, having turned back upon them, are indeed moving inwards but are yet on the path, struggling in pursuit of the saving knowledge. For such *jīvas* the manifested world (*drśya*) will have to continue. And the number of *jīvas* being infinite there will never come a time when there will be no more a manifest, objective world (*Yoga Sūtra* II. 22). But this does not violate the possibility of periodic dissolution of the world.

We have seen above that the *krama* of modification of the *drśya* ends as soon as the *puruṣārtha* is realised. But as the *krama* has an end, has it also a beginning? The *drśya* being only a product or evolute of the relation between *Purusa* and *Prakṛti*, the question recurs—what is the origin of this relation and when did it originate? We pointed out that the *anāgatāvasthā* is the beginning of the *krama* of the *dharma*. Does this *avasthā* refer to a definite point of time or is it simply a vague assumption following from the necessity of thought alone? Put more pointedly, the question refers itself to the moral explanation of the bondage and consequent limitations imposed on the self. In reply to this pertinent question, the *Sāṅkhya Yoga*, like other kindred systems, asserts that we cannot posit an absolute beginning of this series of *ksanas*, that since every *ksana* is explicable only on the hypothesis of a preceding *ksana* no absolutely first *ksana*

is conceivable. The causal series must be held to be infinite *ab ante*.

Moreover, what is the nature of this relation between Puruṣa and Prakṛti (i.e. between Puruṣa and Sattva)? The relation is given in every judgment of ours, which is a function (*vṛtti*) of the buddhi and implies a co-ordination of subject and object. Such a co-ordination of two distinct and mutually exclusive principles is not possible except through confusion or non-discrimination (*avidyā, viparyaya*). Thus this relation, which is the source of phenomenal consciousness and misery, is due to mithyā-jñāna. But the origin of mithyā-jñāna can be explained only as a consequent of another mithyā-jñāna and that of another, and in this way the series would be stretched infinitely backwards and we would not be able to arrive at its first term at all. The gunas being always in relation to the Puruṣa, (because both are eternal)¹ their effects too must always have been in relation with it. (*dharmīnām anādisamyogād dharmamātrānām apy anādiḥ samyogah*. Pañcaśikha in *Yogabhāṣya* II. 22).

But the usual argument set forward in support of the beginningless character of saṃsāra consists in the inexplicability of the inequalities of pleasure, pain etc. on the hypothesis of a beginning in time.

The inevitable conclusion which follows from the above is practically a confession of ignorance. However smartly we may tackle the problem, the mystery remains ever the same. Different attempts at solution simply change the form of the difficulty, but the mystery is never

¹This is the doctrine of anādisamyogah. Cf. *dr̥gdarsānaśaktyor nityatvād anādiḥ samyogo vyākhyātaḥ*:—*Yogabhāṣya* II. 22. The Naiyāyikas, as a rule, reject the possibility of contact being without a beginning. According to them samyoga, which is aprāptipūrvikā prāptiḥ, must be due to motion, either of one or of both. But aśamyoga also is sometimes admitted. Cf. *Nyāya Vārtikā*, p. 466. For eternity of saṃsāra see *Nyāyabhāṣya*, 3 I. 27; *Nyāya Vārtikā*, I. I. 2; 1.1.19. *Nyāya Mañjarī*, p. 499. The relation which is expressed in Yoga as a contact between Puruṣa and Prakṛti (or rather Sattva i.e. Citta) appears in Nyāya as the contact of the Self with the manas (*Nyāya Mañjarī*, p. 499) or with the body (*Nyāya Bhāṣya* 3.1.27).

fully cleared. Yet from an intellectual and rational point of view, the doctrine of anāditva remains the only valid theory on the point.

This doctrine implies that there has never been a first karman or a first mithyājñāna, in the absolute sense of the term. There has always been a push from behind. The difficulty of admitting a first karman would be great. Assuming pluralism and absence of limitations, all karmans would be uniform in the beginning and differences would never ensue. According to such a view the selves, before they fell into the meshes of Prakṛti, must have been in a free condition, joyous and pure. Why then should they have acted at all? And even if they had acted, why should one have acted differently from another? In such a theory differences have to be assumed in the very beginning, and since these differences are self-explained and do not require an intrinsic ground of justification, why not extend the same lower down in the series? But this would upset the causal principle and end in a chaos of thought. Better, therefore, than introducing differences on the *eternal planes* (*nityadhāman*), it is to explain them in the usual way by referring them to the adequate causal conditions working *in time*. An endless succession is not an illegitimate hypothesis.

Unless the causal series is admitted to be infinite, that is, if the world be supposed to have a beginning in time, we must have to take recourse, as already noted, to the doctrine of accident and chance (*nirnimittavāda*). In that case, the experience of pleasure and pain on the part of jīvas would remain unexplained and there would follow the defect of akṛtābhyāgama or fallacy of unmerited reward and punishment. Moreover, the doctrine would involve the possibility of the free souls also returning to bondage. Śāṅkara expresses himself on this point thus: ādimattve hi saṁsārasyā'kasmād udbhūter muktānām api punaḥ saṁsārodhbhūtiprasaṅgah, akṛtābhyāgama-prasaṅgaś ca, sukhadukkhādivaiṣamyasya nirnimittatvāt

(*Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*, II. 1. 36). These inequalities are not explicable through Īśvara and through mere avidyā (without *karmans* following from the *vāsanās* of the *kleśas*, viz. *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *moha*) which is uniform in all (cf. also *Sāṅkara Bhāṣya* I. 3. 30).

This is the burden of infinite karman which every jīva bears on his back. To escape from this is to obtain permanent peace. How this may be done need not be discussed at this point. The question why one jīva differs from another morally, since all are equally burdened with anādi karman of an infinite kind, seems to be solved by the consideration of succession (*karma*) in the development or ripening of the karmans. The karmans being infinite, their permutations and combinations too are infinite. Hence the difference in the different series of lives.

This view is not universally admitted even in India, though undoubtedly this is accepted in all the recognised systems of Indian philosophy. For there are schools which, while conceding that the world as such has neither beginning nor end, deny that a particular jīva's course of existence in it should also be beginningless. They mean to say that as the jīvahood has an end at a definite point of time, it begins also in time. It is inconceivable that a line, which is known to end, should have no beginning. If the term 'anādi' is intended to mean that we do not know when the series begins, simply because our own vision does not reach far back, it is all right. It would merely amount to a confession of the fact that our eyes are dimmed with avidyā and cannot discover the beginning; but if it means, as it undoubtedly does, that it has no beginning at all, it is nonsense. These thinkers teach that the jīva is originally pure and free, and essentially identical with Īśvara, but that through some fault on his part he was thrown into the vortex of saṁsāra in which he has been rotating ever since and from which he will be able to escape only when the force (*vega*) with which he fell (which itself was determined by the intensity of

the original fault) will have been exhausted. The intensity of his fault determines the length of his stay away in saṃsāra. His original fall and his final emancipation are both due to the action of Divine Will, the former known as nīgrahaśakti and the latter as the anugrahaśakti (Power of Grace) of the Supreme Lord.

The question how the jīvas, all pure and spotless at first, are at all capable of transgression, and even then why they transgress in different ways, is answered by saying that they are all 'free' (*svatantra*) at this stage and that their actions are all self-determined. The different series of lives of the jīvas may be explained by their original differences on the Eternal Plane. These differences do not require to be explained from without. They follow from the essential difference in the nature of jīvas. For, according to this view, the jīvas are different from one another, so far as personality is concerned, although each of them may be pure, free, etc. equally with the rest. This is a doctrine characteristic of all the pluralistic systems.

STAGES IN YOGA

The earliest, and I might say the greatest (if not the only), pre-occupation of an ordinary man's life is the thought of happiness to himself or to those around him. It is this positive thought—and it pre-supposes in its fullest significance an absolute negation of all possible evil—which spurs him into activity and constitutes the mainspring of his moral existence. But circumstanced as he is, he is hardly in a position to clearly envisage the ideal which lies vaguely before him. For the clear presentation of the ideal requires a degree of mental clarity and disinterested quiescence which is rarely to be found in an average man of the present age, in which the insistent demands of one's physical nature and surroundings leave one hardly any time or energy to devote to a calm consideration of a deep ethical problem. The difficulty remains the same, even when the ideal is pictured in a different colour. Perfection, harmony, universal love and service, freedom—all these concepts represent the varied aspects of one and the same ideal, and the vagueness found in respect of the one pertains equally to all the rest.

The truth is, the facts of transcendent life are, as a rule, so little known to the world outside that the very existence or possibility of such a life is often more a matter of pious belief than of sincere conviction. And it is no wonder. With the limitations imposed upon us by our material nature it is hardly possible to look behind the appearances and have a glimpse of the transcendent realms beyond. The knowledge of a higher life than what is ordinarily presented to us cannot be possible unless and until our general outlook is widened in consequence of the inner awakening due to Yoga. Yoga is

really the paramount power which leads us not only to a knowledge of the higher life, which is spiritual, but also to its practical realisation by the Self. India has always asserted, and it has been doing so in no feeble accents since the very dawn of the world's civilisation, that it is exclusively in Yoga that one can find the key to the solution of all the problems of life and mind as well as to the realisation of the supreme end of existence. "Nā'sti yogasamañ balam", "ayañ tu paramo dharmah yad yogenā'tmadarśanam" and similar other sayings point to this fact.

But what is Yoga? What is the secret of the great power which is universally attributed to it? What are the natural stages through which the life of a Yogin must, of necessity, pass before it can attain to consummation and realise its community with the essence of the Universal Life and even transcend it? Before these questions are taken up for discussion it should be clearly borne in mind that what ordinarily passes for Yoga in the world around us can hardly be described as such in the real sense of the term. Even if it be not a travesty of the great science it is at least a faint semblance, mostly artificial, of a rudimentary aspect of the complex psycho-physical discipline which in itself represents only a fragment of the true way to Yoga proper. It is unfortunate that ordinary people, including most of the educated persons of the present day (both of the West and of this country), have all their knowledge of the subject derived from this source. And the effect of this corrupt and vitiated knowledge on their mental outlook has been what might be expected. To understand a subject properly, specially when the subject is of an intricate and extremely delicate character, it is necessary that the mind should be dispossessed of all its pre-conceived notions and predilections and held in readiness in an attitude of passive but self-conscious receptivity.

Yoga is really the establishment of identity, at least

of communion, between the individual self (*jīvātman*) and the Universal Self (*paramātman*), which pre-supposes a corresponding relation on the lower planes of existence viz., between the mind and the individual self, between the senses and the mind and between the object and the senses. The individual can not realise its eternal affinity with the Universal or merge itself in it, unless it can get over the influence of the mind with which it falsely identifies itself. In the same way, the absorption of the mind in the quiet awareness of the Self is not possible so long as, through concentration and consequent self-effacement, it has not got rid of the distracting power of the senses over it. On the lowest level, similarly, the senses can not calm down and attain to unity with the mind until they are free from the action of the objects of the world outside. All the principles are thus found to be arranged in a concatenated series. In the lowest stage of spiritual perfection, therefore, Yoga may be described in a language which would represent it as the withdrawal of the senses from the external world and their convergence in the mind. Ascending a step higher up, one would find it in the suspension of the modalities of the mind itself and its consequent unity, as it were, with the individual self, from which it appears as distinct only through its workings. When the mind ceases to be active its distinctness as an entity vanishes altogether. But the final and culminating perfection of Yoga does not manifest itself even at this stage, which represents the standpoint of Patañjali and his school. For with the individual left as separate from the Universal and the Supreme the higher function of Yoga cannot be stated to have been fulfilled. As soon as the artificial barrier raised between the higher and the lower self is demolished the Pure Self emerges as a radiant and eternally self-aware existence of Joy in which the two aspects of its being appear as united in an eternal embrace of ineffable sweetness. This is Yoga in the truest sense of the word.

We propose to study the problem under these three aspects, though as a matter of actual fact each of these aspects may be examined in several distinct phases. The first stage which finds its achievement in the abstraction of the senses from their objects is really the viewpoint of Hathayoga proper, as taught by Mārkaṇḍeya in ancient times and by Matsyendranāth, and his band of followers (e.g., Gorakṣa, Jalandhara, Caturāṅgī, etc.) in the middle ages. The activities of the senses and their contact with the external world are occasioned by the operation of Vāyu, which though corresponding to the so-called bio-motor force of the living organism is to be regarded as identical with Vāsanā. The vision of an external world as other than the Supreme Self is, in fact, a magic show of illusive character devoid of all reality. It is the action of Vāyu or Vāsanā on the sensory mechanism of organic existence which projects before it a world of illusion. The discipline of the first stage consists in the removal of this illusion. The control of Vāyu, at which all the processes of Hatha Yoga aim, ends in securing a relative steadiness of the senses and therewith a comparative detachment from the world outside. This is an indispensable preliminary to the success of the mental culture towards which the discipline of the next higher stage is directed. Perfection in the first stage is the perfection of body as presupposed in the control of the senses. The human body in its normal state, however healthy in an ordinary sense, is highly defective and incapable of acting as a fit instrument for the exercise of higher powers. It has to be purged of its impurities and made clean. This purification may be effected by a variety of ways, many of which fall within the scope of Hatha Yoga proper. This culture of the senses, of which the physical culture is an aspect, is completed when the senses are drawn inwards and coalesce in a common sense, which is different from and yet identical with the mind.

As soon as the common outer sense disappears what

is left behind is the mind in a state of concentration. As this concentration matures and gathers strength, various degrees of ecstatic intuition manifest themselves, of course as a result of a continued process of meditation. The rise of Prajñā is consequent on the attainment of samādhi of the mind. But as the samādhi corresponds to the object aimed at, its variety is dependent on the varieties of objects. The object may be an ordinary thing perceived in the world around us or a subtle element. It may even be the inner organ itself or agent behind the organ making use of it as an instrument. The luminous substance of the mind, when immediately in contact with an object—the senses having ceased—interpenetrates into it and is imbued with its nature and form. The Self behind the mind, now converted into the object as it were, shines on as a silent witness of the entire process of metamorphosis and of its result. It looks on as a transcendent observer towards the mind which, having been already purged, now appears in the form of the object concerned. During this time the mind is free from subjection to the physical body; in fact the body totally disappears in the radiance of the luminous mind, and this is not only in the eye of the person engaged in the spiritual pursuit but even of the world. This marks a condition when the subtle body of man, being disengaged from his fleshy bonds as a result of his efforts in the first stage described above, asserts itself in a luminous form, the brightness and the colour of which are proportionate to the degree of purity attained. This light has a pseudo-eternal form of its own, but it is not easily revealed; so long as association with the body continues to be strong it appears more or less in the shape of its physical counterpart from which it has been partially and temporarily separated. This influence of the flesh on the mind is really the impurity of the latter, so that the relative purity of the mind corresponds to its comparative elimination of the physical shape imposed upon it. And

this elimination, which is indicated by the gradual brightening and whitening of the luminous stuff, may or may not be accompanied by the appearance of a fresh form, according as the impress of an object outside itself may or may not have already been made upon it. The existence of this impress represents a particular stage of samādhi conditioned by the character of the object occasioning it. Pātañjali's school marks four distinct subdivisions of this stage as we shall observe hereafter. But there are various other possible schemes which are recognised in the other systems. In case there is no outside object to determine the form of the luminous mind and even no subjective impression carried forth from the flesh left behind, the mind in the ordinary circumstances would sink into formlessness entailing an unconscious and a dark existence. It cannot ordinarily retain its individuality—in fact it finds no character of its own—when it is absolutely free. It gets overpowered under the weight of primitive matter from which it emerged as an essence to co-operate with the Spirit in the work of spiritual emancipation. This is the Sphinx' riddle which inevitably presents itself to the aspirant.

The mind cannot be dispensed with before it has been pressed into service. What is really needed is that it should be purged and purified and then enlightened. The light having once dawned on the mind, the mind is merged in it and the light alone remains, which becomes then the adjunct of the lower spirit and marks its attainment of self-consciousness. In the poetical language of the Śāstras, this is a necessary phase of the spiritual awakening or the awakening of the Kuṇḍalinī. But the practical difficulty is that as soon as the mind, which is always illumined by the Spirit behind it, loses touch with the object which impresses it anew or with its old impressions, it loses its luminous nature and sinks into the unconscious, it loses its luminous nature and sinks into

the unconscious.¹ And for its purification such loss of touch is indispensable. The required solution consists in the purification of the mind with its consciousness and luminosity retained, that is in the revelation of the pseudo-eternal form of the light which stands fixed behind the subtle body. Call it by the name of mental body, celestial body (*divyadeha*), ideal body (*bhāvadeha*) or by any other name, it is a marvellous acquisition. It is a form of perpetual freshness and ideal beauty radiant with a sweet halo shining above the mists of worldly passions and the incessant flux of Time, and is eternally free from decay and death. The second stage of the spiritual journey ends in the attainment of the outer phase of this

¹ That the cessation of the modalities of the mind is in itself no criterion of Wisdom is recognised by all the Śāstras and by the people who have some experience of the path. The system propounded by Patañjali makes a clear-cut distinction between the cessation due to physiological or even psychological causes (*bhava-pratyaya asamprajñāta samādhi*) and that which follows as a matter of course from the rise of Intuition or Prajñā (*upāyopratyaya asamprajñāta samādhi*). Intuition is the legitimate offspring of the Samprajñāta Samādhi which develops itself steadily and through continued practice from proper sādhanas (*upāya*), viz. śraddhā, vīrya and smṛti. The ascending courses of this samādhi serve to clarify the Intuition and liberate it from the discursive elements of the lower nature. The purity of Intuition implies an effacement of all the saṃskāras and inhibition of all the vṛttis and its own disappearance in the end. This is Yoga proper, from the standpoint of Patañjali, in which the individual spirit, standing on itself, becomes the witness of the Nature, in itself and in its becoming (though the process of becoming for the observing subject has stopped). The Buddhists also were aware of this distinction in Nirodha. The difference between the prasaṅkyā nirodha and the aprasaṅkyā nirodha which has been described with such details in general treatises of some of the Buddhist sects is in reality this very difference in another shape. One is reminded in this connection of the interesting story of the Buddhist scholar Kamala Śīla, the disciple of Śāntarakṣita, who was invited from Magadha to Tibet by its king Thsron Den Tsan and had a learned controversy on this very question with the great Chinese Monk Mahāyān Hoshang (900 A.D.). Hoshang maintained if the mind was kept absolutely free from thought or vikalpanā, emancipation from worldly existence (*bhava*) was possible. This freedom from thought or vikalpanā corresponded in his opinion to the state of Nuṛālamba which was the ideal to be aimed at. But the position of Kamalaśīla was that the absolute negation of mental activity implied an absence of pratyaveksana prajñā (critical knowledge), without which perfect knowledge (*samyakjñāna*), which was transcendent (*lokavigata*), could not arise. The inactivity of the mind or its unconscious state could not ensure eternal freedom from vikalpas for which the rise of transcendent wisdom through pratyaveksana prajñā was indispensable.

status. The inner phase cannot be acquired except through initiation or the special grace of the Guru or the Supreme Master.

Before we proceed to describe at some length the third and the highest stage, we may appropriately pause to examine the second stage of the path. There are four successive periods of this as recognised by Vyāsa in his commentary on *Yoga-Sūtras*:—

(a) The initial (*prathamakalpika*) period when the light has just set in (*pravṛttamātrajyotiḥ*). During this time the supernormal sense is evolved. The Yogin who is passing through this period is yet a mere practitioner, though the manifestation of the inner light brings within his reach certain extraordinary phenomena.

Reading the thoughts of other minds, sensing distant objects as if they were near (e.g. clairvoyance, clair-audience, etc.), direct knowledge of the past and the future as well as that of the present, and various other powers of a like nature accrue to a Yogin even in the first period of his spiritual evolution. But they are only occasional manifestations and not permanent possessions. In the same way visions of gods and goddesses, of angels and siddhas, of strange scenes of distant worlds and past lives occur to him from time to time, indicating that he is on a new path with glorious prospects lying before him.

(b) The second period, (called *madhu* or *madhu-matī bhūmi*), marks a decided advance on the first and is initiated by the origin of the clarified intuition, called *rtambharā prajñā*, when the mind of the Yogin gains a vision of pure truth and is never touched by error. This intuition can not originate so long as the objective *samādhi* is not perfected. It has already been observed that the *samādhi* may have for its support either an external substance which is a gross physical object or a subtle element. There is really no limit to the magnitude of the objective support either in its greatness or in its minuteness. As a matter of fact there is nothing existing

in nature to which the mind of the Yogin cannot be directed. The subtle and super-sensuous objects consist of the atoms—rather their rudimentary bases (*tanmātras*)—the Ego, the Pure Liṅga and the ultimate Guṇas. This is a very critical period in the life of a Yogin, in which he is apt to be led astray by the passion of conceit or by attachment. The Yogin at this stage has already passed beyond the initial state of illumination but has not yet obtained full control over the senses and the elements. The visits of celestial beings—whether angels, gods, fairies or of any other class—of which we read so much in the lives of the mystics, are of common occurrence during this time. Even tempting offers are sometimes made, but the Yogin, not yet firm in his position, has to exercise his judgement and spurn all such offers. It is to be noted that this, the second period of a Yogin's life, represents remarkable purity (*śuddhi*) which invites such temptations but no powers.

(c) The third period, (called *prajñājyotiḥ*) marks the fullest mastery of the elements and the senses—a mastery which affords him control over the forces of nature, creative, preservative and destructive. The conquest of the five primordial elements and ability to use them at will gives rise in the mind to the eight great powers and also tends to produce a beautiful and durable body. It should be remembered that each of the elements has five distinct aspects which have to be mastered one by one. The grossest aspect of the elements (*sthūla*) is, of course, familiar to us all as the object of our sense-perception. In other words, for instance, the specific characters of the outer world which are reported by the senses as well as the peculiar collocation in which they appear to us constitute the so-called dense form of the elements. The entire sensible universe belong to this category and it is not possible for an ordinary man to step beyond it. The next form of the elements (called *śvarūpa*) is more general and as such is not easily per-

ceived as distinct except by logical abstraction. Thus configuration is the generic essence of the first element, wetness (*sneha*) of the second, heat of the third and so forth. It is worth pointing out that the specific properties noted above, viz. sound, touch, colour, moisture and smell are evolved from, and are the peculiar manifestations of, these generic essences. Every substance existing in the world (*dravya*), in fact substance itself, is no more than a combination of these generic and specific qualities in a co-ordinated complex. The laws of collocation are extremely intricate, but they govern the entire field of cosmic action. A mere assemblage of particles does not show signs of unity and life—which presuppose synthesis and harmony; and without this unity there can be no substance. What in scientific parlance is denominated as chemical affinity is from the view-point of Yoga the semblance of a relation, in fact of a composite union, existing on a higher plane, which vaguely asserts itself even after descent from the plane concerned. Where such unity is not in existence the collection of particles is only a mechanical and barren affair and has no urge of life within, and it does not tend to evolve any new property characteristic of the production of a new substance. The third or subtle form (*sūkṣma*) of the elements is the tanmātra, of which the atomic substance with its generic and specific properties is a modification. The fourth form (*anvaya*) is the gunas which follow the nature of the effect. The fifth aspect of an element is the pragmatic virtue (*arthavattva*) inherent in the gunas in so far as the latter serve the ends of worldly experience or freedom. All these aspects reveal themselves to a Yogin and are subject to his control.

The conquest of the elements produces great psychic powers. Thus when a Yogin can command the lowest or gross form of matter he finds it possible to convert his body into any dimension he likes, becoming as minute as a particle and as big as the universe (*animā* and *mahimā*).

He can attain to extreme levity and rise up against gravitation, so that flying through space becomes possible to him (*laghīmā*). To such a man real distance is annihilated—he is capable of touching a thing even from a great distance (*prāpti*). The conquest of the second form of matter (*svarūpa*) enables the Yogin to become immune from the effect of the generic properties of substance. Thus it is possible for such a person to sink into the earth as if into water, the earth not resisting him (*prākāmya*). The third subtle, that is tanmātric, form of the element, when subdued, produces the *siddhī* called mastery (*vaśitva*), whereby the Yogin can control the bhūtas (earth etc.) and their products, bhautikas (animate and inanimate). The tanmātras are the causal state of the physical world. When these are governed it becomes comparatively easy to regulate the shape of a substance or even its transmutation. When in due course the Yogin has mastered the gunas as such (*anvaya*) he is able to command the origin and destruction of all the bhūtas and their products (*īśitrtva*). The greatest power however, is the supreme efficiency of the will (*yatrakāmāvasāyitva*), whereby the Yogin can arrange the natures of the bhūtas in any manner he wills: this is derived from a control of the highest form of Matter (*arthavattva*). He can make any object serve any purpose and is not tied down by the so-called natural properties. At his will even poison yields the fruits of nectar, and vice versa. Though gifted with these powers and capable of doing anything, the Yogin never cares to transgress the laws of nature, which are imposed on objects by the Will of the First Power. The elements do not resist the freedom of the movement of the Yogin. Thus he can physically enter into a block of solid stone which yields to his touch; the waters cannot drench him even on contact, fires cannot burn him nor can wind dislodge him. Space itself, which is free from all covering (*āvarana*), may be made to serve as a veil to conceal his presence, so that

he may remain invisible even to those higher and exalted beings who wander about through space.

Corresponding to the elements the senses also have five progressive states. The first state of the sense is that of cognition having for its object a thing which is not merely generic but also specific in character (*grahana*). The second state (*svarūpa*) consists in the illuminating (*prakāśātmaka*) essence which characterises every organ of knowledge as such (*karanatvasāmānya*) and every particular kind of organ directed to a particular object. This essence is the sattva portion pertaining to ahaṁkāra or asmitā, which is the third state of the sense. The fourth form of the sense is the *guṇas*. But it should be borne in mind that the *guṇas* form the pervasive aspect (*anvaya*) of the *bhūtas* and of the senses. The fifth or highest form of the sense is identical with that of the *bhūtas* described above. The control of the senses in all these five states leads to super-normal powers, technically known as the *madhupratika* siddhis. A Yogin with his senses held in control attains to the power of transporting himself physically to any distance within an instant. It is called *manojavittva* because at such a stage the body acquires the velocity of the mind on account of the senses being controlled. In an ordinary state a man cannot expect to make his body respond to the mind, in the immediacy and quickness of its movements, owing to defects in the senses. Apart from this, the sense of the Yogin is then able to act on the desired object, however remote in time or distance, even outside the physical body, though ordinarily a sense cannot operate except when related to a body. Besides, the Yogin has then at his command all the emanations of the primordial Nature.

When the different states of matter and sense have been thus mastered the Yogin has no longer the risk of a fall. The powers he has attained no longer depart from him. But at this time he becomes very particular about the states to be realised in future. The highest siddhi

of a Yogin, (called *viśokā*), which consists in omniscience and universal mastery, remains yet to be obtained. When the mind realises the greatest purity and steadiness, it comes under the fullest control of the Yogin, who is then fixed in the knowledge of distinction between the mind and the self and becomes truly a master (*vaśī*). Thus the supreme power of a man comes from a control of the mind. The ultimate constituents of Nature, those from which the sense and the matter evolve, present themselves to such a person as to their master, responsive to his will. This state represents the God-like nature of a Yogin, who is all-knowing, all-powerful, free and divested of all the bonds of *kleśa* (e.g. ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and fear of self-annihilation).

(d) The fourth period marks a transcendence of the supreme *viśokā* power also. The Yogin realises that even this power, greatest though it is in the state of outer consciousness (*vyutthāna*), is yet a foreign element and has to be eliminated. The acquisition of the supreme power is the first result of *Vivekakhyaṭi* and non-attachment to this power ending in the *nirodha* proper and *absolution* (*kaivalya*) is the next. The fourth period commences from after the supreme non-attachment (i.e. detachment from the *gunas*) and continues so long as the mind continues to exist. This is *jīvanmukti* proper from the viewpoint of Yoga. The mind is dissolved by means of the *nirodha*, when *Kaivalya* follows, in which the Self shines by itself unaccompanied by the mind.

From the above sketch it would appear that the four periods, beginning with the first appearance of the inner light and closing with its absolute purity, stand for the entire (*samprajñātā*) stage. The *nirodha* or *asamprajñāta* stage comes in when the light or mind has disappeared and the Self alone shines. This is *Kaivalya*.

KAIVALYA AND ITS PLACE IN DUALISTIC TĀNTRIC CULTURE

I

A close student of Indian philosophy cannot fail to be struck with the apparently anomalous attitude of certain schools of thought towards what is usually considered to be the highest object of spiritual pursuit of a man, viz. Kaivalya. The Vaiṣṇavas, the Śaivas, the Śāktas—in fact, most of the philosophical systems connected with some form of Āgamic culture—refer to it, as if it were a thing not worthy of our higher quest. We propose to analyse, in the following lines, as briefly as possible, this attitude of champions of Tāntric Sādhanā (dualistic) and try to find out the place assigned to Kaivalya in it.

The term 'Kaivalya', which is pre-eminently a Sāṅkhya term, conveys the sense of being 'kevala' or alone. It implies the idea of purity and freedom from defilement. Purusa or Self is essentially pure: it seems to be defiled owing to its association, through non-discrimination (*aviveka*), with Prakṛti or Matter—an association which is said to be beginningless in time. The entire psychology of Sāṅkhya discipline aims at producing a discriminative knowledge which reveals Puruṣa as distinct from Sattva i.e., Prakṛti and helps it to be established in its transcendent purity, otherwise known as Kaivalya. It is a state in which Purusa by virtue of its essential character of awareness stands isolated from Prakṛti as the self-conscious witness (*draṣṭā*) of her undifferentiated existence, above and beyond the play of her forces.

II

It is well-known that this conception of the soul's consummation does not appeal to most of the Vaiṣṇavas. But before speaking of them we may try to find out the general attitude of the other orthodox thinkers. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of Niḥśreyasa or Apavarga, as the destruction of the viśeṣa guṇas of the Self, is more or less similar in character to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga view. Consciousness, like will, pleasure and several other qualities, inheres in the Self and forms an integral element in its psychic life. Nevertheless it is a product and as such does not co-exist with the Self as it's constant and inalienable attribute. It arises in consequence of the contact of the mind (*manas*) with the Self due to the activity of the mind—an activity which results ultimately from the function of the adṛṣta attached to the Self concerned. The saving knowledge destroys ignorance and cuts at the root of all adṛṣta. The higher Mukti which follows upon the fall of body is thus a state of the Self in which consciousness and other qualities are conspicuous by their absence. In this lack of consciousness and other so-called psychic qualities there is a virtual agreement between Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya conceptions. For, in Sāṅkhya too, Purusa does not possess consciousness etc. as attributes; it is cit in essence, indeed, but not cetanā except in relation to buddhi, which is a product of Prakṛti. The position of Vedānta is analogous, save for its conception of unity of the Self, rather than its plurality as in Sāṅkhya. It is true that the Vedantic Self is self-luminous, but consciousness or will as a quality does not belong to it. Qualities seem to appear in it on account of its apparent relation with Māyā. It is evident, therefore, that the conception of Moksa in the various orthodox systems is, in a sense, similar and comes very nearly to the Sāṅkhya view of Kaivalya.

III

The Vaiṣṇava thinkers, however, evidently under different inspiration, raised their voices against Kaivalya as the highest end of life. The exact position of the *Pāñcarātra Samhitās* in this matter is not definitely known, though in view of the theistic character of their literature and the great emphasis they place upon bhakti in their sādhanā, it may be presumed that their attitude to Kaivalya was not marked by any sense of high regard. But the followers of Rāmānuja school are very explicit on this question. They hold that Kaivalya represents an experience of the soul, through jñānayoga, of its own Self as dissociated from Prakṛti or Matter. There are two rival opinions current among the Vaiṣṇavas as to the status of the soul which attains Kaivalya-Mukti. According to the Tenkalais, such an emancipated soul (*kevala*) lives for ever in a corner of the Paramapada having reached there by the white path (*arcirādimārga*) and enjoys there eternal and ineffable peace, but it has never any hope of finding God and enjoying His communion. Its life is like that of a forlorn wife forsaken by her husband. The Vaḍakalais, on the other hand, affirm that the Kevala lives, not in the outskirts of the Paramapada but somewhere within the dominion of Prakṛti itself.¹ Kaivalya is thus,

¹ kaivalyaṁ nāma jñānayogāt prakṛtivyuktasvātmānubhavarūpo'nubhavaḥ arcirādimārgena paramapadagata eva kvacit kone pariyaktapatnīnyāyena bhagavadanubhavaavyatiriktasvātmānubhavaḥ. Keced arcirādimārgena gatasya punarāvṛtyāśraṇanāt prakṛtīmandala eva kvacid deśe svātmānubhava ity āhuh

(See *Yatnāramatadīpikā*, by Srinivasa, 76, Poona Ed. 1984)

Dr. Schrader describes the Kevalas in the following terms —“There exists a second class of Muktas, namely the so-called Kevalas or ‘exclusive ones’ who are actually ‘isolated’ because they have reached liberation, not by devotion to God, but by constant meditation upon the real nature of their own soul. They are said to be living like the wife who has lost her husband, ‘in some corner outside both the Highest Heaven and the Cosmic Egg’” (*Introduction to the Pāñcarātra*, p. 59), cf. also P. N. Srinivasachari, MA —“*The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita*” (Adyar, 1948) pp 347-349.

from both the points of view, distinguished from Mokṣa proper which consists in the experience of endless joy of divine presence (*brahmānubhava*), manifestation of divine powers and all kinds of service and ministration of the Divine Will according to differences in place, time and circumstances. It is realised through bhaktiyoga and prapatti and not through jñānayoga.

IV

The Pāśupatās, too, like their Vaiṣṇava brethren do not look upon Kaivalya as an object of one's highest spiritual striving. For they hold that though Kaivalya is indeed a state of freedom from pain (*duḥkhānta*) it is negative in character and undivine (*anātmaka*): it is not mokṣa proper and is regarded as inferior to higher mokṣa (*sātmaka mokṣa*) consisting in the manifestation of supreme power or lordship (*mahaiśvarya*) i.e., infinite powers of knowledge and action. Being dualists they are naturally inclined to the view that even in the highest mokṣa the liberated soul is not absorbed in the eternal Divine Being. What really happens, they say, is that it becomes one with God in the sense that godly attributes are evolved in it. The evolution of Divinity inherent in every human soul is the end of Pāśupata spiritual culture and though Kaivalya is a supernatural condition in which transcendence of Prakṛti is effected by discriminative knowledge, it does not amount to a destruction of animality or paśutva and restoration of divinity or Śivatva in it. Animality is simply withdrawn in Kaivalya to be revived subsequently during creation. Hence it is said:

sāṅkhyayogena ye muktāḥ

sāṅkhyayogeśvarās ca ye/

brahmādayas tiryagantāḥ sarve te

paśavah smrtāḥ//

The higher Mokṣa is technically called Siddhi or

Aiśvarya, in which the powers of jñāna and kriyā are infinitely manifested, and is distinguished from Kaivalya as described above. The Pāśupatas state that all conscious beings with the exception of God and the Siddhas are paśus (animals) and exist in two states alternately, as embodied beings invested with Kalās (e.g., *kārya* and *kārana* i.e., bodies made of matter and faculties) during saṁsāra and as disembodied monads (*vīdeha*) free from Kalās during Kaivalya (which is a state of *pralaya*). The Kalās are the pāśas or bonds which fetter the souls and compel them to be dependent on the external objects (*visayas*) not only for action but even for knowledge. This dependence (*asvātantrya*) implies absence of *aiśvarya* or divinity which is its essential character. Hence in the eyes of a Pāśupata, bondage (*bandha*) is nothing but the loss of the soul's inherent divinity.

The Kalās or pāśas being the colouring elements called añjana, the paśus are said to be of two kinds, viz. sāñjana, when the souls are endowed with bodies and organs and nirañjana when the bodies and organs fall off. But it is to be remembered that even a bodiless state as such can not be the aim of human aspiration. The *Pāśupata Sūtras* declare plainly (cf. *Sūtra* V. 33) that Rudra-Sāyujya (and not Kaivalya) is the supreme end of life and the commentator Kaundīnya observes that it signifies a state of Yoga or indissoluble communion (*sāyujya-samyoga* or *samyakyoga*).

The greatest defect in Sāṅkhya-Kaivalya is that it is a state of unconsciousness in which the soul does not know itself or others.¹ In the case of highest Moksa the word *duhkhānta* means not only cessation of pain, but also realisation of positive attributes, for which Divine Grace (*Īśprasāda*) is essential.²

¹ sāṅkhyayogamuktāḥ kaivalyam gatāḥ svātmaparātmañānarahitāḥ sammurcchītvat sthītāḥ
Kaundīnya on *Pāśupata Sūtra* V. 40

² duhkhānām atyantam paramāpoho guṇāḥ aptis ca

Ibid.

V

From the aforesaid observations it would be clear that the Vaiṣṇava and Pāsupata cultural traditions, which trace their origin and authority to the earlier Āgamas, look down upon the ideal of Kaivalya in its usually accepted connotation as unworthy of acceptance on the part of a person who aspires after divine life and seeks for communion with God. We now proceed to ascertain the views of the Śaivas and start with the Siddhānta school.

It is held by the Śaivas, as by the Pāsupatas, that Kaivalya cannot be the highest end of man, as it does not represent the fulness of his spiritual development. Every Ātman is divine by nature (*śivamaya*), is essentially one with or akin to Śiva. But owing to obscuration of his nature through mala from the beginningless past it has been deprived of this divinity which is its inalienable property and has put upon itself a veil of an undivine nature. The soul, whether temporarily associated with mala or eternally free from it, is in essence always the same—pure, unsullied and full of divine radiance (*śivamaya*). Its divinity consists really in its śaktis conceived as the unity of infinite powers generally under the categories of knowledge and activity. During the period of obscuration these powers are held in abeyance and are unable to function, so that the soul thus obscured is incapable of realising its intrinsic purity and persists in imagining itself as a worldly being at the mercy of external forces. Such a soul is known as paśu or animal. The Ātman which is ever-free from mala is the Supreme Self or Parama Śiva, whose nature shines in its own glory and power from eternity.

The individual soul, though identical in nature with the Supreme Śiva and sharing consciously in this identity during Mokṣa, is a distinct being and retains its distinct-

ness through eternity.¹ The disappearance of mala restores it to its divine purity, but its mergence in Parama Śiva is never attained. What is usually called the realisation of Śivatva is in fact the re-instatement of the soul in its lost status of divine glory.

As mala continues to cling to the soul during Kaivalya this state cannot be held to be an equivalent of Moksa. Mala constitutes the paśutva or animality of the soul and is opposed to the manifestation of its divinity. It is, therefore, evident that until mala is eliminated there is no question of the soul returning to its divine status.

To understand the matter more clearly we must know what mala is, how it affects the soul and how this affection can be got rid of.

It is said that from eternity the soul is associated with an obscuring substance—a substance which functions under the veiling power (*tirodhāna śakti*) of the Lord. This substance is called mala, the removal of which cannot be effected by knowledge (*jñāna*), however high. It can be removed only by an action (*kriyā*), an act, not of the human soul concerned but of the Supreme Lord Himself.

It is pointed out by the Siddhāntin that what is usually called ajñāna or ignorance is of two kinds. It may be (a) as in the case of erroneous perception of a snake in a rope, an instance of non-discrimination (*aviveka* or *avivekādhyaśāya*) of one who has had a previous experience of similarity (*śādrśya*); or (b) it may be as in the case of perception of two moons in the sky when there is really one (or as in the case of perception of yellowness in a conch-shell where there is no such colour), an instance of what is called vikalpajñāna due to the action of some disturbing substance present in the visual organ. Both are forms of ajñāna and known as

¹ parama anādisiddha ity arthah muktātmanām tu tatprasādalavdhaśivatvayogitayā tato vatsamyam. tattvaprakāśe muktātmanāo'pi śivāḥ, kintv'ete tatprasāda'o muktāḥ. yo 'nādimukta eko vijñeyah.

such. But while the former is removable by *jñāna* or discriminative knowledge (*vivekajñāna*), the latter cannot be so removed. Its removal is consequent on the removal of the substance which causes it. Removal of a substance is, of course, possible only through action.

The Siddhāntin holds that the *ajñāna*, to which the animal soul is subject, is of the nature of a *vikalpa* due to the effect of a substance called *mala* attached to it and can be removed only when this substance is eliminated. This substance constitutes the animality (*paśutva*) of world-bound soul. It is through association with this that the soul, essentially divine and possessed of infinite knowledge and power, degenerates into an animal or *paśu*. And when it is removed—and this removal is effected through an action (*kriyā*) only—the soul recognises its inherent divinity and is established in it. No action or effort of the soul is capable of this achievement. It is done by an act of the divine personality entitled *dīksā*.

This substance is called *mala* because it conceals the *tejas* or divine light and power. It is like the husk of paddy, the outer coating in the grain of rice. It helps, under God's will, to produce concretisation in *Māyā* in regard to the soul to which it is attached. *Māyā* becomes productive under the action of *mala* and gives rise to *kalās*.

It is well-known to an expert in practical alchemy that the blackish stain in copper (*kālimā*) though innate (*sahaja*) in it, vanishes under the action of the force of mercury (*rasaśakti*). In the same manner, the Siddhāntin asserts, the *mala* which is ingrained in the soul and forms a part of its nature disappears through the operation of Divine Power (*śivaśakti*) during *dīksā*. The destruction of *Māyā*, which is an artificial bond working from without (*āgantuka*) involves a process altogether different from that implied in the destruction of *mala* which is innate or natural to the soul.

This substance is one, but its powers (*śakti*) are

many, each power being in each soul subject to disappearance after its period of maturation comes to an end. The fact that mala is beginningless (*anādi*) does not imply a beginninglessness in the series (*pravāha*). It is impenetrable (*abhedyā*) and simple. The powers of mala function or cease to function as obscurant under the action of the Rodhaśakti of the Lord. But as the Lord is ever auspicious His Rodhaśakti, too, is really no other than this power of Universal Grace (*sarvānugrahaśakti*) treated as a bond (*pāśa*).

NIRMĀNAKĀYA

I

The word Nirmānakāya occurs in the text of the *Kusumāñjali*, p. 3 (Ben. Ed.). The meaning of the term being obscure, different commentators have proposed different interpretations upon it. But it seems that the true import remains still to be determined.

Haridāsa's exposition of the term (as *nirmāṇārtham kāyah*) is hardly more than a mere conjecture. Varadarāja and Gunānanda's explanation,¹ too, are not quite clear and fail to bring out the precise and original significance of the word.

Apparently the *word* does not belong to the stock of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature, and the passage in the *Kusumāñjali* referred to above does not represent the views of the Naiyāyikas at all. But it must be plainly understood that the conception was a common property of all the ancient philosophical systems of India. In the *Yogadarśana*, for instance, the word is interpreted as a body or a series of bodies assumed at will by a Yogi who has risen above the so-called laws of nature and learnt to command its secret forces. In the Mahāyānic Buddhism also the word bears practically a similar sense. As for the reason why and the manner how God, the Yogi, or the Buddha takes on such a body different answers may, of course, be given from different points of view, but they are ultimately resolved into the same position.

¹ (a) jagannirmānāya svecchāmātranirmītāni samsāracetanavarganirmītāni vā śarīrāni. (Varadarāja)

(b) Nirmānakāyam vedābhivyāñjanaghatādīkaranaśīksārtham ca kāyavyūham. (Gunānanda)

Thus (a) in an aphorism attributed to Pañcaśikha¹ we find it stated in connection with the revelation of Sāṅkhya Yoga, that Kapila the First Enlightened One (*Ādividvān*), created a mind, hence called *Nirmānacitta*, and through its medium declared the saving knowledge to the enquiring Āsuri. The motive in this case is explicitly mentioned to be his deep compassion (*kārūṇya*) on the pains of mundane existence. It is believed that whenever the human soul feels itself sorely in need, a response comes from the higher worlds. To teach Wisdom and the Way to Liberation to erring humanity, the Siddhas may, if they so choose, take on a material form, before plunging into the Eternal Quiescence of Kaivalya.

(b) So in Mahāyāna Buddhism also the object of Buddha's assuming a *Nirmānakāya* is said to be the service of entire creation (*sattvārtha*). Vasubandhu in his commentary on Asaṅga's *Mahāyāna Sūtrālaṅkāra* (verse 63) plainly characterises such a body as contributive to *parārthasampatti* in contradistinction from the *Sambhogakāya*, which is purely, though in its highest sense, of a personal character (*svārthasampattilakṣaṇa*). This distinction reminds one of the contrast sometimes drawn in the later literature between the *līlādeha* and the *māyādeha* of the Supreme Divinity. The one is, in terms of Vaisnava philosophy, *aprākṛta*, *supranatural*, while the other is a natural—a material (whether subtle or gross), incarnation (*avatāra*) assumed in response to the needs of human soul.

(c) Similarly in the Nyāya system, though the word *Nirmānakāya* is doubtless absent, the fact of God's investing Himself with a material form from time to time is admitted throughout without a question. In the

¹ The aphorism appears as a quotation in Vyāsa's commentary on Yoga-Sūtras, thus —

Ādividvān nirmānacittam adhiṣṭhāya kārūṇyād bhagavān paramarsur āsuraye
jñāsamānāya tantraṁ pro'vāca. Both Vācaspati and Viṅṇānabhikṣu attribute
it to Pañcaśikha.

second chapter of the *Kusumāñjali* Udayana says that in the beginning of a particular cycle God assumes a material body to serve as Teacher for the guidance of the newly created world.¹ much in the same manner as a magician induces and presides over, by the mere effort of his will, the movements of the puppets. This power of God is called *Māyā* and *Vibhūti*. In the fifth chapter of the same book, he adds that not in the beginning of creation only but whenever the assumption of such a form is necessary He assumes it and displays His powers : *grhṇāti hi īśvaro'pi kāryavaśāt śarīram antarāntarā, darśayati ca vibhūtim iti.* (cf. Gangeśa's *Īśvarānumānam*, pp. 84-5 Bib. Ed.). Now it is useless to enquire whether He builds a *new* body and then enters into it or enters into a body already in existence (i.e. a natural body, or as *Vācaspati Mīśra* calls it *svabhāvanirmītaśarīra*) in the manner known as *bhūtāveśanyāya*, for both amount to the same thing² since even in the latter case (*āveśa*) the person already in possession of the body has to be stripped (permanently or provisionally) of his personality (i.e. must be rendered passive), before his body can be employed as an instrument for any definite purpose.

(*d*) So in Śaṅkara's system. He plainly says : *syāt parameśvarasyā'pī'cchāvaśān māyāmayaṁ rūpaṁ sādhakānugrahārtham* (under *Vedānta Sūtra* 1.1.20). Like the Supreme God the liberated (but not yet unified) souls, too, have a similar power.

From the above, one fact stands out clear, viz. that what is usually called *Nirmānakāya* is generally resort-

¹ *samayo' py ekenai'va māyāvīne'va vyutpādyavyutpādakabhāvāvasthitānānakāryādhisthānād vyavahāratah sukara eva* (*Kusumāñjali* Ben. Ed. ch 11 p 53). Here the bodies of the Teacher and the Pupil are both Divine, being created for purposes of guidance of humanity

² Sometimes an objection is raised : The *Jīva*, in so far as he is a *Jīva*, albeit endowed with Yogic powers, is spatially limited (*prādeśika*) and incapable of simultaneously entering into and presiding over the natural (*svabhāvanirmītanī*) bodies which occupy different positions in space (*Bhāmata* under *Sūtra* 4.4.15)

ed to by the Exalted Ones for the sake of teaching mankind. It is primarily the Body of the Supreme Teacher. This will make intelligible the Buddhist belief according to which Gautama is represented as the *Nirmānakāya* of the transcendental Buddha in the Tusita heaven—a point which is quite in consonance with his character as the guru of humanity.¹ The Buddha is known elsewhere to have created such a body (a “double” as it were, or a “likeness of himself” as Kern puts it, *Manual of Indian Buddhism* p. 33) during his stay at Śrāvastī and through his body expounded the Abhidharma to his mother Māyā who was in heaven.

But that *Nirmānakāya* may be assumed on other occasions also need not be gainsaid. Thus—

(a) The Yogins are known to create simultaneously a number of such bodies of various kinds and work out through them the remnants of their past karman after the attainment of self-knowledge. This simultaneous group of bodies dominated by One Central Will called *prayojakacitta* is technically known as *Kāya-Vyūha*.

Vātsāyana refers to this fact in the following interesting passage: *yogī khalu rddhau prādurbhūtāyām vikaranadharmā nirmāya sendriyāni śarīrāntarāni teṣu teṣu yugapaj jñeyān upalabhate.* (comm. on *Nyāya Sūtra* 3.2.20). So does *Udayana* in the *Nyāyavārtikātātparyapariśuddhi*, (p 83, Bibliotheca Indica Ed.).²

(b) The miraculous story of Saubhari may be cited as another well-known instance of *Kāya-Vyūha*. The legend runs that the Rsi Saubhari built simultaneously (*aparyāyena*) fifty similar bodies for himself, and with each enjoyed the company of each of the fifty daughters

¹ This is the *Velūyaka* theory. cf *Kathā Vatthu*, xviii, 1, 2

² *tathāpy āgamaprāmānyāt kāyayaugapadyasyā'pi prasārīkhyānaphalatayā siddhatvād anantānām aniyatavipākasamayātām cā'bhyupagamyai'va parihr̥tam. Vibhūtimatā'nekakālopaḥgyam apy ēkadā bhujyata ity atra samudrapānam udāharanam yogardhiprabhāvasampanno vivīdhaphalabhāgino vicītrasvabhāvān ekadai'va bahūn kāyān icchāmātrenai'va nirmimīta ity atra dandakāranya-sr̥ṣṭir udāharanam iti,*

of King Māndhātā. (cf. *Bhāmati*, under *Vedānta Sūtra* 4.4.11; *Gauda Brahmānandī*, pp. 569-570).

(c) In the commentary on *Vedānta Sūtra* 1.3.27, Śaṅkara urges that the Devas too, like the Yogins, have the similar power of simultaneous self-multiplication, so that the same Devatā may appear, with what is apparently the same body, in different places (i.e. sacrifices) at one and the same time: Ekasyā'pi devatātmanah yugapad anekasvarūpapratipattiḥ sambhavati smṛtir api prāptānimādyaiśvaryānām yoginam api yugapad anekāśarīrayogaṁ darśayati, kimu vaktavyam ājānasiddhānām devānām. Anekarūpapratipattisambhavāc ca ekai'kā devatā bahubhī rūpair ātmānaṁ pravibhajya bahusu yāgesu yugapad āngabhāvaṁ gacchātī'ti.

(d) In the *Bhāgavata* 10.33.20 when describing the Rāsālilā it is said that Kṛṣṇa multiplied himself into as many forms as there were Gopis:

kṛtvā tāvantam ātmānaṁ yāvatiṛ gopayoṣitah/
reme sa bhāgavāns tābhir ātmārāmo'pi līlayā//

(cf. *Bhāgavat* 10.69.2). The Bengal Vaiṣṇavas call this manifestation by the name of Prakāśa (See *Laghubhāgavatāmṛta*).

II

As to how this may be possible Vācaspati Mīśra offers a few words of explanation. He says that the body of the Devas is not born of parental union, but that it is produced directly from the element which are acted on and set into collocation by the powers of Will. The vision of the Devas, who are described as ājānasiddha, is not obscured by the distance of time or space or by other limitations. Their knowledge is always of the nature of direct presentation extending equally to all time and to all space. And this upādānagocarā-parokṣajñāna being present, there is nothing to prevent

such bodies being formed by a natural process. The Devas being bhūtajayins fit material is always responsive to their Will (*Bhāmatī*, Nir. Ed., p. 249.).

What is said of the Devas in the above could be said with equal propriety of the powerful Yogins. But in the Yoga system itself the process of this body-formation is somewhat differently explained.¹ It is there pointed out (*Yo. Sut.* IV, 4.) how the Yogin projects on one hand a desired number of personalities and on the other a Supreme Personality (*prayojakacitta*) to direct them to his will—all from the stuff of pure Egoity—(*Asmitā*). Cf. also Śankarācārya: *Ekamano'nuvarttīni samanaskāny'evā'parāni śarīrāni satyasamkalpatvat sraṅsyati. srstesu ca tesū'pādhibhedād ātmano'pi bhedenā'dhiṣṭhātrtvam yoksyate. eṣai'va ca yogaśāstreṣu yoginām anekāśarīrayogaprakriyā.*

(under *Ved. Sut.* 4.4.15)

The bodies which he brings into existence are subject immediately to these personalities and ultimately to the Supreme Person, which is but another name for his created (and creative) Will.² The projection, maintenance and withdrawal of these multiple personalities and

¹In elucidation of this point I extract the following from the excellent commentary on the *Pañcaśikhā Sūtras* by Svāmi Hariharānanda Āraṇya of Kapilāsrama. "When a great Yogi by subduing all passions and attachments and being disillusioned destroys all saṃskāras or mental accretions (the *durée* of Bergson) then by a conscious effort of the will he can stop all psychosīs, nay obliterate the empiric ego or phenomenal existence, for all times to come if he desires it. This state is Kaivalya Nirvāna. After realising Nirvāna but before having gone permanently to that state, if there be any reason (the only reason in this case is his desire to do good to others) for continuing phenomenal existence, then the Yogi may do so by relaxing the nirodha samādhi or the mentation-stopping effort, and creating anew the necessary faculties of thinking. The potential energy of the mind having been dissipated or *durée* destroyed, these faculties (*nirmānacittam*) are to be considered as new formations. The term is also found in the Pāli scriptures, and the Buddhists also explain in this way the continued post-nirvānic activities of the Buddha or Arhat after he has attained Nirvāna" (pp. 6-7). Cf. also his notes on the Yogabhāṣya under *sūtras* 4.4-5 (p. 223)

²For some interesting notes on this subject see Viṣṇvāna Bhikṣu, *Yogavarttika*, pp. 262-263. (Ben. Edition).

bodies are entirely a matter of his choice, so that they cannot in any way affect the absoluteness of his freedom.

In the orthodox systems as a rule the *Nirmānakāya* is said to be produced from some pre-existing matter, viz. atoms or *Prakṛti*. The miraculous or supernormal element, if there could be such a thing, lies only in the efficient factor—the incalculable potency of the Yogic Will. I say 'as a rule', because there are systems where according to their special viewpoint, this restriction is not deemed necessary. In the *Vedānta*, for example, which teaches the identity of *nimitta* and *upādāna* the need for such pre-existing matter is not recognised. The existence of *Māyā* as an independent entity being denied, the stuff of the *Nirmānakāya*, viz. *Māyā* would indeed be the very Self at whose will the body as such manifests itself. From the phenomenal standpoint the substratum of the body is indeed *Māyā* but in reality it is nothing but the Spirit, pure and undefiled. The difference between *parināmyupādāna* and *vivartopādāna* is only empirical. The *Pratyabhijñā* system of Kashmirian *Śaiva* philosophy is more precise and explicit on the point. *Abhinava Gupta* definitely says that Divine or Yogic creation does not stand in need of any pre-existing material. It comes forth as the spontaneous expression of the Free Will of the Self.¹

The *Mādhyamika* Buddhist also rejects the necessity of assuming pre-existing matter. Consistently with his doctrine of Universal Void he holds that such a body, as everything else in creation, is a product from the Void, and is therefore identical with it, being devoid

¹ *yogisamvida eva sā tādrśī śaktih, yad ābhāsaracitryarūpam arthajātam prakāśayati*ti. tadasti sambhavaḥ—yat samvid eva abhyupagatasvātantryā apratighātalaksanād icchāviśeṣava śāt samvido anadhikātmatayā anapāyād antasthitam eva sadbhāvajātam idam ity eva prānabuddhdehādeh vitṛṇa-kiyan-mātrasamvidrūpād vāhyatvenā'bhāsayati'ti (*Abhinavagupta's Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* 15.8. pp 184-85).

This is a general statement of all creation proceeding from the Free Will of the Enlightened One and is applicable to *Nirmānakāya* as well.

of all reality. It is a mere apparition without an underlying substance. It differs from the normal bodies exactly as the orthodox systems hold, in so far as it comes into being and disappears through the conscious effort of the *nirmānacitta* (which itself is a creation from the Void) and is entirely free from the compelling influence of *adr̥ṣṭa* or *karma*, (cf. *Bodhisattvabhūmi* I. V : *nirvastukaṁ nirmāṇam nirmānacittena yathākāmaṁ abhisamskṛtam*.)

Thus the *Nirmānakāya*, though real to the empiric consciousness, is yet nothing more in its usual acceptation than a mere phantom, an illusory appearance, from the Divine or Buddha's (or Yogin's) point of view. It manifests itself before the phenomenal world for a limited time to serve some definite end and having finished its self-imposed task vanishes into the Fullness (or Void) of the Transcendental Realms. The doctrine of *Avatāra*, in its different forms, is in a sense an aspect of this wider view about the *Nirmānakāya*. In the *Nārāyaṇīya* section of the *Mahābhārata* we find that the body which *Nārada* beheld of the Lord *Nārāyaṇa* in *Śvetadvīpa* was only a 'phantom-body' and not His Essence, and as such could be pronounced to be a case of *Nirmānakāya*:

etat tvayā na vijñeyam rūpavān iti dr̥śyase/
māya hy'eṣā mayā sr̥ṣṭā yan mām paśyasi nārada//
(Māyā=Nirmāṇa)¹.

So in the *Gītā* it is said that the birth, body and movements of the Lord are super-natural (*divya*)—a statement which may lend itself to a double interpretation: viz. either that these are created and phantasmal (*nirmāna*), and appear as real only through the Lord's *Māyā*, or that these are eternal and real, as the mediaeval *Vaiṣṇavas* so strongly insisted.

¹See *Laghu Bhāgavatāmṛta*, Jīva Goswami, *Satsandarbhā; Caitanya-caritāmṛta*, B. N. Seal, *Vaiṣṇavism and Christianity*, pp. 64-66.

The whole question is indeed of great interest, though highly complicated; and especially so when it is studied in its relation to the allied scheme of Rūpas including Vilāsas and Svāmśas, Prakāśas, Āveśas and Avatāras of the Vaiṣṇava philosophers and to the doctrine of Emanations (*vyūha*) in general.¹

At any rate the doctrine of Nirmāṇakāya, as in the early Indian systems (e.g. Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Buddhism etc.) was in a certain sense docetic in colouring. But it must be remembered, at the same time, that the opposite view too was not wanting even at the outset.

III

The doctrine, if not exactly the term, is very old, and the germs of both may be found in the famous *R̥gveda Mantra*: *Indro māyabhiḥ pūrūrūpa iyate* (*R̥gveda*, VI. 47, 18) where the magical, self-multiplicative power of the Lord (Indra) is clearly indicated. I fail to see any justification, therefore, in the view usually held attributing to Aśvaghōṣa the credit of inventing the theory of Nirmāṇakāya. Besides Pañcaśikha's lost *Yogasūtra*, which Vyāsa quotes and to which reference is made above, contains an open declaration of this particular doctrine. That Pañcaśikha had been a very ancient Sāṅkhya authority even in the days of Aśvaghōṣa (100 A.D.) may be taken for granted. Indian tradition invariably makes Pañcaśikha the third Sāṅkhyacārya in order from Kapila; Jaigīṣavya and others being comparatively recent. In the *Buddhacarita* (XII. 67) Aśvaghōṣa refers to Jaigīṣavya as one of the ancient Sāṅkhya teachers whose views were represented by Alāḍakālāma, the scholar to whom Buddha repaired in search of wisdom; and if

¹ Nārāyana Tirtha in his *Bhakti Candrikā* takes it to be a case of Avatāra rather than a Vyūha.

Pañcaśikha is earlier than Jaigīsavya he must be considered as belonging certainly to the pre-Buddhistic age.¹

Of course this does not preclude the possibility that Aśvaghōṣa gave to the doctrine of Nirmāṇa a prominence in the popular mind, and even a tinge which it had lacked in the earlier centuries, but it does not seem that he was its original propounder.

The meaning of the term Nirmānakāya is now practically established. It shows that the word Nirmāṇa has not in this phrase its later and ordinary sense of "Natural Formation". It implied in the ancient literature the notion of the miraculous, the self-multiplicative or multi-formative power of the Adepts—a notion which seems to have been well-nigh forgotten in the subsequent ages. While explaining the term Nirmānarati, the name of a class of devas, (*Mahābhārata. Anuśūsana Parva, XVIII. 75*), Nilakanṭha, rightly brings out the old and peculiar sense of Nirmāṇa when he notes: Nirmānam anekadhābhavanam yogenā'nekaśarīradhāraṇam. (*Bangavāsi, Ed. p. 1883*). Haridāsa seems to be wrong, therefore, in expounding the phrase as nirmāṇārtham kāyaḥ. The word, as in this phrase, is an adjective rather than a verbal noun, and means literally "contrived by magic, brought forth in an extra-ordinary manner". Even when

¹ Cf. Also Haribarānanda's introduction to Pañcaśikha pp 2-4. The only argument which Dr. Garbe (*Sāṅkhya and Yoga p. 3*) advances against the high antiquity of Pañcaśikha is what he considers to be the linguistic testimony of his fragments. But this is a highly questionable testimony on which diversities of opinion are possible. But even if this be conceded, there can be no denying the fact that Pañcaśikha was pre-Christian, at least prior to Aśvaghōṣa in age, (cf. Dr. Belvalkar's paper on Māthara Vrtti in *Bhandarkar Memorial Volume, p. 180*, footnote 2), where he seems inclined to claim for Pañcaśikha a period before 200 B.C.). In support of the great antiquity of this Ācārya it may be pointed out that one of the works of Pañcaśikha, viz *Sastitantra* (Vācaspati's ascription of it to Vārsaganya in *Bhāmāti* on 2.1.3, may be an oversight) was known to early Jaina literature, e.g., *Bhagavati Sātra* (see Weber, *Bhagavati, II. pp. 246-8*). Dr. Keith also in his recent work on the Sāṅkhya system seems to make Pañcaśikha, a comparatively late author, placing him with Dr. Garbe (*Sāṅkhya Philosophie p. 34*) in the first century A.D. or even a century later (p. 43). We propose to deal with the arguments of Keith at length in a separate paper.

used as a substantive it stands for an object, usually a body, which is so contrived (*nirmāyata iti nirmāṇaḥ*). The *Divyāvadāna* (Cowell Neil's Ed. pp. 162 and 166), and Vasubandhu's commentary on *Mahāyāna Sūtrālaṅkāra* (9.63) illustrate the use of the terms *nirmāṇa* and *nirmāṇakāya* in this sense.¹

¹ Cf. also Foussin, *The Three Bodies of a Buddha* in *J.R.A.S.* 1906 (p. 968). For some interesting notes on *Nirmāna Kāya*, see also D. T. Suzuki, *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism* pp. 73, 257, 268, W.M. McGovern, *An Introduction to Mahāyāna Buddhism*, pp. 75-98.

SOME ASPECTS OF VĪRA ŚAIVA

PHILOSOPHY

I

Though the sect of Vīra Śaivas or Liṅgāyats holds an important position in the religious history of Southern India, its name, except at Benares, is not perhaps so widely known in the North. Neither its history and sectarian characteristics nor its system of philosophy are so familiar to the student of Indian culture as one might wish them to be. It is proposed therefore to speak a few words in the present paper on some aspects of this philosophy.

The sect had its origin about the middle of the 12th century A.D., being founded by a Brahmin named Vāsava, who had been the prime minister of the Kalachuri King Bijjala. Of course there are differences of opinion. But it is beyond doubt that Vāsava was a very important figure, and if he was not the actual founder he was at least the reformer of the sect. What Gautama had been to Buddhism and Mahavīra to Jainism (according to tradition) Vāsava was to this Śaiva faith. According to tradition, the sect originated from five ascetics who became the first heads of five original monasteries. The names of these pontiffs are: Ekorāma, Panditārādhyā, Revaṇa, Marula and Viśvārādhyā, and those of the monasteries respectively are: Śri Śaila, Kedāranātha, Rambhāpuri (Balehalli), Ujjaini and Benares. They appeared in a miraculous way from the following Liṅgas respectively, viz, Śri Mallikārjuna in Dhātu Kuṇḍa, Rāmanātha in Draṅṅsārāma, Someśvara in Kollipāki, Siddheśa in Vataḅsetra and Viśveśvara in Benares.

There seems to exist a variety of opinion regarding

the line of teachers through whom the teachings of the sect are said to have been transmitted. Śrīpati in his commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra* makes Sadāśīva the original teacher. From him we have the following line :

Sadāśīva
|
Śaktidhara
|
Dadhīci
|
Durvāsas
|
Viśvāmitra
|
Sukeśa
|
Agastya
|
Cinmaya Vāmadeva
|
Sri Revana Siddha

This Revana was one of the five original *mohants* of the order. Śrīpati was apparently a disciple of Revana to whom as well as to Ekorāma he pays his respects.

Māyideva, author of *Anubhava-Sūtra* and *Viśeṣārtha-Prakāśikā*, another teacher of this sect, claims his spiritual descent from Upamanyu, thus :

Upamanyu
|
Bhīmanātha
|
Kuleśvara
|
Vopanātha
|
Nākarāja
|
Saṅgameśvara
|
Māyideva

It may be of interest to note that in the *Vāyavīya Samhitā* of the *Śiva Purāṇa* (section I, chapter 28, verses 15-16) Upamanyu is mentioned with three others, viz. Ruru, Dadhīci and Agastya as the original propounders of Śaiva doctrines and authors of four distinct Samhitās. Śripati also in his commentary on the *Vedānta Sūtra*, "Śāstrayonitvāt" mentions the names of Upamanyu, Dadhīci, Gautama, Durvāsas, Renuka, Dāruka, Śaṅkhakarṇa, Gokarna, etc. as those of great teachers who were omniscient (*sarvajña*)—a term which is explained as meaning sarvavedavedāntoktasakalapadārthabhijña.

II

The Primal Reality, called here by the name of Sthala,¹ is the abiding background of all phenomena (creative, preservative and destructive) and as such is identical with Parama Śiva. Absolute Freedom, Eternal Self-revelation and Supreme Selfhood (*pūrnāhantā*) constitute its very essence. When this Primal Reality wants to play with Itself as Worshipper and worshipped there arises on its calm bosom what we might describe as a slight tremor or vibration, very much like the agitation which appears on the calm surface of an ocean before heavy breakers begin to rise into view. This tremor results in dividing the Sthala into two aspects by depriving it, as it were, of its equilibrium, so that the portion where self-consciousness is predominant is called by one name, viz. Śiva, and the remaining portion by another, viz. Jīva.

¹ sarvesām sthānabhūtātval layabhūtātvas tathā/
tattvānām mahadādīnām sthālam ity abhidhīyate//
adhsthānasamastasya sthāvarasya carasya ca/
jagato yad bhavet tattvam taddhi vai sthālam ucyate//
ādihārah sarvasaktīnām jyotisām akhilātmanām/
yat tattvam bhavati prājñāih sthālam tat pariḡīyate//
ālayah sarvabhūtānām lokānām lokasampadām/
yad bhavet paramam brahma sthālam tat prāhur aksaram//

The Primal Reality would thus appear to be a state in which the substance and its power are in unaffected equilibrium. The substance is known in the Āgamas as Para Śiva and the power as Parā Śakti or Cidambarā. The *Anubhava Sūtra* (2.20) says:

śaktir apratimā sāksāt śivena sahadharminī/
sākṣinī satyasampūrṇā nirvikalpā maheśvarī//

The Lingāyat philosophers are advocates of Viśiṣṭād-vaīta like Śrī Kaṇṭha and the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas, and they have consequently to assume that Śakti as qualifying the Supreme Reality is its eternal adjunct and never separable from it.¹ It is two-fold, according as it abides in Brahman directly as Light or Cit Śakti or indirectly as the Reflection of the Light or Acit Śakti. The two names represent the two opposite aspects of the same fundamental Power, so that the system does not recognise any inherent contradiction between Matter and Spirit.²

The *Sārasvata Sūtra*³ says that the Śakti, which always resides in the Supreme Self, is called vimarśa when it reposes exclusively in the Self (*svasthā*). The Self which as awareness is the background of the entire creation must be described as *existing*,—for without its presence all would be darkness and void,—and therefore it must be held to be the subject of existence or being. It is the Agent (*karttā*) or Śiva, and Existence the Action (*kriyā*) or Śakti. When the Primal Reality loses its

¹ The Śruti also declares that the Parā Śakti of the Lord is *natural* and that it is manifold in character, cf. parā'sya śaktir vividhai'va śrūyate svābhāviki jñānabalakriyā ca, Śivāditya observes

dharmarūpā parā śaktir dharmarūpaḥ paraḥ śivah/
tasyā'nāvrttarūpaṭvāt parā śaktih parātmanah//
sarvadā tatsvarūpena bhāti bhānor iva prabhā/
tādātmyam anayor nityam dharmadharmisvabhāvatah//

² Cf. Śvānubhava Śivayogendra (*Śvādvaitadarpana*, ch. I) asmanmate brahma-dharmarūpāyāḥ śakteściechaktirūpatvam tatpratvimbārūpāyā ciecchaktirūpatvam ity aṅgkārena ciecchaktitātpratvimbācchaktyor brahmadharmavirodhābhāvena śaktidvayam samuccitya'kasya'va sūksmadacidarūpaśaktiviśistatvasya laksanī-karane tātparyāt.

³ san hrdayaparakāśo bhavanasya kriyāyā bhavati karttā/
sar'va kriyā vimarśaḥ svasthā kṣubhitā ca viśvavistārā//


equilibrium the Śakti becomes *partially* agitated (*kṣubhāta*) and transforms itself into the manifested universe consisting of thirty-six tattvas and of an infinite variety of products. The agitation of the Śakti is partial, because there are some aspects of the Śakti e.g. Cit and Ānanda which being devoid of succession (*krama*) by nature are never subject to agitation. It is Icchā and the others alone which are sometimes agitated and sometimes in a state of balance. The Śakti, both spiritual and material, in its unmanifest condition is called subtle (*sūkṣma*) and its manifested state is known as gross (*sthūla*). In dissolution which represents the causal undifferentiated state of Brahman both spirit and matter are involved while their evolution or differentiation marks the beginning of the creative or productive stage.

(a) Through the agitation of its own Power (*svaśaktikṣobhamātreṇa*) the Sthala becomes divided into two—Līṅga and Aṅga. But this division is only an apparent cleft in the Indivisible, the duality being due to the limiting conditions (*upādhi*) of accidental existence. Accepting the current coinage of Vedānta terminology it may be said by way of illustration that Līṅga corresponds to the mahat of mahākāśa and Aṅga to the ghaṭa of ghaṭākāśa. Beyond a verbal distinction introduced by association with two distinct concepts (e.g. *mahat* and *ghaṭa*) there is no difference in ākāśa at all, so far as it is considered in its pure essence. It is as ever one and undivided. So too with Līṅgasthala and Aṅgasthala. Līṅga is the Upāsya, the object of worship and Aṅga the ūpāsaka or worshipper, but in reality both the worshipper and the worshipped are one:

nāśivasya śivo-pāstir ghaṭate janmakotībhīḥ/
śivasyai'va śivopāstir iti nānāśrutismṛtiḥ//

Thus one of the great dicta of mystic experience is asserted and vindicated. He is the worshipper and He is the worshipped—in fact, He is worshipping Himself

through Himself. The universe, with all its activities, is an expression of His Self-delight, manifested in myriads of ways.¹ So at a glance the picture is :



(b) Like Sthala, Śakti (Power), too, becomes two-fold during manifestation. The original Śakti is ubiquitous and practically identical with Śiva. As residing in the Līṅga this power is known as Kalā (*Kalāśaktiḥ : Līṅgasthalāśrayā Śaktiḥ Kalārūpā prakārtitā*) and when in Aṅga then it is called Bhakti. The former is pravṛtti and is the cause of the origin of worlds, the latter is nivṛtti and is the cause of their dissolution. It is the mysterious virtue of Śakti (*Kalā*) which makes what is absolutely formless and homogeneous take on an infinite number of forms; and through an equally mysterious virtue inherent in Bhakti all varieties of forms return into the blankness of the Primal Unity. One looks down, as it were, from the heights and is tinged with Māyā, while the other looks up from the depths and is free from all defilement. Briefly speaking, the natural tendency of Śakti is towards multiplication and that of Bhakti is towards unification. The Self, as endowed with this Śakti, is an object of worship, and as possessed of Bhakti it is the worshipper.

¹ So in Vaiṣṇavism, more particularly in the Gaudīya and Vallabhīya schools, He is declared to be comprising within Himself the Lover and the Beloved both (cf. *Rādhakopāṃśad*). The Advaita Śaiva and Advaita Vaiṣṇava are really on a par in their outlook on the Supreme Being, except for the attitude with which each approaches Him in relationship. The true Śaiva is a devotee and a worshipper, but a Vaiṣṇava is nothing if not a lover. Anśvarya or the sense of Divine Majesty prevails in the former. Mādhurya or Divine Fellowship in the latter. To the Śaiva-Sādhaka, God reveals Himself as the Father, the Lord and the Teacher, to the Vaiṣṇava He is the Friend and Beloved, and sometimes also the Child.

III

That the Linga is identical with Śiva has been already noted.¹ It is threefold: (a) Bhāvaliṅga, (b) Prāṇaliṅga and (c) Iṣṭaliṅga. Of these (a) *Bhāvaliṅga* is described as pure being (*sanmātra*) partless or indivisible (*niṣkala*) and accessible to intuition (*bhāva*) alone. It is the Sat aspect of Divine Essence and the highest tattva (*Paratattva*).

(b) *Prāṇaliṅga* is at once above all division and yet infinitely divided (*sakala* and *niṣkala*) and is reached by the mind. It forms the Cit aspect of the Divine Essence and the subtle tattva (*sūkṣmatattva*).

(c) The third one, the so-called *Iṣṭaliṅga*, is called Mahat and is the source, for the devotee, of all his pleasure and immunity from pain. It is to this that the afflicted soul appeals for succour. It is the Ānanda-aspect of the Deity and forms the gross tattva (*sthūlatattva*).

Each of these Liṅgas is two-fold. Thus—

- | | | |
|-----------------|---|-------------------------------|
| (a) Bhāvaliṅga= | { | (i) Mahāliṅga |
| | | (ii) Prasādaliṅga |
| (b) Prāṇaliṅga= | { | (iii) Caraliṅga or Jaṅgamaṅga |
| | | (iv) Śivaliṅga |
| (c) Iṣṭaliṅga= | { | (v) Guruliṅga |
| | | (vi) Ācāraliṅga |

These are the six Sthālas, and corresponding to them, each to each, there are six Śaktis:

evaṃ ṣadvidhaṃ bhūtaṃ liṅgaṃ paramakāraṇam/
svaśaktivaibhavāc caiva svātantryāl līlayā'pi ca/
śaktayaḥ ṣadvidhā jñeyāḥ ṣatsthāleṣu samāpitāḥ//

The six Śaktis are named: Cit Śakti, Parā Śakti, Ādi Śakti, Icchā Śakti or Vidyā, Jñāna Śakti or Pratiṣṭhā and Kriyā Śakti or Nivṛtti.

¹ Iyate gamyate yatra yena sarvaṃ carācaram/
taḍ eva liṅgam ity uktam liṅgatattvapārāyanaiḥ//

(i) The Mahāliṅga, in association with the Light of Supreme Revelation (*Cicchakti*), flashes eternally upon itself. This is known as Śivatattva, the ultimate unity, full, subtle and immeasurable, without beginning or end. It is accessible to intuition (*bhāva*).

(ii) Prasādaliṅga, with Parā Śakti, is known as Sadākhyā Tattva and is open to jñāna. It is devoid of all limitations (*upādhi*), bright, supersensuous, and contains within itself *in potentia* the yet unmanifested universe.

(iii) The Caraliṅga, with Ādi Śakti, is realised in mental concentration (*mānasa dhyāna*).

(iv) The Śivaliṅga, with Icchā Śakti is the Ego (*ahamkṛti*), described as one-faced (*ekamukha*) and luminous, shining with the vidyākālās.

(v) The Guruliṅga, with Jñāna Śakti, is the great teacher (*upadeśaka*) from whom the Tantras come forth as if by a spontaneous movement.

(vi) The Ācāraliṅga, with Kriyā Śakti, is the source of renunciation.

IV

Āṅga is the soul or jīva, so called because it resorts to the Liṅga and finds its rest there.¹ It is said to be of three kinds: (a) Yogāṅga, (b) Bhogāṅga and (c) Tyāgāṅga.

The first enjoys communion with Śiva, the second enjoys Power (*bhoga*) with Him, and the third is so called from the fact of its having cast off the cosmic illusion (*samsārabhrāntisamtyāga*). Of these—

(a) Yogāṅga, being self-contained, represents the

¹ anādy antam aṅgam tatpadam paramam prati/
yad gacchati mahābhaktyā tad aṅgam iti niścitam//
sambhavet paramam tattvam tadgatataparāyanah/
angasthalam iti prāhur angatattvaviśārādāh//
am iti brahma cinnmātram gacchatī'ti gam ucyate/
rūthyate aṅgam iti prājñair angatattvavicintakah//

causal state and is identified with the dreamless sleep. It corresponds to the Prājña of Vedānta.

(b) Bhogāṅga, being intrinsic (*antarāṅga*), represents the subtle (*sūkṣma*) state and is identified with dream, standing for the Taijasa of Vedānta.

(c) Tyāgāṅga being extrinsic (*vahiraṅga*), represents the gross state and is identified with the waking life. It is equivalent to the Viśva of Vedānta.

Like the Liṅga, the Aṅga is of two varieties each :

- | | | |
|---------------|---|-----------------------|
| (a) Yogāṅga= | { | (i) Aikya Sthala. |
| | | (ii) Śaraṇa Sthala. |
| (b) Bhogāṅga= | { | (iii) Prānalīṅga. |
| | | (iv) Prasādi. |
| (c) Tyāgāṅgā= | { | (v) Maheśvara Sthala. |
| | | (vi) Bhakta Sthala. |

Bhakti, as a dominant mood, is really one and undivided, but appears as many-coloured in relation to the six Sthalas :

madhurādiṣu yat satsu praviśya salilam yathā/
tattadākārato bhāti tathā bhaktiḥ sthale sthale//

The names of the six kinds of Bhakti, arranged in the order of the Aṅgas, are: (i) Samarasākārā, (ii) Ānandākārā, (iii) Anubhavākārā, (iv) Avadhānātmikā, (v) Naiṣṭhikī and (vi) Sadbhakti.

V

It is said that Jīva is a part (*aṁśa*) of Śiva, and hence like Him pure (*amala*), eternal (*nitya*), spotless (*nirañjana*), and tranquil (*śānta*). Essentially there is not the slightest difference between the two. And when this semblance of distinction due to the presence of the threefold defilement, which perennially haunts one in the state of bondage and stands in the way of one's self-realisation, melts away, there dawns upon the "naughted" soul the vision of its destiny fulfilled. Taken back, ab-

sorbed, into the Being of Śiva, the soul finds at last its consummation reached. The six attributes which are usually predicated of Śiva or of the Pure Self are named : Omniscience, Self-contentedness, Immaculate Wisdom, Freedom, Absolute and Infinite Power.¹

Just as Līṅga-Sthala (*Śiva*) becomes manifold through its own Power (*Śakti*) so does Aṅga-Sthala (*jīva*) become correspondingly multiplied through its devotion (*bhakti*). As Līṅga becomes more and more drawn up into the state of Śiva through accession of Power, so does Aṅga become lifted higher and higher into the level of Ātman by reason of its Devotion, till in the end Pure Śiva and Pure Ātman alone remain, eternally attached to each other, as Master and Attendant, as Worshipped and Worshipper, or as Teacher and Pupil. This is the blessed state to which every devotee inwardly aspires.²

The union of jīva and Śiva as described in the above, is called here Sāyujya Mukti, and constitutes, according to the teachings of this sect, the highest form of salvation :

tasmāl līṅgāṅgayogāt parā muktir na vidyate.

¹ sarvajñatvam ca trptatvam tathā'nādiprabodhitā/
svatantratā'pi cā'luptasaktitā'nantaśaktitā//
ity etair laksanair ṣadbhīh śivāṅgam iti laksyate/
tasmād aṅgasthalaṁ sāksād ātmai'vā'yam na samśayaḥ//

Anubhava Sūtra.

These terms are explained in Śrīkanṭha Śivācārya's commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra* 1.12 (Mysore Ed pp. 10-12). See also Appaya Dīksita's *Śivārīkamanidīpikā* on the above (Kumbhakonam Ed. pp. 121-125).

² yad yad rūpam upāśyā'ra [=pāśyatvat] śivo vrajati śaktimān/
upāsakatvatāś cā'tmā tat tad āpnoti bhaktimān//
yathā svarūpam ādatte pūjyatvena mahēśvaraḥ/
pūjakatvena cā'tmā'yam etad rūpam anuvrajat//
yathā svarūpam ādatte sādhyatvāt paramēśvaraḥ/
sādhatvatād asāv'ātmā tat tad āsthāya tisthati//
yad yat svarūpam ādatte gurutvenā'mbukāpath/
śyatyatvenā'yam ātmā ca tat tad rūpam upāsate//

cf. the first verse of Utpala's 13th stotra .

saṅgrahena sukhaduhkhalaksanam māṁ prati sthitam idam śrnu prabho/
saukhyam eva bhavatā samāgamah svāmnā viraha eva duhkhitā//

Ksemarāja in his commentary explains the term 'samāgama' as samāveśyai-kyam and 'viraha' as svarūpāpratyaḥhijñānam.

Ātman is really a direct part of Śiva, pure and free ; in its mundane existence it appears as roaming, restless and in chains. It is on account of self-forgetfulness that the state of bondage seems so real to it. It identifies, falsely, the body with itself, accepting as a matter of course the hard penalties which such an act of identification inevitably entails ; at the best, it considers itself as the owner of the body and inseparably associated with it. A period of storm and unrest naturally follows, accompanied by pain, heart-burnings, doubts and despondencies and culminating in the disillusionment of a blighted life. Racked by agonies, the soul seeks refuge in the wisdom of an elevated and illuminated Self, asking for edification as to its real character (*ko'ham*). The teacher (*deśika*), out of compassion (*karuṇābalāt*) and in response to his query, declares the great truth as expressed in the mantra "Tat tvam asi"—expounding analytically that the words 'tat' and 'tvam' denote liṅga and aṅga respectively and that the word 'asi' stands for their identity which is the truth of both.

The pupil is then led through a solemn process of initiation known as Mahā Śaivī Dīkṣā which results in snapping asunder the bonds of ignorance, effecting the union of Aṅga with Liṅga and removing the three-fold impurity.

dīyate liṅgasambandhaḥ kṣīyate ca malatrayam/
dīyate kṣīyate yasmāt sā dīkṣe'ti nigadyate//¹

Dīkṣā is threefold: (a) Vedhātmikā, (b) Mantrātmikā and (c) Kriyātmikā.

(a) The word *Vedhā* stands here as a symbol for the

¹ In the *Śivapurāna* (Vāya Sam., Pt 2, chap. 13) the verse appears in the following slightly altered form.

dīyate yena vijñānam kṣīyate pāśabandhanam/
tasmāt samskāra evā'yam dīkṣe'ty api ca kathyate//

The *Rudrayāmala* and *Merutanta* also contain the same definition of dīkṣā (See *Puraścaryānava*, Benares Ed., p. 40); so the *Devībhāgavata* XII. 75 cf also *Śiva Sūtra* III. 28, with Kṣemarāja's *Vimarśinī* (pp. 114—115) and Bhāskara's *Vārttika* (pp. 69-70), *Siddhāntaśikhāmani*, ch. VI, 11-12 (p. 85).

touch of the teacher's hand on the disciple's head. The mere gazing of the teacher is enough to rouse into action the spiritual energy of the disciple.¹ In the *Śivādvaitadarpaṇa* (ch. III) it is further observed that the result of this *dīkṣā* is the contact (*saṃyoga*) of the *Yogāṅga* (the soul as conditioned by its causal envelope) with the *Bhāvalinga*.

(b) *Mantra* means what the teacher whispers into the ears of the disciple. This form of *dīkṣā* consists in the instruction of the great five-syllabled mantra and is represented by the contact of the *Bhogāṅga* of the *Jīva* with the *Prāṇalinga*.²

(c) *Kriyā dīkṣā* is the ceremonial part of the initiation, in which the disciple is seated within the *svastika*-circle drawn, and made to repeat by way of penances the name of Śiva and to meditate on Him. Then follows the three-fold anointment of the disciple with waters from five jars.³

Such is the mysterious power of this initiatory process that it effects a complete revolution in the life of the neophyte. It makes manifest to him his hidden and hitherto unrecognised powers and secures for him the

¹ Cf. *Anubhava Sūtra*, V. 40, 57. Also *Siddhānta Śikhāmanī*, VI. 13-14:

guroḥ āloka-mātreṇa hastamastakayogataḥ/
yah śivatvasamāveśo vedhādīkṣe'ti sā matā//

Śrīmaritontaḍārya adds: guror drstigarbhe sthitvā karakamale samupan-nasyā'tmanah cinmayasvarūpopadeśo vedhādīkṣā.

² Cf. *Anubhava Sūtra*, V. 41, 58, *Siddhānta Śikhāmanī*, VI. 14, *Śivādvaita-darpaṇa*, ch: III.

³ *Kriyā* refers to what is offered by the guru to the disciple in his hand, i.e. the Śivalinga. The rule is that an auspicious linga (one made of crystal, moon or sun-stones, or one prepared from the rock of Śrī Śaila or obtained from the bed of the *Nerbudda*) has to be secured, sanctified, anointed and worshipped, and thereupon the teacher has to draw forth by means of the so-called *ankuśa-mudrā* from the head (i.e. *sahasrāra*) of the disciple the *Śarvikalā* and infuse it into the linga. This process resembles that of lighting one fire from another already burning (*pradīpād dīpāntaram iva*). He has then to draw out in a similar manner the *Jivakalā* or *Vital Power* (*Prāṇa*) of the disciple and settle it on the linga. The two *kalās* are thus balanced with each other, and the linga is then placed in the hand of the disciple with instruction to hold it on his body.

Beatific Vision ; and the veil of cosmic illusion is for ever lifted from his eyes.

The details of this inner conversion are not set out here with as much fullness as might be desired. But what is said is enough to convince one that the whole process is graduated, even though on occasions quite rapid. It is said that the novice is instructed, immediately after his initiation, to meditate upon the Kalā. This leads on successively to the realisations of 'bhāva, of manas, of dṛṣṭi and finally of the Sthala itself. The Kalā serves to awaken (*bodhanā*) and bring into play the latent energies stored in the mantra. Having drawn it forth (*ākṛṣya*) by force, the initiate is to lay it in the Liṅga which is All-Light. As soon as this Supreme Liṅga is seen, all the karmas of the jīva are burnt off, his struggles and vacillations—indeed the whole machinery of his discursive understanding—come to an end, and he becomes a new man altogether, convinced and pacified. As to the manner in which this is done, it is said that the Teacher brings the three Liṅgas down in touch with the three Aṅgas of the disciple by a three-fold process along the same line, but in an inverted course (viz. through dṛṣṭi, manas and bhāva down to Kalā). That is, by means of the Vedhādīkṣā the Bhāvaliṅga is united with the Yogāṅga ; the Prāṇaliṅga is united with Bhogāṅga through Mantradīkṣā ; and through Kriyādīkṣā the unification of Iṣṭaliṅga with Tyāgāṅga is brought about. The union of Liṅga and Aṅga is likened to the union of flame (*śikhā*) and camphor (*karpūra*), Liṅga being the flame and Aṅga the camphor.

This union is indeed the inner reality of all upāsanā. The duality of exclusiveness being gone, the soul rests for ever unmolested in the presence of its Lord and feels identified with His Being. The cessation of duality and of divided consciousness as effected in this way is variously termed—as *nivṛtti* (rest), as *viśrānti* (quiescence) and sometimes as *parama sukha* (supreme happiness).

The identity thus established is not absolute. But all empirical differences, incident to a life of bondage, have also vanished. Śiva and Ātman are in all essentials one and the self-same thing, both being of the nature of Pure Existence, Consciousness and Bliss—in fact, the Being of one is the Being of the other. But a mysterious difference still persists through which the one appears as the Lord and the other as the servant, and so forth. It is a state, not describable in the language of man, in which the opposite moments of the so-called identity and difference, with which the lower mind is familiar, are reconciled in the synthesis of a higher unity. This state is called “bhāga-yoga”, and bears, in the mystery of its relation, a close resemblance to the intimacy subsisting between, say, fire and its light, or ice and water or camphor and its perfume. The two are not separable except by a logical abstraction.

As soon as this union comes to happen, the seed of pure devotion (*parā bhakti*) which has till now been embedded in the soul waiting for a favourable opportunity begins to sprout forth and germinate:

tasmāt kṣetrasya bījasya bījīnāś ca kadācana/
 viyogo ne'ṣyate kvā'pi sadā samyoga eva hi//
 yogena tu parā bhaktir iti bhaktes tu vaibhavam/
 tasyāḥ svarūpasadbhāvāt sadbhaktir iti kīrtitā//

This is Sadbhakti which works up to higher and higher levels, bringing each Aṅga into contact with its corresponding Liṅga, till it comes to the supreme stage called Sāmarasya when the Mahāliṅga and Aikya Sthala are *completely* fused with each other.

This six-fold contact is called Ṣaḍaṅga Yoga and is declared to be a means to the attainment of Śīvatattva, to the attainment of Divine Alliance.

VI

A few words now require to be said about the manner in which the activities of the Jīva are to be offered up one and all to the Lord. It is said that this dedication (*arpaṇa*) is to be made in a spirit of meekness and self-abnegation. It is two-fold, according as the object dedicated is (a) an action (*kriyārpaṇa*) or (b) a thought and emotion (*jñānārpaṇa*).

(a) Let us try to understand what the author intends to convey by the former term (*kriyārpaṇa*). It is said that the object which the self holds enjoyable in its earthly life must belong to one of the three categories of bhogyadravya—(i) sthūla, (ii) pravivikta or (iii) ānanda; and consequently the dedication is also three-fold.

(i) The first and lowest kind of such object is *rūpa* which the viśva offers up to the Iṣṭalinga. This is external dedication (*vāhyārpaṇa*).

(ii) The next in order is *ruci*, which is offered up by the taijasa to the Prāṇalinga. This is internal dedication (*antarārpaṇa*).

(iii) But the highest form of dedication is that known as Ātmasaṅga, in which the prājña offers up *trpti* to the Bhāvalinga by way of sacrifice.

This statement, albeit brief, gives an excellent account of what according to this system constitutes the true philosophy of enjoyment. All enjoyment is not bondage, it is held, but only that which is divorced from the Spirit. Nothing is to be accepted for personal gratification unless it be dedicated to the Lord who is the real owner of all. That is, everything being His should be offered to Him, and then received back from Him as a free gift of prasāda for purposes of enjoyment. Else it would be an act of misappropriation. Cravings after fruits and petty desires should be given up. Whatever is

not thus offered in sacrifice to the Lord is not fit for enjoyment.

yad rūpam arpitam linge tad rūpam bhoktum arhati/
rūpāntaram na bhoktavyām bhuktaṁ cet tad
anarpitam//

The purity and liberation of heart,¹ the inner enfranchisement, (*nirlepa*), which this attitude of dedication ends in effecting, vary in degree and are differently named śuddhi, siddhi and prasiddhi.

(b) The second form of dedication (*jñānārpana*) which is described as ineffable (*svānubhutyekagocara*), and not definable by words, and of which the purpose is to remove taints of sensible objects, is said to consist in offering up to the Sthala revealed in the six *Līngas* the six kinds of experiences of the soul, viz. the five sense-impressions and the sixth—*parināma* or the feeling of pleasure, pain, etc. All these varied objects, of which the world of man is composed, being offered to the Lord, the Ātman is able to enjoy them as His favour (*prasāda*) and find in them the fulfilment of an all-encompassing delight:

aikyātmako'yaṁ pariṇāmavastu
sadā mahāliṅgasamarpitam hi/
svabhāvasiddhanijabhaktiyogān
nisevate trptighanaprasādam//

The mysterious relation between Faith and Grace is such that it is hard to say which of them stands in the relation of cause to the other. It is said that Grace leads to Faith and also Faith to Grace:

prasādād devatābhaktiḥ prasādo bhaktisambhavaḥ/
yathā vā'ṅkurato bījaṁ bījato vā yathā'ṅkuraḥ//²

¹ This is practically an explication of the central teaching of the *Īsopanisad*. Cf. the idea involved in its first couplet: tena tyaktena bhūñjīthāh etc. It is a compromise in spirit between the absolute rejection (*samnyāsa*) of *vedānta* and the utter self-indulgence of the sensual life (for a masterly analysis of this *Upanisad* and its exposition *vide* A. Ghose's papers in "Ārya", Vol. I) cf. *Gītā*, III. 12.

² From this it is apparent that the two acts—or rather the two attitudes—

When all the activities of the soul, through dedication to the Lord, come to absolute rest in themselves (*svas-minneva svayam yānti viśrāntim*), this state of repose is called Kriyāvīsranti or Happiness. It is a state when, all desires satisfied (*āptakāma*), the soul rises above the stirrings and strivings of a finite existence and becomes perfectly free. Its true character is then revealed and it realises in a single act of intuition, no longer subject to the disturbing influence of Time, its eternal unity with the Supreme Being—"I am Śiva Himself" (*aham sākṣāt Śiva eva*). For one who has attained to these heights all the movements of the body, all the activities of the will, are transmuted into forms of Divine worship.¹ His will is but God's will, everything is in fact to him 'apparelled in a celestial light'—a Divine manifestation.

His freedom of movement (*svicchācāra*) forms at this stage the highest kind of worship. Such a man is no more subject in his dealings to the regulations of ethical codes (*vidhi* and *niṣedha*) or even to the laws of Nature. His devotion is unrestricted (*nirāṅkuṣa*), all-

are not so much as two *distinct* attitudes as two phases of the same indescribable reality, so that what is Bhakti (Faith) on the part of jīva is really the other side of what is Prasāda (Grace)¹ from the view-point of Īśvara. There is no causal relation between the two. This will remind one of the famous statement in the Bhāgavata wherein it is said that whatever is offered to the Lord comes back reflected to the soul and that the best way of securing a thing is to sacrifice it unto the Lord

nai'vatmanaḥ prabhur ayaṁ nijalābhapūrno/
mānaṁ jaṇād avidusaḥ karuṇo vṛṇite//
yad yaj jano bhagavate vidadhīta mānam/
tac cā'tmane pratimukhasya yathā mukhaśrīh//

The two acts are really simultaneous. See Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's discussion on this point in his commentary on the *Gītā*, VII 14. Cf. Meister Eckhart

"*Thy opening and His entering are but one moment*" (Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 159)

¹ āptakāmasya sukhinah kāmācārahirmukhāh/
pravṛttā laukikāḥ sarve prayayur nāśam ātmani//
pranastev esu sarvesu svechchācāreṇa yat kṛtam/
tacchivārcanam eva syād yadbhuktam tacchivārcitam//
śivarūpatayā bhāti yasya sarvam svabhāvatah/
svicchācārasamācārah tasya cā'rcā hi śūlinah//

absorbing. Yoga has done its share of work in conducting him above the realms of Māyā: Bhakti alone endures. This bhakti is an ever-flowing source of happiness, being above the trammels of bondage.¹ This is the so-called Advaita Bhakti of which we hear so much in subsequent literature and which is characterised as nijanirvānarūpinī. It is to be distinguished from Dvaita Bhakti which involves difference between the worshipper and the worshipped and is a source of evil (*kleśahetuprasādhinī*). The actions of an Advaita Bhakta are no actions at all, though appearing as such.² These are neither fruitful nor barren, but are by nature (*svabhāvataḥ*) the plays of Divine Will (*līlāmātraḥ*). It is thus evident that the true Śaiva Bhakti finds scope for manifestation only when the liberation is effected. That Parā Bhakti stands above Mokṣa is clear from the following lines of Māyideva:

jñānād eva hi mokṣah syān mokṣād upari śāmbhavī/
bhaktiḥ paratarā bhāti svatantrā bhaktiḥ//
lokayor ubhayor aihikāmusmikapadārthayoh/
gamāgamam vinai'vā'ste bhaktiḥ
sompūrṇavaibhavā//

This is an interesting statement, as showing that as in Bhāgavata Vaiṣṇavism, so in the Śaiva Siddhānta also, Mokṣa is not held to be the highest end of man, but forms only the gateway through which the soul has to pass for realising its divine possibilities of Self-Adoration and Self-Delight. The doctrine of what has come to be known as

¹ bandhamuktyor abhāve hi bhaktir uktā nīrargalā/
na bandhe mocane cā'pi līnyoś ca samuccaye//
na yogo na tapo'nyac ca kramah ko'pi na vidyate/
amāye śivamarge'smin bhaktur ekā praśasyate// (*Anubhava Sūtra*)

The latter verse occurs with some variation in Utpala's *Śvastotrāvalī*, stotra no. I verse 18.

² advaitabhaktiyuktasya yognaḥ sakalā kriyā/
astī dagdhatanyāyāt kriyāmātrā na hi kriyā//
yathā nānāvidhā nadyo nānāvidhajalā api/
syandamānā imāḥ sarvāḥ pārāvāram samāśrītāḥ//
tadrūpenai'va drśyante nāmarūpe vihāya ca/
tathā'dvaitam samāśritya kriyā nānāvidhā api//

a fifth Puruṣārtha finds an explicit enunciation¹ in this system as well, and it would be a historical blunder to associate it exclusively with the Gauḍīya and other Vaiṣṇava sects affiliated to the Bhāgavata order.

In the following lines of Māyideva it is stated that true bhakti comes after jñāna :

jñānam brūte bhaktih kurute śivajivayoh/
 pṛthagbhāvam, tena jñānam pūrvam bhakti-
 stutaratayā vibhāti tataḥ//

Jñānakāṇḍa starts from and finds its justification in the egoistic consciousness (*abhimāna*) of man, and so far is on a par with the karmakāṇḍa, the difference being based only on the nature of this consciousness. Thus in the Way of Action the soul must needs feel itself to be an active agent (*karttā*); in the way of Knowledge too, though it does not participate in and stands above the multiple activities of Nature and watches them from its lonely height, it still feels itself to be their constant witness, indifferent and poised in the serenity of its blissful unconcern. But in Devotion both these abhimānas are transcended, and stress is laid on the passive aspect of the soul. It is a marvellous state and is incapable of expression in human language. For who can fathom the mystery of that ineffable state in which every enjoyment of the soul becomes equivalent to divine worship, so that what appears on one hand as the satisfaction (*trpti*) of the soul is on the other a synonym of the Favour (*prasāda*) of God. It is through Advaita Bhakti that Absolute Grace of the Lord is realised.²

advatatattvarūpena drīyante bhaktiyogatah/
 kṛyākārasvarūpena pratītā api sarvadā//
 na kevalakṛiyā hy asya hīlāmātrāh svabhāvatah//
¹ dharmādīpuruṣārthānām caturṇām paratah parā/
 pañcamah puruṣārtho hi bhaktih śaivī sanātani//

Anubhava Sūtra, VIII. 78

² svacchandācāravarttīnyā bhaktiyā yat kṛtam arcanam/
 yad bhuktam arpitam lunge satyam eva mayo'ditam//
 gandhapuspādīgandhasya grahanam tasya pūjanam/
 saḍrasāsāvādanam tasya narvedyāya prakalpitaḥ//

Through this Grace unending of the Supreme Self, resulting as a matter of course from Parā Bhakti, is vouchsafed unto the soul a Unitive or Deified Life (*sarvātmabhāva*)—a life in which everything reveals itself as the Self. Such is the infinite potency of Divine Grace that the subject, object and instrument of every action, cognition and enjoyment—nay, the action, cognition and enjoyment themselves are recognised as verily the Self. The body, the senses, the names, the vital energies, the intellect, the egoism—indeed the injunctions and the prohibitions, are all glorified into one universal Reality, viz. the Self.¹

indriyākārabhāsā sā viśayākārabhāsanam/
 krīdayā devatā bhunkte svata ity arcanam krtam//
 lingadehī śivātmāyam lingācārī na laukikah/
 sarvam lingamayam rūpam lingena samam aśnute//
 sarvāngam lingam eva syād annapānam yad arpitam/
 prasādah tṛptir eva syāt sarvam lingamayaṁ bhavet//
 evam advaitabhaktyai'va prasādah sarvatomukhah/
 prasidhyati tatah sarvam ātmarūpena drśyate//

¹ kartā kārayitā ca'va karanam kāryam eva ca/
 sarvam ātmatayā bhāti prasādāt pārameśvarāt//
 bhaktā bhojayitā bhogyam bhogopokaranāny api/
 sarvam ātmatayā bhāti prasādāt pārameśvarāt//
 grāhakaś ca tathā grāhyam grahanam sarvatomukham/
 sarvam ātmatayā bhāti prasādāt pārameśvarāt//
 śarīram indriyam prāṇā mano budhir ahaṁkṛtiḥ/
 sarvam ātmatayā bhāti prasādāt pārameśvarāt//
 vidhayaśca nisedhaśca nisiddhakaranāny api/
 sarvam ātmatayā bhāti prasādāt pārameśvarāt//

NOTES ON PĀŚUPATA PHILOSOPHY

ANTIQUITY OF THE PĀŚUPATA SECT

The *Sarvadarśana Saṁgraha* of Mādhavācārya devotes a chapter to the treatment of the philosophical doctrines and teachings of the Pāśupatas. It seems therefore clear that as early as the fourteenth century of the Christian era the sect had assumed such importance that it claimed recognition as a distinct theologico-philosophical school. From a careful study of the earlier literature it would appear that the sect is much older than the days of Mādhava. Udayana (1000 A.D.) refers to it in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* and the author of *Nyāyasāra*, wrote a work viz. *Gaṇakārikā*, dealing with the Pāśupata categories.¹ Uddyotakara, the author of *Nyāyavārttika* (500 A.D.), calls himself a Pāśupatācārya. The Purāṇas and even the *Mahābhārata* contain numerous references to this sect. The *Brahmasūtras* of Bādarāyana include a section in the second pāda of chapter II, refuting the views of the adherents of this sect.

ORIGIN OF THE SECT

The earliest history of the sect is shrouded in mystery. In the Vedic literature, the word Pāśupati indeed occurs in various places,² but only as a synonym of Rudra. It has not got there that technical meaning which we find invariably attached to it in subsequent Pāśupata literature. The sect was of course known to the *Mahābhārata*.

¹ The work has been published in the Gaekawar Oriental Series from Baroda (No XV), 1920,

² Cf. *Ath Sam* 11.2.28, *Vāja Sam* 16.28; *Pārask. Grhyasūtra* 2, 8; *Āśva Grhyasūtra* 48

The *Vāmana Purāṇa* (VI. 86-91) classifies the worshippers of Śiva Līṅga under four groups viz. (a) Śaiva, (b) Pāsupata or Mahāpāsupata, (c) Kāladamana and (d) Kāpālika and observes that all these sects had their origin in Brahmā. The Pāsupata sect was represented by Mahārṣi Bharadvāja and his disciple, Rājā Somakeśvara.¹

It is stated in the *Śiva Purāṇa* that Vāsudeva Kṛṣṇa learnt the Pāsupata system from Upamanyu, the elder brother of Dhaumya.

LITERATURE OF THE SECT

We have now no means of ascertaining the extent of the early literature or its details. But from the statement of the *Śiva Purāṇa* it appears that the original doctrines of the sect were contained in four Saṁhitās compiled by Ruru, Dadhīci, Agastya and Upamanyu (*Śiva Purāṇa* V. (a) 28. 15-16). The *Atharva Śira* and some other Upaniṣads belong to this sect. The philosophical position of the school is based on a sūtra work, called *Pāsupata-śāstra-pañcārtha-darśana* and attributed to Maheśvara. This work was in five chapters (hence called *Pañcādhyāyī*) and commented on by Rāśikara, the twenty-eighth and last incarnation of Śiva. Mādhavācārya, Keśava Kāsmīrī and Rāmānanda (on *Kūśīkhaṇḍa*) refer to this work. Bhāsarvajña wrote eight kārīkās, called *Gaṇakārīkā* dealing with the Pāsupata doctrines. An unknown author commented on these kārīkās (*Ratnatīkā*, p. 10). The same wrote a work called *Satkāryavicāra*. *Saṁskārakārīkā* is a manual treating of Pāsupata rituals. Haradatta was one of the earlier authors of this school, but no detail regarding his

¹The Śaiva sect was led by Śakti, son of Vaśiṣṭha and guru of Gopāyana. The Kāladamana sect was represented by Āpastamba, the guru of Krāthēśvara, Dhanada (=Kuvera) headed the Kāpālika sect and had a disciple named Arnodara, who was a Śudra by caste. Dhanada is described as a Mahāvratā

life or works is known. The *Yogacintāmaṇi* of Śivānanda speaks of a work named *Nakulīśayogaparāyaṇa* which evidently belong to this sect.¹

HISTORICAL FOUNDER OF THE SECT

The historical foundation of the sect, evidently a subsequent branch of the original school, is attributed to one Nakulīśa, who was an inhabitant of Karavana² near modern Broach in the Boroda state. His name appears in various forms viz. Lakulīśa, Laguḍīśa, etc. The origin of the name is not known, but it is surmised that he was so called on account of his always holding a cudgel (*laguḍa*) in his hand. The Vairāgīs of this sect bear this characteristic even now. It is difficult to determine the age of this early Śaiva preacher. He is believed to have been an incarnation of Śiva. It is stated in the *Vāyu Purāna* that simultaneously with the appearance of Śrī Kṛṣṇa as Vāsudeva, Mahādeva manifested himself as Lakulī at a place, thence called Kāyāvarohana, now corrupted into Karwana. He entered into a corpse lying on the burning ground and got up as a preacher.

According to this Purāna, Lakulī had four disciples who practised the Pāśupata Yoga and besmeared their bodies with ashes and dust. The names of these four heroes are: (i) Kuśika, (ii) Gārgya, (iii) Mitra and (iv) Kauruṣya. The Chintra Inscription alludes to this

¹ The editor in the footnote (p 100) adds that it is a Yoga work of the Hādī class, belonging to Śarva school

² The Sanskrit name of this place was Kāyāvarohana, lit the place where the body (of Śiva) descended. It refers to the story that Śiva incarnated himself in this place in the form of a human figure holding a club in hand. A temple of Lakulīśa is still to be seen here. An inscription is found in the neighbourhood of the temple of Ekalngaji, at a distance of 14 miles from Udaipur. The *Śiva purāna* (*Sanat K Samhitā* 31.12) refers to Lakulī of Kāyāvarohana as one of the sixty-eight forms of Śiva.

story.¹ Though the synchronism of Vāsudeva Kṛṣṇa and Lakulīśa, as pointed out by the Purāna, is hardly capable of being established, the age of the Śaiva teacher remains still unsettled.²

DOCTRINES

(i) The Kārya is threefold, viz., Vidyā, Kalā and Paśu. Vidyā is a quality of the Paśu,³ and is of two kinds: Knowledge (*bodha*) and ignorance (*abodha*). The former is essentially either vivekapravṛtti or avivekapravṛtti, but from the standpoint of object it is fourfold or fivefold. The vivekapravṛtti is manifested by a valid source of knowledge and is called citta. It is by means of the citta that an animal is conscious of (*cetayate*) the world, with the help of the light of Caitanya. The second type of vidyā (*abodhavidyā*), is described as paśvarthadharmādharmaikā.

Kalā is dependent on a conscious agent and is itself unconscious. It is of two kinds, viz. kārya and kāraṇa. The former is of ten types viz., the five tattvas (*prthivī* etc.) and the five guṇas (*rūpa* etc.). The latter is of three kinds, viz., five senses, five motor organs and three inner organs, i.e., buddhi, ahaṅkāra and manas.

The Paśu is either sāñjana endowed with body and senses or nirañjana, i.e., bereft of body and senses.

(ii) Kāraṇa, literally a cause, is the name of Pati (*Īśvara*, God). He is the anugrahaka of all creation and

¹ In this inscription however the name of the third disciple, as given above appears as Maitreya.

² Farquhar believes that Lakulīśa was a historical person and lived between the ages of *Mahābhārata* and the *Vāyu Purāna* (*Rel. Literature* p 147). The age of this Purāna is taken to be 300-400 A D Hence Lakulīśa is placed at an earlier date. Fleet says (*J.R.A.S.* 1907 p 419) that the figure of Śiva with club found on the coins of the Kushān King Huviśka represents Lakulīśa

³ *Ratnakā* observes that its character as a guṇa is from the standpoint of Pāsupata system, but according to Vaiśeṣika it would be dravya.

destruction. He is one and without a second. His classification is based on a difference of *guṇa* and *karma* only. The *kāraṇa* is independent in this system and is not dependent on *karma* and other factors. He is *Pati* which implies possession of infinite power or knowledge and action i.e. possession for all times of *Aiśvarya*. He is *Ādya* or the primal one, i.e., possesses natural powers.

(iii) *Yoga*—It is defined as the communion between *Ātman* and *Īsvara* through the medium of *citta*. There are two varieties of *yoga*—one is active (*kriyātmaka*) in form of *japa*, *dhyāna* etc. and the other stands for cessation of all action (*kriyoparāma*). The latter kind is technically known as *Samvidgati*. The fruit of *Yoga* in this system is not *Kaivalya* (as in *Sāṅkhya* and *Pātañjala*) but realisation of Supreme Power (*parmaiśvarya*) accompanied by end of pain.

(iv) *Vidhi*—*Vidhi* is the name of a function which aims at *dharma* or *artha*. It is two-fold, being primary or secondary. The primary *Vidhi* is *Caryā*, which is of two kinds, viz., *vrata* and *dvāras*. The *vratas* are thus enumerated—(a) ash-bath, (b) ash-bed (*bhasmanāśayyā*) (c) *upahāra* or *niyama* consisting of laughter (*hasita*),¹ song (*gīta*),² dancing (*nṛtya*),³ *hudukkāra*,⁴ obeisance (*namaskāra*) and chanting (*japya*), (d) *japa* and (e) circumambulation (*pradakṣiṇa*).

The *dvāras* are:

(a)¹ *Krāthana* or the showing of the body during waking moments as if it were in sleep.

(b) *Spandana* or the quivering of the limbs as under the influence of *Vāyu*.

¹ *Hasita* is *attahāsa*—side-splitting laughter, with lips etc. gaping wide.

² *Gīta* refers to singing of songs in praise of *Śiva* and in accordance with the canon of the science of music.

³ Dancing must be according to the dictates of *Nāṭyaśāstra*.

⁴ *Hudukkāra* is the utterance of the sound 'Huduk' in the manner of an expelling. This sanctifying sound is produced from the contact of the tongue with the palate.

(c) Maṇḍana or going in the manner of one suffering from injury in the leg, or rather limping.

(d) Śṛṅgāraṇa or showing oneself by means of one's physical erotic movements (*vilāsāḥ*) as if one is in passion at the sight of a beautiful and youthful lady.

(e) Avitatkarana or performing an evil action condemned by the world in the manner of one devoid of sense of discrimination.

(f) Avitad-bhāṣaṇa or uttering of meaningless or contradictory words.

The secondary vidhi is what is subsidiary and auxiliary to the primary vidhi, i.e., anusnāna and bhakṣo-cchiṣṭa.

(v) Duḥkhānta or End of pain.

With the Pāsupatas Duḥkhānta means, not only negation of sorrow but also realisation of supreme Lordship (*Paramaiśvarya*). Duḥkhānta is of two kinds: anātmaka and sātmaka. The former is absolute cessation of all pain. The latter is realisation of power which consists in drkkriyāśakti. Drkśakti (= *dhīśakti*) is really one, but is called five-fold through difference of object, viz. śravaṇa, manana, vijñāna and sarvajñatva. Similarly kriyāśakti too, though one, is described as three-fold through upacāra—viz., monojavitva, kāmarūpitva and vikaranadharmitva. The word darśana means knowledge of everything amenable to sight and touch—subtle, distant and closed. The perfect knowledge of every śabda is śravaṇa, of every thought is manana, of every śāstra, through text and sense, is vijñāna; and omniscience is the perfect knowledge, eternally shining, of all tattvas in regard to all things, said or unsaid, either in summary or in detail or severally. Manojavitva is the power of doing something instantaneously. Kāmarūpitva is the power of controlling any form simply at one's will and under stress of karma etc. Vikaranadharmitva is the power of doing or knowing anything (*niratisayaiśvaryasambandhitva*) without any organ.

This two-fold śakti is collectively called Supreme Lordship. When this two-fold siddhi is reached, all the ten marks of siddhi reveal themselves. These marks are: avaśyatva, anāveśyatva, avadhyaatva, abhayatva, aksayatva, ajaratva, amaratva, apratighāta, mahattva and patitva. These are explained below: Avaśya is absolutely free. There are differences of opinion on the meaning of the term avaśyatva. One view is that vaśyatva is a mala and when it is removed the dharma existing in Puruṣa viz., avaśyatva is manifested. The author of *Ratnatīka* reproduces this view, saying that the manifestation of aiśvarya is not admitted, for it is unreasonable to hold that a dharma which is not of the nature of the dharmī (*anātmakadharmā*) should be manifested. If it were manifested the dharma would be anātmaka. Hence avaśyatva means aiśvarya-sambandha. It is this which eliminates subordination. Anāveśyatva means that the jñānasambandha cannot be overpowered by another person. Akṣayatva implies eternal relation with aiśvarya. Apratighāta is thus defined: sarvatrā'bhipretārthesu pravarttamānasya maheśvarenā'py apratibandhadharmittvam. (*Ratnatīkā* p. 10). Mahattva is superiority to all paśus, owing to greatness of aiśvarya. Patitva is Lordship of all kāryas, viz., Paśu, Vidyā and Kalā.

ŚĀKTA PHILOSOPHY

I

The term 'Śākta philosophy' loosely used in the sense of a school of philosophical doctrines covers the entire field of Śākta culture in India. Every system of culture has its own line of approach to reality. An enquiry into ancient cultures would show that the cult of Śakti is very old in India as in other parts of the world. And it is quite possible that it existed along with Śaiva and Pāśupata cults in the days of the pre-historic Indus Valley civilization.

In spite of the antiquity of Śākta culture and of its philosophical traditions no serious attempt seems to have been made in the past to systematize them and give them a definite shape.¹ The result was that though the culture was held in great esteem as embodying the secret wisdom of the *elect* it did not find its proper place in any of the compendia of Indian philosophy, including the *Sarvadarśanasangraha* of Madhavācārya.²

The reason why no serious attempt was made is said to have been either that it was deemed improper to drag down for rational examination truths inaccessible to the experience of ordinary men, or that no further systematization of the revealed truths than what is contained in the allied works of the Śaiva philosophers was needed for the

¹ Pt Panchānan Tarkaratna in his *Śākta-Bhāṣya* on the *Brahma Sūtra* and on the *Īśa-upaniṣad* (Pub Banaras, Śaka, 1859-61), attempted to bring into prominence what he regarded as the Śākta point of view in the history of Indian philosophy. The attempt is laudable, but it does not truly represent any of the traditional viewpoints of the Śākta schools.

² *Sarva-Siddhānta-Samgraha* attributed to Śankarācārya, *Sad-darśana-sāmuçaya* by Haribhadra and Rājasekhara, *Viveka-vitāsa* by Jinadatta etc. are similar works, but in none of them the Śākta system is represented, even referred to by name

average reader. This reason is not convincing enough, for if the Upaniṣads could be made the basis of a philosophical system, there is no reason why the Śakta Āgamas could not be similarly utilized. For the function of philosophy is, as Joad rightly remarks, to accept the data furnished by the specialists who have worked in the field and then to "assess their meaning and significance."

The Āgamas have their own theory as to the manner in which supreme knowledge descends on earth-consciousness. The Scriptures, as such are ultimately traceable to this source.¹ The question as to how intuitions of a higher plane of consciousness are translated into thought and language, committed to writing and made communicable to others have been answered by Vyāsa in his commentary on *Yoga-Sūtra* (I. 43.). He says that the supersensuous perception of Yogins obtained through nirvitarka-samādhi is really an intuition of the unique character (*viśeṣa*) of an object, but being associated with verbal elements it loses its immediacy and is turned into a concept capable of being transmitted to others. This is how, according to him, scriptures originate.² The supreme knowledge of Pratibhā is integral and cannot be obtained from the words of teachers. It is self-generated and does not depend upon an external factor.³

The cult of Śakti produced a profound influence on

¹ The descent is from Parā-vāc through Paśyantī and Madhyamā to the Vaikhari level (see Jayarātha on *Tantrāloka*, I. p. 84 and J. C. Chatterjee. *Kashmir Śaivism*, pp. 4-6) As regards the order of descent there are different accounts, though the underlying idea is the same. Cf. *Parasurāma-kalpa-Sūtra*, I. II; *Setu-Bandha* by Bhāskara Rāya, 7 47 *Kāma-śalā-vilāsa* with cidvallī, 50-3; *Yogini-hṛdaya-dīpikā* pp. 1-3, *Saubhāgya-subhagodaya* (quoted in *Dīpikā*, pp. 79-82) etc.

² As to how intuitive knowledge is converted into thought, Patañjali holds that it is through association with śabda. The supersensuous perception of the Yogin in regard to an object obtained through nirvitarka-samādhi, gives rise to an immediate knowledge of its unique character, but if it is to be communicated to others it has to be interwoven with śabda and then in that thought-form transmitted through language

³ See my article "The doctrine of Pratibhā in Indian Philosophy" in the *Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute*, 1923-4, Vol. VPP. 1-18, 113-32.

general Indian thought. A topographical survey of India would show that the country is scattered over numerous centres of Śakti-Sādhana. It was widespread in the past and has continued unbroken till to-day.¹

The history of Śākta-Tāntrika culture may be divided into three periods :

(a) Ancient or pre-Buddhistic, going back to pre-historic age.

(b) Mediaeval or post-Buddhistic, rather post-Christian, extending to about A.D. 1200.

(c) Modern, from A.D. 1300 till now.

No works of the ancient age are now forthcoming. The most authoritative treatises available today belong to the mediaeval period, though it is likely that some of these works contain traditions and even actual fragments which may be referred to the earlier period. The mediaeval was the most creative period in the history of the Tāntrika, as, in fact, in that of many other branches of Sanskrit literature. Most of the standard works, including the original Āgamas and the treatises based on them and commentaries on them by subsequent writers, fall in this period. The modern period too has been productive, but with a few brilliant exceptions most of the works produced in this period are of secondary character and include compilations, practical handbooks and minor tracts dealing with miscellaneous subjects.

The Śākta literature is extensive, though most of it is of mixed character. Śiva and Śakti being intimately related, Saiva and Śākta Tantras have generally a common cultural background, not only in practices but in philosophical conceptions as well. The Āgamas are mostly inclined towards Advaita, but other view-points are not wanting. It is believed that the sixty-four

¹ See Sir John Woodroffe, *Shakti and Shākta*, pp 155-7, *Kalyāṇa Śakti* Number, pp. 637-93.

Bhairava-Āgamas which issued from the Yogini face of Śiva were non-dualistic, the ten *Śava-Āgamas* were dualistic and the eighteen *Raudra-Āgamas* were of a mixed character.¹ Besides these, there were numerous other Āgamas most of which have disappeared, though some have survived in a complete or mutilated form or are known through references and quotations. Among the works which have a philosophical bearing may be mentioned the names of *Svacchanda*, *Mālinīvijaya*, *Vijñāna-Bhairava*, *Tri-Śiro Bhairava*, *Kula-gahvara*, *Paramānanda-Tantra*, etc. and also *Āgama-Rahasya*, *Abheda-Kārikā*, *Ājñāvātāra* etc.

Each Āgama has four pādas, of which *jñānapāda* is devoted to a discussion of philosophical problems. It is not to be supposed that the approach to the problems and their solutions in each *Āgama* have always been the same. Very great differences are sometimes noticed, but in a general way it may be said that most of the Āgamas presuppose a common cultural heritage. From this point of view therefore a real grouping and a classification based upon the specific teachings of each group are possible. At some future date when a regular history of the development of Śākta thought will come to be written these differences and specific characters will have to be taken into account.

There are different schools of Śākta culture, among which the line of Śrī-vidyā possesses an extensive literature. The school of Kālī has also its own literature though not so extensive. The Śrī-kula includes certain śaktis and Kālī-kula includes certain others. Both these schools and all the other cults are in a sense inter-related. Agastya, Durvāsas, Dattātreyā and others² were devoted

¹ See Jayaratha on *Tantrāloka*, I, 18. There is reference to sixty-four Tantras in Sankara's *Saundarya-Lahari* V. 37. Laksmīdhara's commentary gives a list of the names. Other lists are found in the *Sarvollāsa* and *Vāmakeśvara-Tantras*.

² Nāgānanda is supposed to have been the author of a *Śakti-Sūtra*. Another

to *Śri-vidyā* and produced a number of interesting works. Agastya is credited with the authorship of a *Śakti-Sūtra* and a *Śakti-mahimna-stotra*.¹ This Sūtra unlike the *Brahma-Sūtra* or *Śiva-Sūtra* has not much philosophical value. But the stotra has its own importance. Durvāsas, who had been ordered by Śri-kanṭha (*Śiva*) to propagate the Āgamas, is said to have created three Ṛṣis by the power of his mind and asked them 'to found orders to preach all shades of philosophical thoughts.'² Durvāsas himself is known to have been the author of two stotras dedicated to Śiva and Śakti, entitled,—*Para-Śambhu-Stotra* and *Lalitā-Stotra-ratna*, which go under his name.³ According to tradition Dattātreya was the author of a *saṁhitā* work (called *Datta-saṁhitā*)⁴ in eighteen thousand verses. Paraśurāma is said to have studied this extensive work, and to bring its contents within easy reach of students summarized it in a body of six thousand sūtras distributed into fifty sections. The *saṁhitā* and the *sūtras* were both abridged in the form of a dialogue between Dattātreya and Paraśurāma by Sumedhas, a pupil of Paraśurāma. This work may be identified with *Tripurā-Rahasya*, in the *Māhātmya* section of which the

Śakti-Sūtra is attributed to Bharadvāja (See *Kalyāna*, Ibid, p 624). The authenticity of these works are not very clear.

¹ A work called *Śri-vidyā-dīpikā* is attributed to Agastya. It contains an interpretation of the Pañcadaśī-mantra received by him from Hayagrīva.

² See J. C. Chatterji's *Kashmir-Śaivism* pp 23-4, K. C. Pāndey, *Abhinavagupta*, p. 72 (cf also p 55, Durvāsas is said to have taught the sixty-four monistic Āgamas to Kṛṣṇa).

³ In the colophon of the *Lalitā-Stotra-Ratna* Durvāsas is called *Sakalāgamācārya Cakravartin*. Nityānanda in his commentary says that Durvāsas, *alias* Krodhabhāṭṭāraka is really Śiva himself, the master of the teachers of Āgamas, born of the womb of Anurūpā. The *Śakti-Stotra* has been published from Bombay (*N Sagar*). The *Para-Śambhu-Stotra* of which a ms. was examined by me is divided into several sections dealing with *Kṛyā-Śakti*, *Kundalinī*, *Mātrkā* etc. Here *Parama-Śiva* is described as the world teacher who reveals *Mahā-mātrkā* in order to manifest *Brahma-tattva*, which is His own self-revelation, the *Prakāśa* having been hidden so long in His heart. Even in this stotra Durvāsas is called *Krodhabhāṭṭāraka*. It is said that *Somānanda*, the great Śaiva teacher of *Kāśmra* descended from Durvāsas.

⁴ *Datta-saṁhitā* is referred to in *Saubhāgya-Bhāskara*.

tradition is recorded. The *jñāna khaṇḍa* of this work forms an excellent introduction to Śākta philosophy.¹

Gauḍapāda, supposed to be identical with the Parama-Guru of Śaṅkarācārya, wrote a sūtra work, called *Śrī-vidyā-ratna-sūtra*, on which Śaṅkarāranya commented. It is an important work in the history of Śākta literature but not of much philosophical value.² His *Subhagodaya-Stuti* and Śaṅkara's *Saundaryalaharī* deserve a passing mention. Śaṅkara's *Prapañca-Sāra* with Padmapāda's commentary as well as the *Prayogakramadīpikā* are standard works. So is Lakṣmana Deśika's *Sāradātīlaka* on which Rāghava Bhatta commented. Somānanda in his *Śivadr̥ṣṭi* refers to the school of Śāktas as allied to his own school (*Śaiva*) and says that in their opinion Śakti is the only substance, Śiva being but a name reserved for its inactive condition.³ Though he was a Śaiva in conviction his analysis of Vāc is a valuable contribution to Śākta thought. As regards the great Abhinavagupta he was verily the soul of Śākta culture. He was a pronounced Kaula and his literary activities in the field of *Śaiva-Śākta-Āgama*, as in that of poetics and dramaturgy, gave it a unique philosophical value which has not yet been surpassed by any of his contemporaries or successors. His *Tantrāloka* is an encyclopaedic work on Śaiva-Śākta philosophy based on many earlier works. His *Mālinī-vijaya-vārttika*, *Parā-Trimśikā-vivaraṇa*, *Pratyabhijñā-vimarśinī* and *Pratyabhijñā-vivṛti-vimarśinī* are full of extra-ordinary learning and spiritual wisdom.

¹ It is evident that the work of Sumedhas (of Hārīta family and known as Hārītāyana) is really to be identified with the *Tripurā-Rahasya* itself rather than with the *Kalpa-Sūtra* of Paraśurāma as some have done, because the *Kalpa-Sūtra* is not in the shape of a dialogue between Dattātreya and Paraśurāma and is not attributed to Sumedhas, whereas *Tripurā-Rahasya* has the form of a similar dialogue and is attributed to Sumedhas Hārītāyana

² See *Śrī-vidyā-Ratna-Sūtra* with commentary by Śaṅkarāranya (Sarasvati Bhavan Texts, Benaras) edited by M. M. Pt. Narayan Shastri Khiste.

³ See *Śiva-dr̥ṣṭi*, p. 94.

After Abhinava, the most important names are those of Gorakṣa, Puṇyānanda, Naṭanānanda, Amṛtānanda, Svatantrānanda and Bhāskara Rāya. Gorakṣa alias Maheśvarānanda was the author of *Mahārtha-mañjarī*, and also its commentary entitled *Parimala*, *Samvid-Ullāsa* etc. He was a close follower of Abhinava. *Pratyabhijñāhrdaya*, referred to as Śakti-Sūtra by Bhāskara,¹ was commented on by Kṣemarāja, also related to Abhinava. Puṇyānanda's *Kāma-kalā-vilasā* is a standard work on kāmakalā and deals with śakti in its creative aspect. Naṭanānanda wrote its commentary called *cid-vallī*. Amṛtānanda was Puṇyānanda's disciple. His *Yogināhrdayadīpikā*, a commentary of the yogināhrdaya section of *Nityāśoḍaśikārṇava* of the *Vāmakeśvara-Tantra* represents one of the most valuable works on Tāntrika culture. Other works also, e.g. *Saubhāgya-subhagodaya*, are known to have come from his pen. Svatantrānanda wrote his *Mātrkā-cakra-viveka*, a unique work in five sections devoted to an elaborate exposition of *Rahasya-Āgama* or secret wisdom of the Śākta-Tantras. There is an excellent commentary on this work by one Śivānanda Muni. Bhāskara Rāya is perhaps the most erudite Śākta scholar in recent times (A.D. 1723-1740) who wrote many valuable works on Śākta Āgama. His best work is probably *Setu-Bandha*, the commentary on *Nityāśoḍaśikārṇava*. His *Sāmbhavānanda-Kalpa-latī*, *Varivasyā-rahasya*, *Varivasyā-prakāśa*, commentaries on *Kaula*, *Tripurā* and *Bhāvanū-upanisads*, on *Lalitā-sahasra-nāma* (*Saubhāgya-bhāskara*) and on *Durgā-Sapta-Śatī* (*Guptavatī*) are deservedly famous works and exhibit the author at his best. Pūrnānanda's *Śrī-tattva-cintā-maṇi* is a good book but contains very little philosophical information.

As regards the Kālī school the following works may be mentioned: *Kālu-jñāna*, *Kālottara*, *Mahākāla-Sam-*

¹ See *Saubhāgya-Bhāskara*, pp 96-97 etc.

hitā, Vyomakeśa-Saṁhītā, Jayadratha-yāmala, Uttara-tantra, Śakti-Saṁgama-tantra, (Kāli section), etc.

II

The Supreme Reality called Samvit, is of the nature of pure intelligence which is self-luminous and unaffected by the limitations of time, space and causality. It is infinite light called prakāśa with an unstinted freedom of action called vimarśa or svātantrya. This freedom constitutes its power which in fact is identical with its being and remains involved in it as well as expresses itself as its inalienable property. The essence of Samvit is consciousness free from vikalpas and is fundamentally distinct from matter. It is one, being integral, continuous, compact and of homogeneous texture and there is no possibility of break in its continuity and admixture of foreign element in its essence. Being free it does not depend on anything else for its manifestation and function.

The power may be said to exist in a two-fold condition. Creation, dissolution etc., are in reality consequent on the play of this power. It is always active, its activity being expressed on the one hand as self-limitation (*tiro-dhāna*) involving the appearance (*sr̥ṣṭi*) of the universe as such till then absorbed in and identified with the essence of Reality and on the other as self-expression only (*anugraha*=grace) implying the disappearance (*saṁhāra*) of the same and its absorption in the Reality. Maintenance (*sthiti*) of the world represents an intermediate state between *saṁhāra* and *sr̥ṣṭi*.

Samvit is like a clean mirror within which the universe shines as an image reflected in a transparent medium. As the image is not distinct from the mirror, the universe is inseparable from Samvit. But the analogy between the two need not be pushed beyond this limit. The mirror reflects an object, but Samvit in its

fullness being creative requires no object outside itself. This freedom or power of actualization is *svātantrya* or *māyā*; The world thus manifested within the Absolute has infinite varieties, but the *Samvit* remains always the same unbroken unity of existence and consciousness. Reality as universal Being is one but its specific forms are multiple, just as the mirror is one but the images reflected in it are many. The one becomes many, not under the pressure of any external principle but through its own intrinsic dynamism. Motion seems to be initiated and multiplicity evolved within the primal unity under its influence. For this reason the one always retains its unity and yet creation etc., with their infinite varieties, follow. The many is as real as the one, for both are the same.

We are thus confronted with three possible states for consideration :

(a) *Samvit* alone, but not the world appearing within it (= *cit*).

(b) *Samvit* as well as the world shining within it, without external projection (= *ānanda*).

(c) *Samvit*, the world within it and its projection outside (= *icchā*).

In every case *Samvit* as such remains one and the same and is not in the least affected. Hence it is called *nir-vikalpa*, free from *vikalpas* and modifications. On comparison of the three states it would seem that the first represents a condition in which there is no manifestation within or without. The second is a state of manifestation within, but not without. The third state, being that of *icchā*, means external projection, though in reality *Samvit* in itself being full can have nothing outside it, for even the so-called externality is not really external to it.

That *Samvit* is free from *vikalpa* and that creation is *vikalpa* or *kalpanā* is admitted by both Śākta Āgama and the Vedānta. But the question is, how does creation

as a vikalpa emanate from Saṁvit which is pure and free from vikalpas? The Vedānta says, it does not so emanate, but is part of a beginningless process (in spite of cyclic beginnings) going on within the domain of matter or māyā and superimposed on Saṁvit or Brahman which reveals it—a process which is not in any way initiated by it.

But the attitude of Āgama is different. It believes in Svātantrya or power in the Saṁvit to generate movement, though it is only ābhāsa, and externality is only apparent. The universe is within this power and power is within the Absolute. When power is supposed to be dormant, vimarśa is held to be dissolved in prakāśa (*antar-līna-vimarśa*): Śakti seems to be sleeping as Kuṇḍalinī and Śiva is no longer Śiva, but a Śava, the state being not one of spirit but of lifeless matter. But when power is awake, as indeed it always is, the supreme consciousness remains conscious of Itself. This self-awareness of the Absolute expresses itself as “I” or “Aham”, which is described as full (*pūrṇa*), since there is nothing outside it to act as a counter-entity in the form of “this” or “idam.” In the technical language of the Āgama, the state of Absolute from this point of view is called Pūrṇā’hamtā. The fullness of Aham implies the presence of the entire universe reflected within it as within a mirror. The universe is then one with Aham.

Saṁvit is prakāśa as well as vimarśa—it is beyond the universe (*viśvottīrṇa*) and yet permeates it (*viśvāt-maka*). The two aspects constitute one integral whole. This is a-ha-m, the first letter “a” standing for prakāśā, the last letter “ha” representing vimarśa; the unity of the two, which would denote the unity of all the letters of the alphabet between “a” and “ha”, is indicated by bindu “m”. Thus Aham is symbolized by bindu. The creative act of the Supreme Will breaks as it were this bindu and sets in operation the entire cosmic process.

The externalization referred to above is the manifestation of a non-ego (*an-aham-bhāva*) within the pure

Ego (*Śuddha-Ātman*), appearing as external to the limited ego; it is the root Ignorance (*mūlā'vidyā*) of the Vedānta. This non-ego is the so-called a-vyakta (unmanifest) or jaḍa-śakti (matter). But the freedom or the spiritual power of Saṁvit, known as Cit-Śakti, is beyond this Ignorance, but to this *power* the Advaita Vedānta, as usually interpreted, seems to be a stranger. As avidyā or the material *power* issues out of the spiritual *power*, the ultimate source of all contingent existence, there is no discrepancy in the statement, often found in Śākta works (e.g. *Tripurā-rahasya*, *ṁāna khaṇḍa*) that *power* has three distinct states of its existence:

(a) During the universal dissolution, when the Self is free from all vikalpas, Śakti exists as pure Cit-Śakti, i.e. Parā-Prakṛti (of the *Gītā*). As mirror is the life of the image it is the life-principle of jīva and jagat which are sustained by it.

(b) When after pralaya the pure state ceases and when although there is no vikalpa as such, there is yet a tendency in that direction, the power is called Māyā-Śakti.

(c) But when the vikalpas are fully developed and materiality becomes dense Śakti appears as Avidyā or Jaḍa-Śakti or Prakṛti. When māyā and avidyā are subsumed under one name it is called jaḍa-prakṛti (i.e. *aparā-prakṛti* of the *Gītā*).

It has already been observed that the appearance of the universe in creation (*sr̥ṣṭi*) follows upon the self-limitation of the divine *power* and cosmic end in dissolution (*pralaya*) follows from the self-assertion of the same *power*. After the period of cosmic night is over the supreme will, in co-operation with the mature adṛṣṭas of jīvas, manifests, only partially as it were, the essence of the Self, whereon the Self is revealed as limited. The appearance of limitation is thus the emergence of not-self, known as avidyā or jaḍaśakti, called also differently by the names of void (*śūnya*), prakṛti, absolute nega-

tion, darkness (*tamas*) and *ākāśa*. This is the first stage in the order of creation and represents the first limitation imposed on the Limitless. The erroneous belief, generated through the freedom of the Self, that the Ego is partial (*ankadeśika*) and not full and universal (*pūrṇa*) is responsible for the appearance of this something which being a portion of the Self is yet outside of it and free from self-consciousness and is described as not-self or by any other name as shown above.

Thus the Supreme Reality splits itself spontaneously, as it were, into two sections—one appearing as the subject and the other as the object. *Purṇā'hamtā* which is the essence of Supreme Reality disappears after this cleavage: the portion to which limited egoism attaches being the subject and the other portion free from egoism the object. The object as thus making its appearance is the un-manifest (*a-vyakta*) Nature from which the entire creation emanates and which is perceived by the subject as distinct from itself.

Caitanya is of the nature of self-luminous light (*sphurat*), which shines on itself (*svātman*) and is known as *ahamtā* or I-ness. When resting on the non-ego (*anātman*) it expresses itself as *idamtā* or This-ness. The essence of Caitanya consists in the fact that the light (*prakāśa*) is always revealed to itself. This universal Ego or "I" stands behind all dualism. The supreme Ego is universal, as there is nothing to limit (*pariccheda*) or to differentiate (*vyāvṛtti*) it and the entire visible universe exists in identity with it. But this characteristic by its very nature is absent from matter (*jada*), which is not self-manifest. Just as light and heat co-exist in fire, in the same way universal *ahamtā* and freedom or *śakti* co-exist in Caitanya. This freedom is *māyā* which though essentially identical with Caitanya (*cid-eka-rūpa*) brings out varieties of an infinite kind, but in bringing out this variety it does not in the least swerve from the Essence.

The appearance of the universe in pure Caitanya has three distinct stages:

(a) The first is the germinal state (*bījāvasthā*), when the material power, which is still in its earliest phase of manifestation, is pure. Matter does not assert itself at this stage and consequently there is no differentiation in experience. In other words, it does not yet appear as distinct from Caitanya, though potentially it exists. This state is represented by the five pure tattvas, viz. Śiva, Śakti, Sadāśiva, Śuddha-vidyā and Īvara.

(i) The avidyā, which has been described above as being Caitanya in its limited appearance as an object external to the subject, is called Śiva. In pure Caitanya, owing to the play of its own will, an infinite number of limited aspects (*svā'mśas*) arise. These are mutually distinct. From this point of view, to every limited aspect of Cit there is a corresponding object external to it, but to the unlimited Cit or Pure Self (*Pūrṇa-Ātman-Para Śiva*) there is no externality. The universal (*sāmānya*) common to all the pure and limited Cit aspects referred to above is called Śiva-tattva. The tattva is thus a universal holding within it all the individuals (*viśeṣas*), but Para Śiva or Pure-Self is transcendent and comprises both the universal and the individuals. Hence Śiva-tattva may be more properly described as pure Caitanya in its general but conditional form, free from all vikalpas and is to be distinguished from the Absolute proper.

(ii) The appearance of Śiva (*paridchinna-nirvikalpa-cit*) as "I" (*Aham*) is called Śakti. Although this self-presentative character (*aham-bhāsana*) is in the essence of Cit, so that there can be in fact no differentiation between Śiva and Śakti as such, the Cit is nevertheless known as Śiva in so far as it is free from all differentiating attributes and as Śakti by virtue of its characteristic self-awareness.

(iii) When the self-presentation (*aham-bhāsana*) is

no longer confined to the Self but is extended to the not-self or the object (*mahā-śunya*) external to the self, it is known as *Sadā-śiva*. This state marks the identification of the self with the not-self in the form "I am this" and indicates predominance of spirit over matter.

(iv) But when matter prevails and the consciousness assumes the form "This is I" the state is technically called *Iśvara*.

(v) The term "*Śuddha-vidyā*" is reserved for the state which represents an equality in the presentation of the subjective and objective elements in consciousness.

(b) The second stage in the evolution of *avidyā* represents a further development of difference or materiality, when the subtle products of matter and spirit make their appearance. In this mixed condition the mixed (*miśra*) *tattvas*, viz, *māyā*, *kalā*, *vidyā*, *rāga*, *kāla* and *niyati* reveal themselves.

(i) The confirmation of difference due to the free-will of the Supreme, which characterizes the second stage, has the effect of reversing the normal relation between spirit and matter. Thus while in the first stage described above spirit or *cit-śakti* dominates matter or *jaḍa-śakti* which exists in a rudimentary state, merged in spirit, the second stage shows the preponderance of matter over spirit. Consciousness loses its supremacy and becomes a quality inherent in the material subject. All this is due to the emergence and development of difference in *Caitanya*. This material subject, which is matter prevailing over spirit and related to it as a substance to its quality, is called *māyā*.

(ii-vi) The five aspects of *māyā* are the five so-called *kañcukas* or wrappings which are the five eternal *śaktis* of *Para Śiva* in a limited form. The obscuring power of *māyā* acts as a veil as it were upon the omnipotence, omniscience, self-contentment, eternity and the freedom of the supreme Self and thus acting is known as *kalā*, *vidyā*, *rāga*, *kāla* and *niyati* respectively.

(vii) The Pure Self as obscured by *māyā* and its five-fold activities appears as *puruṣa* with its limitations of action, knowledge, contentment, eternity, and freedom.

(c) The third or grossest stage in the evolution of *avidyā* is represented by the dense products of the mixed *tattvas*, where matter is overwhelmingly strong. This stands for the group of the twenty-four *tattvas*, from primary *prakṛti* down to *pṛthivi*, constituting the material order.

Prakṛti, with which the lower creation begins, is indeed the assemblage (*samaṣṭi*) of the dispositions and tendencies (*vāsanās*) of all persons with various and beginningless *karmans*: it may be fitly described as the body of the *kārma* dispositions of the *jīvas*, considered as inhering in *cit-śakti* or self. This *karma-vāsanā* or *Prakṛti* is three-fold according as the experience which is its moral outcome is pleasant or painful or of the nature of a comatose condition in which neither pleasure nor pain is felt.

The dispositions exist in two-fold condition, viz, as *avyakta* when they lie unmanifest as in dreamless sleep or as *citta* when they manifest themselves as in dreams and wakeful states. In the dreamless state there can be no experience of pleasure and pain, because as the mature *karmans* only can be worked off through experience, the others which are not yet sufficiently ripe are not ready for fructification. It is a fact that *karmans*, when they are matured by time, cause the cognitive power (*jñāna-śakti*) of the conscious self to move outwards and have contact with the external world, which is the objective outcome of *prakṛti*. In a state of sleep such movement is naturally absent. But the process of time during which the sleep continues acts on the *karmans* and matures some of them so that the aforesaid power is allowed to come in touch with the outer objects or with their semblances and the sleep is over. The power as thus qualified by the body of *karma* dispositions leading to contact with

the objects and consequent experience (*bhoga*) is known as *citta*.

The *citta* differs according to the difference of *puruṣa*, but it is one with the *prakṛti* in dreamless sleep. Thus it may be viewed as *puruṣa* or as *prakṛti* according as the conscious (*cit*) or unconscious (*a-vyakta*) element prevails in it. It is not therefore a distinct category, but falls either under *puruṣa* or under *prakṛti*¹. The *citta* is in fact the inner organ (*antaḥ-karana*) which is known under three names according to the triple character of its function, viz, as *ahaṁkāra* when it feels the ego-sense, as *buddhi* when it comes to a decision and as *manas* when it thinks or cogitates within.

A short note on the Śākta view of *manas* (mind) would not be out of place here. Like the supreme *Saṁvit* *manas* has two aspects, viz, *Prakāśa* and *Vimarśa*. *Prakāśa* indicates the resting of the *manas* on, and its contact with, other objects; and *vimarśa* consists in mental agitation in regard to that very object caught as a reflection within and expressed in thought as "it is thus", which involves association with past images stored in the mind. What happens may be thus explained: the *manas* becomes first connected with the object through the senses, etc., when the latter manifests itself in an undifferentiated form due to freedom from verbal references (*śabdollekha*). This is *nir-vikalpaka-jñāna* and is always inferable according to those who do not believe in the self-validity of knowledge. According to Śākta-Āgama, however, this is mere *prakāśa* (*i.e. darśana*) or bare awareness of the object. At the next moment the external object impinges its form on the *manas* by way of reflection, expressed in the judgement "It is thus". This is called *vicāra*, a state of consciousness in which a particular object is differentiated from others and is mixed up with conceptual elements. It is *vimarśa* or sa-

¹ See *Tri-purā-rahasya*, *Jñāna Khanda*, ch. XIV, 33-77.

vikalpaka-jñāna. Thus the manas has a two-fold state, as mentioned above. The vimarśa may be fresh as in case of immediate experience (*anubhava*) or old as in case of memory (*smṛti*) and mental co-ordination (*anusandhāna*). Both the latter states are due to psychic dispositions caused by experience.

The states of consciousness are now easily intelligible. The sleep-state (*susupti*), from this point of view, would come under prakāśa, viz, prakāśa of nidrā. It is a form of nir-vikalpaka-jñāna. It is durable and is not momentary and is regarded as a state of insentiency (*mūḍhadasā*) due to absence of vimarśa. It is pure prakāśa, which is another name for insentiency. The waking state (*jāgara*), on the other hand, is mostly of the nature of vimarśa and is not a state of insentiency. Thus after an unbroken series of states of consciousness free from images (*vikalpas*) in dreamless sleep, there arises, during the subsequent state of waking, a series of images.

But what is the nature of nidrā which is revealed in sleep? It is replied that it represents the great void to which we have alluded in the earlier pages as identical with the so-called ākaśa and which is the earliest externalized manifestation after the divine Ātman caused its first self-limitation. It is formless and unmanifest and is revealed in sleep when nothing else exists. It is absence of all visible forms conceived as one universal background. This being revealed in sleep the man on waking feels that he was aware of nothing during the state.

It is a well-known phenomenon, noted by Śākta philosophers, that even during waking the mind becomes insentient as in sleep at the moment of seeing an object, but this insentiency is not felt as such. The nir-vikalpaka-jñāna of the waking hours being momentary the insentiency sinks below (*tirohitavat*) under the pressure of quick succession of images.

In sleep the prakāśa aspect of the manas remains, but the vimarśa lapses. This is why the manas is usually

described as being dissolved in that state. Similarly the manas is in a state of dissolution when an outer object is just seen.

The citta is really self as directed towards the knowable object. In sleep the manas being free from images remains quiet and motionless. Its momentary modifications being absent it is said to be dissolved. Such a state is therefore discernible in each of the three following conditions, viz :

(a) Nir-vikalpa-samādhi, when the pure Self remains established in its self-luminous essence.

(b) Sleep, when the unmanifest or great void is revealed.

(c) Vision of an object, when there is prakāśa or revelation of the external object through the usual sense-contact.

In all these different states there is an apparent similarity of concentrated prakāśa due to non-manifestation of vimarśa as "it is thus" (*śabdānubedha*). Though the same prakāśa underlies all the states, the states themselves are not identical, in as much as the subsequent vimarśa expressed in the form of mental co-ordination (*anusandhāna*) is different in each case. Thus the vimarśa in case of samādhi assumes the form "I was silent during this time"; in sleep it is expressed as "I knew nothing during this time"; but in vision of external object it takes on the form "It is such an object." This difference in vimarśa is not explicable except on the assumption of some sort of difference in the objects concerned. But it does not destroy the unity of the essence, viz, freedom from images or verbal associations on the three states in question. The difference in object is as follows :

The object in samādhi is pure self unmixed with the forms of visible body, etc. The object in sleep is the unmanifest or avyakta which is an external formless thing. The object in vision is an external substance

with peculiar features and distinguishable from others.

Hence though the objects (*bhāśya*) are different the bare consciousness (*bhāsa*) or awareness which is common to all is one and the same and is undifferentiated. In other words, though *saṁādhi*, *nidrā* and the external objects are different from one another the consciousness in which they are revealed is one. This shows that difference in the object cannot produce any corresponding difference in the consciousness or the essence (*svārūpa*). Difference in essence is possible only through reflection which is absent in all the three cases as they are equally of the nature of pure awareness (*prakāśa*).

Samādhi and sleep being of longer duration are capable of being thought about (*vimarśa*) in subsequent moments, but the case of vision of an object is different, because it is momentary. In the same manner, momentary *saṁādhi* or sleep can not be made an appropriate object of *vimarśa*. Even in waking hours there exists momentary *saṁādhis* as well as *suṣuptis* which are generally ignored.¹

III

Śāradā-tilaka (I. 7-8) while describing the origin of the manifested world, contains an important passage, which shows the order of manifestation as follows :

(i) Parameśvara, described as “sakala” and “Saccidānandabibhava”.

(ii) Śakti

(iii) Nāda (para)

(iv) Bindu (para)

(v) Bindu (apara) Bija

(vi) Nāda (apara)

¹ See *Ibid*, XVI, 64—94; also chapters XVII—XVIII.

In the above context the word "Paraméśvara" means evidently the Supreme Divine in which infinite power, Śakti or Kalā¹, lies in eternal union. The divine being is described here as of the nature of an eternal Self-Existence (*sat*), Self-Consciousness (*cit*) and Self-Delight (*ānanda*). During creation what first happens is the manifestation of power (*śakti*) which so long lay hidden in the depths of Being. There is no doubt that this power is characterized by Will (*icchā*), which is its first evolute.

In the *Śiva-purāṇa* (*Vāyavīya-saṃhitā*) it is said that the emergence of Śakti in the beginning of creation is like the appearance of oil out of oil-seeds. It is a spontaneous act, initiated by the divine Will. In other words, it is through the divine will that the supreme Power which is synonymous with it and remains concealed in the divine Essence reveals itself.²

The appearance of Śakti after the great cosmic night is like the revival of memory in a re-awakened person, after the unconsciousness of sleep. The desire for a vision, again of the lost world, is associated with a sense of void, which is māyā. Māyā stands at the beginning of subsequent creation and the divine principle which produces it is its Lord or Controller. The vision of void is accompanied by an undistinct sound called para-nāda, which fills the entire space. Nāda is of the nature of light. That sound and light co-exist and are related as phases of the same phenomenon are recognized in the Tantras. The first self-expression of the Supreme Will (*icchā*) is the origination of void (*śūnya*) and of the sound and light filling this void. All this comes under the category of Will. The next step is represented by

¹ In this context the word "Kalā" stands for the supercosmic transcendent power of the Lord and is to be clearly distinguished from the five Kalās evolved as forces from bindu conceived as cosmic matter and force related to the tattvas and bhāvanās.

² śivecchayā parā śaktiḥ śiva-tattvakaṭām gatā/
tataḥ paṃsphuraty ādau sarge tailam tilād iva//

the concentration of this diffuse light-sound into a focus (*under the secret influence of Will*) called bindu. It is in this stage that the power of action (*kriyā-śakti*) distinctly unfolds itself. The creative principles (*tattva*) are evolved out of this supreme bindu. Bindu subsequently breaks itself into three; the three parts are known as bindu, bīja and nāda. Bindu is the part in which the Śiva-aspect is predominant, while in bīja Śakti prevails. In nāda, however, the elements of Śiva and Śakti are of equal strength.

What disturbs the equilibrium of the bindu? *Saradā-tīlaka* says nothing in reply to this question. *Prapañca-sāra* (I. 42-3) says that it is kāla which breaks the equilibrium of bindu, and in this view kāla is an eternal aspect of the eternal puruṣa through which this intimate knowledge of supreme Prakṛti is said to be derived. Prakṛti knows itself and is self-luminous.¹

The great *sound* which comes into being when the bindu splits itself is known as Śabda-Brahman, as *Saradā-tīlaka* (I. 11-12) and *Prapañca-sāra* (I. 44.) observe.

It is well-known that what is figured as the pericarp of the thousand-petalled lotus within the crown of the head is the so-called Brahma-randhra which is often referred to as a void. It extends through the suṣumnā nādi down to the very bottom of the interior of the spinal column. If the mind stays in the void it loses its restless nature and enables one to attain to the realization of oneself as above the guṇas. The Will-power and supreme nāda emerge from this source².

¹ *Prapañca-Sāra* I. 46. The actuating power of kāla is suggested elsewhere also by the expression kālaperitayā. The *Prayoga-krama-dīpikā* (p. 412) explains the term thus: prakṛter eva pralayāvasthāto yat paripakvadaśānāntaram śṛṣṭyunmukhaiḥ karmabbir udbhinnaḥ rūpaḥ yo'sau binduḥ.

² The identification of Mahā-sūnya with vyāpini kalā of Praṇava is according to the *Svacchanda-tantra*. But some writers equate Mahā-sūnya with the initial nāda. See Purnānanda's *Śri-tattva-cintāmaṇi*. The terms sixteenth (*sodasi*) and seventeenth (*sapta-daśi*) kalā of the moon are used differently in different texts. When the supreme Nāda (*iii*) is called the sixteenth, or amā kalā the name "seventeenth kalā" is reserved for the supreme power or Samanā (*ii*).

The supreme nāda stands for the supercausal or mahā-kāraṇa state of Brahman, which is known as visarga-maṇḍala. If the supreme Śakti is called kula and supreme Śiva a-kula, the sphere of visarga may be described as below them both. But usually it is placed in the upper layer of Brahma-randhra, below which the regular order are the so-called spheres of the sun, the moon and the great vāyu—all within the limits of the thousand-petalled lotus.

The causal state of Brahman is represented by Śabda-Brahman or kula-kundalinī, figured as a triangle consisting of three principles (*tattva*) viz., bindu, bīja and nāda, issuing from the para-bindu under division. The triangular kundalinī would thus appear to be a manifestation of the primary power represented by para-nāda and para-bindu.

The subtle principles of cosmic structure issue out of the kundalinī and begin to locate themselves in distinct centres in the forehead and lower down in the sympathetic system. It has already been observed that bindu (*lower*) is Śiva, bīja is Śakti and nāda (*lower*) is the product of their union. Bīja or Śakti is virtually the entire alphabet, the letters of which are arranged in a triangular fashion designated in the Tantras as “a-ka-tha” triangle—an equilateral triangle the three sides or lines of which are formed of sixteen letters each, beginning with “a”, “ka” and “tha” respectively. Thus forty-eight letters constitute the three equal sides of this triangle. This triangle is intimately associated with the principles of kāma-kalā. The constituent bindus of kāma-kalā are thus three—two causal (*kāraṇa*) and one of the nature of effect (*kārya*).

The nāda which springs from the interaction of bindu (*lower*) and bīja is to be distinguished from Śabda-

But at other times the term unmaṇī is attributed to the seventeenth kalā, when the words Śakti and Śūnya are used synonymously.

Brahman which manifested itself during the division of para-bindu. The latter may be described as mahānāda. The nāda contains within itself the indistinct sounds of all the letters of the alphabet, much in the same manner as the sunlight may be said to consist of all the coloured rays known to us. The truth of the matter is that mahānāda or Śabda-Brahman, in its manifestation as kuṇḍalinī, is located in the body of a man and serves as the mechanism for the articulation of sounds.

The continued practice of a mantra causes it to be sounded in a subtle manner in the suṣumnā. The sound expands itself and is blended with the lower nāda; it does not and cannot rise up to the mahā-nāda higher up. The focus of mahā-nāda is free from the action of ordinary vāyu which can not rise up to it. It may be of some interest to note that mahā-nāda is associated with para-nāda in the brahma-randhra above it on the one hand and with the lower nāda on the other. The power involved in the lower nāda crosses the middle of the two eyebrows (*bhrū-madhya*) and flows down the suṣumnā channel. At the lowest point nāda is converted into the kuṇḍalinī. The forces of the bīja as concretized in the latter are all within the lower nāda.

The position of Para-bindu has a special value for contemplation, in as much as it represents the nexus of the divine plane on the one hand and cosmic and super-cosmic spheres on the other. It is the place where nāda extends into mahā-nāda or Śabda-Brahman, beyond which is the divine nāda within the Infinite. Para-nāda above is supramental (*unmanā*) divine consciousness and light, while mahā-nāda below is the source of universal creation. Para-bindu stands between the two. It is for this reason considered to be the best centre for contemplation of the Guru.

It may be stated that the bīja consists of varnas and that these are driven down to take their respective places in the six centres below, as soon as the downward moving

power of mahā-nāda passes through the middle of the two eye-brows and extends into the spinal column. These varṇas, the modifications of mahā-nāda, being the blends of nāda and bīja, are so many actions generated from para-bindu which is pre-eminently characterized by active power. Mahā-nāda cannot give rise to the different creative principles unless it passes through the stage of bindu.

We need not proceed further to describe the progressive stages of creation. We find that in the above analysis, which follows mainly the traditions set up by Lakṣmaṇa-Deśika, Śaṅkarācārya and others, there are three nādas : para-nāda, the antecedent of para-bindu ; the mahā-nāda called therein Śabda-Brahman, which follows the disruption of para-bindu ; and the nāda which results from the union of bindu and bīja. Similarly, there are two bindus—para-bindu which is produced from the focussing of para-nāda and which is the source of Śabda-Brahman, the immediate spring of creative forces : and apara-bindu which is the effect of para-bindu with the Śiva element prevailing. As regards the kalā, it would appear that the supreme Śakti which is the eternal associate of the divine principle and always remains in it, either as completely absorbed in it and incapable of differentiation or as partially emergent, is the highest kalā. In a lower sense, however, the name kalā is used to signify the bīja mentioned above. That is to say, the varṇas, symbolized as the letters of the alphabet and conceived as the basic principles of lower nāda or the sound potentials, are kalās in this sense. From this point of view the triangle called “a-ka-tha”, otherwise described as kundalinī, is the kalā.

IV

The earlier Āgamas also generally support a similar view. The supreme Śakti, the instrument of transcendent Śiva in all His activities (*samanā*) is the totality of

all the tattvas.¹ It is within this that the entire universe lies hidden. From this down to vyāpinī or the great void within the brahma-randhra there is a regular series of Śakti representing more and more diminished consciousness and power (e.g. *anāśritā*, *anāthā*, *anamlā* and *vyoma-rupā*), all being hyper-subtle and described by Yogins in terms of negation. In fact not a single Śakti beyond the brahma-randhra lends itself to a positive description. The suṣumnā canal along which the nāda flows up ends in brahma-randhra.

The supreme Śakti is sometimes described as Amākalā. It is then intended to convey the idea that it is eternal, ever-emergent and of the nature of unalloyed bliss, the other kalās which go into the make-up of the world being replenished and supplemented by it. When it is free from visarga it is not outwardly inclined and rests in itself. In this condition it is called Śakti-kuṇḍalinī or Parā-samvit and is likened to a sleeping serpent resting on itself. But when it is ruffled it becomes visarga which is of two kinds: according as it represents the pre-creative flutter called ānanda and symbolized as "a" and the last creative effort bringing out life or Prāna symbolized as "h". Prāna or "h" is sometimes described as haṁsa or sūnya. The two visargas are therefore known as higher and lower ("Para" and "a-Para") graphically represented in nāgarī script as the two points of visarjanīya (:). The Amākalā reveals the two points and flows out in order to manifest forms. Every form in the universe, whether a subject or an object or an instrument of knowledge, is identical with Amākalā, though it may be made to appear as different from it. The determinate

¹ This position, in which kāla is called Sāmya, form a kalā of Samanā and is eternal (being unaffected by mahā-pralaya), is that of the so-called Para-Brahman. It is not the state of Śiva. The atoms abide here in mahā-pralaya, for they are not yet transformed into the essence of Śiva. The movement of Paśu as such commences from here. See *Tantrāloka*, VI. 138-167

² Cf. *Tantrāloka*, VIII 5. 400-5

prakāśa in each form implies this difference. Hence śakti-kuṇḍalinī expressed in visarga is still resting on itself as samvit and is free from movement.

Prāṇa-kuṇḍalinī represents the other end where samvit has already developed in Prāṇa. Samvit is full and self-contained. Its supreme creative act is to be distinguished from the later creative processes, as it means the projection of the Self out of itself into itself. As the source of creation is not anything extraneous to the Self, the latter is the efficient (*nimitta*) as well as the intrinsic cause (*upādāna*) of the effect. Creation takes place within the Self and not within time and space different from it. What is projected or created is also not anything other than the Self. Thus every object in this universe, inner or outer is a form of the Self. The projection is of the nature of multiple ābhāsas manifested as both inner and outer realities. Samvit thus appears gradually as the different letter-sounds in its process of materialization. These are the multiple forms assumed by visarga, the outermost being called "h". The visarga which is only "h" without manifestation is described in some treatises (e.g. *Kula-gahvara*) as the principle of kāma or unrestricted will. As there is no real difference between the visarga and the objective world it is not possible to assume a causal relation between them. Visarga itself appears as vācya as well as vācaka. Infinite manifestation is the essence of visarga, though it does not produce any real multiplicity. The supreme Śakti as being responsible for this manifold appearance, viz, delight (*ānanda*), will (*icchā*), knowledge (*jñāna*) and action (*kriyā*) is the hidden spring of visarga.¹

The subtle visarga ceaselessly expresses itself, and as nāda (or *para-bīja*) existing in every creature it indicates prāṇa and its existence is felt within by all, though

¹ See *Tantrāloka* III 136-48.

its special manifestation is confined to specific occasions. Visarga is thus the attribute of the Supreme Divine which is eternally free and has the power of five-fold divine activity, viz., creation, preservation, destruction or withdrawal, grace and alienation.

The Transcendent or anuttara ('a'), by means of visarga (*upto "h" or Prāṇa*), reveals itself as Śakti ('ha') and then returns to itself and abides in the indivisible prakāśa, which is its own eternal Self, called Śiva-bindu ('m')-a-ha-m. This is how in the universal consciousness, which is no better than bare awareness, there arises a sense of "I". Its relation to the not-self, e.g. body, etc. is an event in time which is psychologically explicable. The Ego-sense in pure consciousness reveals it as one's own Self (*svātman*). The unity of Śiva and Śakti follows logically from the integrality or oneness of this sense which covers both. This is the secret of the fullness of Ego or pūrṇa'-haṁtā to which reference has already been made.

The unity of prakāśa and vimarśa is the bindu called Kāma or Ravi (Sun). The emergence of two bindus out of this primordial one is the state of visarga. The two bindus are Agni (*fire*) and Soma (*moon*), conceived as Cit-kalā. It is not a state of dualism, but one of union between two inseparable elements of a single whole. The two aspects combined, namely, bindu and visarga, are represented as a significant symbol of divine unity, though it is true that in the ultimate state even these elements lose their own lustre. The interaction of the bindus causes nectar or creative fluid to flow out. This is the so-called Hārdha-kalā, the essence of ānanda. The interaction is like the heat of fire acting on butter and causing it to melt and flow. The *one* is sat, the *two* is sat as aware of Itself, i.e. cit (*cit-kalā*) and the hārdha-kalā flowing from between the two is the result of self-awareness felt as ānanda. The entire science of Kāma-kalā is thus the science of Saccidānanda and brahma-

vidyā as indicating an eternal creative act. The substance of delight which flows out constitutes the essence of all the creative principles.

Though prakāśa and vimarśa are identical it is to be remembered that prakāśa is always partless and continuous, while vimarśa is partless and as well as divisible into parts. Whenever therefore prakāśa is referred to as discrete it is to be understood only in a secondary sense. The three bindus working together towards a common end form as it were a single triangle.

Prakāśa within vimarśa is of the form of a white bindu; and vimarśa within Prakāśa is of the form of a red bindu called nāda. The two bindus in union constitute the original bindu called kāma of which these are kalās. The unity of the three is the substance called Kāma-kalā from which the entire creation consisting of words and the thing signified by them originates.

Bhāskara Rāya in his *Varivasyā-rahasya* while speaking of Kāma-kalā refers to the three bindus as well as the hārdha-kalā the nature of which is held to be very secret. The white and red bindus represent in his opinion male and female energies.

Aṃṛtānanda says that hārdha-kalā flows from between the two bindus and is the wave (*laharī*) of vimarśa and sphurattā. Prakāśa is like fire and vimarśa is like the butter which melts under it. The flow is the so-called hārdha-kalā noted above. The Baidava-Cakra, made of three mātṛkās, is the out-flow of Kāma-kalā along with hārdha-kalā, and it is out of this that the thirty-six creative principles emanate.¹

V

The soul as a spiritual atom thus makes its first appearance when the freedom of divine will is lost behind

¹ See *Kāma-kalā-vilāsa* with Commentary, verses 3-8, pp. 4-9; *Yogini-hṛdaya dīpkā*, pp. 8-12, *Varivasyā-rahasya*, pp. 48-60.

its own self-created veil through the transition of Śakti from parā-kunḍalinī to prāṇa-kunḍalinī. This transition is effected by a graded process in which Śakti-kunḍalinī coils itself more and more tightly through the evolution of mātrkāś and varṇas and reaches the level of prāṇa and śūnya. It is a truism that Sāṁvit is first changed into prāṇa before the regular course of subsequent creation represented by the emergence of the first principles or tattvas can possibly take place.

The universe of experience consists of a number of bhuvanas or planes of life and consciousness made up of tattvas. In the Śākta-Śaiva-Āgamas thirty-six tattvas are recognized, out of which twenty-four counted from below are considered as impure, the next seven as mixed and the remaining five as pure.¹ In this scheme prakṛti (24) marks the end of impure, māyā (31) that of mixed, and Śiva (36) that of pure tattvas. Each tattva has a series of bhuvanas affiliated to it.¹ The bhuvanas in spite of their mutual differences in detail have the common characteristics of the tattvas concerned as predominant, though it is recognised as in the Pātañjala school that everywhere everything is to be found (*sarvam sarvātmakam*).² The bhuvanas are the abodes of living beings, endowed with bodies and organs made of the substance the materiality of which corresponds to the nature of their karman or jñāna and the degree of their perfection. The bhuvanas of the pṛthivītattva represent the sphere, known as brahmāṇḍa, the bhuvanas of the tattvas up to prakṛti form the prakṛtyaṇḍa, those of the tattvas up to māyā represent the māyāṇḍa and the bhuvanas of the tattvas up to Śakti beyond māyā constitutes

¹ For the tattvas and the bhuvanas related to them, see *Mrgendra-Āgama*, vidyāpāda, pp. 344-456 (Ed. Kṛṣṇa Śāstrin and Subrahmanya Śāstrin); *Bhoga-kārikā* by Sadyojyoti, VV, 109-13. *Ratna-traya* VV 89-118. Cf. T.A. Gopināth Rao *Elements of Hindu Iconography* II (Pt. 2) pp. 392-7 *Mātrkā-cakra-vivēka*, IV, pp. 86-93.

² Cf. Vyāsa-bhāṣya under *Yoga Sūtra*, III, 14.

the śaktyaṇḍa which is the widest sphere.¹ Beyond Śakti-tattva there is no limitation and consequently no sphere, though bhuvanas are said to exist even in Śiva-tattva which is identified with bindu and śāntyatīta kalā.

The tattvas are generally supposed to be the ultimate principles. but they are not so, as they are constituted by kalās and śaktis which represent the multiple units of energy underlying the entire creation, and which considered in their totality represent the ground of self-expression of the transcendent Śiva. Thus the stuff of the universe is Śakti and in the manner shown in the earlier pages, prakāśa with hārdha-kalā constitutes the substance out of which the tattvas are formed.

The divine attributes of the Self are all diminished, in its atomic condition, when the cit appears as citta. Of the three well-known impurities or malas this is the first, called ānava. It is the state of a paśu in which the sense of limitation is first manifested. This limitation makes possible the rise of vāsanās, as a result of which the assumption of physical body for a certain length of time becomes necessary to work off these vāsanās through experience. These vāsanās constitute kārma-mala. The māyīya-mala is the name given to the source of the triple body, namely, (i) the causal or the kalā-śrīra. (ii) the subtle or puryaṣṭaka. i.e. tattva-śarīra, and (iii) the gross elemental or the bhuvanaja-śarīra. In fact everything which reveals itself in our experience as knowable and objective comes under māyīya-mala. The function of this impurity is to show an object as different from the subject (sva-rūpa). All the principles from kalā down to pṛthivī represent the fetters of māyā or pāśas. These give shape to body, senses, bhuvanas, bhāvas, etc. for

¹ For the four andas, see *Tantra-sāra*, pp. 64-5. The different andas are evolved and destroyed by different powers. Thus the brahmāṇḍa is destroyed by kālāgni and created by Brahmā or Śrīkantha. The prakṛtyaṇḍa and māyaṇḍa are destroyed and created by Śrīkantha, Lord of Kāla tattva. The highest anda of Śakti is destroyed and created by Aghoreśa. See *Tantrāloka*, VI. 170-82.

fulfilling the experience of the soul.¹ Hence what is popularly known as samsāra extends from pṛthivī upto kalā, and not beyond the latter. These three impurities persist always in the worldly soul.

This worldly soul is technically known as sa-kala, being endowed with body, senses, etc. corresponding to the tattva or bhuvana to which it belongs. Such souls range from the lowest plane to the plane of kalā and migrate from plane to plane according to their karmans. There is another state of the soul in which the māyīya-mala as described above is absent, but the other two malas continue as before. This is a state of pralaya or dissolution in which the soul is free from all the creative principles, is in a disembodied condition and remains absorbed in māyā. Such souls are called pralayākālas or pralaya-kevalins. These are bodiless and senseless atoms with karma-saṁskāras and the root Ignorance clinging to them. When, however, the karmans are got rid of through discriminative knowledge, renunciation or such other means, the soul is exalted above māyā, though still retaining its atomic state. It is then above māyā no doubt, but remains within the the limits of mahā-māyā which it cannot escape unless the supreme grace of the Divine Master acts upon it and removes the basic Ignorance which caused its atomicity and the limitation of its infinite powers. This state of the soul represents the highest condition of the paśu known as Vijñānākala or Vijñāna-kevalin. This is Kaivalya. Among these souls those which are thoroughly mature in respect of their impurity are competent to

¹ As regards the three malas see *Pratyabhijñā-hṛdaya*, pp. 21-2, *Saubhāgya-bhāskara* p. 95; *Śiva-sūtra-vārttika* (1-2-3), *Śiva-sūtra-vimarśinī* (1-2-3). The āṇava is two-fold according as it refers to the loss of pure ahamtā in the self and appearance of impure anantā in the not-self. The self loses svātantrya and retains bodha or it is as bheda representing the appearance of multiplicity in unity. It consists of māyā and the thirty-one tattvas produced from it. Karma-mala is adṛṣṭa and may be regarded either as merit or demerit (punya-pāpa). In different texts the meaning of the malas is sometimes found to be slightly different.

receive divine illumination at the beginning of the next creative cycle. The dawn of divine wisdom which is the result of divine grace (*anugraha*) acting upon the soul is the origin of the so-called *śuddha-vidyā*.¹

The states of the soul which follow are not those of a paśu but of Śiva himself, though certain limitations still remain. These limitations are those of *adhikāra*, *bhoga* and *laya* according to the dualists.² They are removed in due course of time through fulfilment of experiences, etc., in the *pure order*.³

The successive stages of spiritual perfection consequent on the dawn of wisdom are represented by the *tattvas* to which the souls are attached. Thus the lowest stage is that of a *Mantra* which corresponds to *Śuddha-vidyā*. The higher states are those of *Mantrēśvaras* corresponding to *Īśvara-tattva*, of *Mantra-maheśvaras* corresponding to *Sadā-Śiva* and of *Śiva* corresponding to the *tattva* known under that name. The state of *Śiva* is really transcendent, being that of pure and absolute con-

¹ The illumination of a mature *vijñānākāla* is either intense or mild according as the *kalusa* or original taint attached to the soul has run its course completely (*samāptā*) or otherwise, the former types of souls are raised to the status of *Vidyēśvaras* and the latter become *mantras*. The *sakala* and *pralayākāla* souls, too, in which the *mala* is mature, are favoured with divine grace and raised to the position of (i) *Mantrēśvaras* (and *ācāryas*) and placed in charge of the different divisions of *Brahmānda* or the planes belonging to *prthivī-tattva*, and of (ii) *Bhuvaneśvaras* or *Lokeśvaras* with powers over the planes belonging to the higher *tattvas* beyond *prthivī*. The *Pralayākālas*, however, where *mala* is immature but *karma* mature, are associated with subtle bodies called *puryaṣṭaka* at the beginning of the next cycle and made to assume physical bodies and migrate from life to life, thus maturing the *mala* through experience. The Śākta or Śaiva belief in three-fold nature of the soul is comparable to the conviction of the Ophites and their predecessors the Orphici in the West—it presupposes a faith that the division corresponds to the degrees of grace and does not imply any essential difference. It is true, however, that according to the dualists some difference does exist between *Śiva* and *Parama-Śiva*. The Valentinian conception of essential distinction in human souls has also its parallel in India as evident from the views of sections of Jainas, Buddhist and Vaiṣṇava writers, but finds no recognition in the *Āgamas*.

² See *Ratna-traya* by Śrīkantha, vv 276-95.

³ The pure order of *śuddha* *adhvan* represents the higher world of pure matter beyond the influence of *māyā*.

sciousness, but the true Absolute is Parama-Śiva where identity with all the tattvas as well as their transcendence are present simultaneously.¹

Due to the limitation of its powers the Self is bound. The Śāktas hold that there are certain hidden forces latent in cid-ākāśa, known as māṭṛkās (lit. *mothers of the world*), which preside over the malas referred to above and over the kalās or the letter-sounds of the language. The supreme māṭṛkā, known as Ambikā, has three aspects, viz. Jyeṣṭhā, Raudrī and Vāmā, each of them having a specific function. The kalās are the ultimate units of human speech with which thought is inextricably interwoven. The māṭṛkās beget in each soul in each act of its knowledge, determinate or indeterminate, an inner cognition (*antaḥ-parāmarśa*) and produce a sort of confusion there on account of intermingling with śabda. Knowledge in this manner assumes the form of joy, sorrow, desire, aversion, conceit, fear, hope, etc., under the influence of these forces. This is how bhāvas originate and govern the unregenerate human soul. Māṭṛkās are thus the secret bonds which bind down a soul, but when they are truly known and their essence is revealed they help it in attaining 'siddhis or super-normal psychic powers.

These forces function in cid-ākāśa so long as the so-called brahma-granthi is not rent asunder. This granthi is evidently the node of identity between spirit and matter and is the spring of ego-sense in man. The moral effect of kuṇḍalinī is so far clear. It is maintained that if the māṭṛkā is not propitiated and if the node is not removed, it is likely that even after the rise of truth-consciousness the soul may, owing to inadvertence (*pramāda*), be caught up in its snares, get entangled in the meshes of śabda and lapse into ignorance or go astray.

The divine Will is one and undivided, but it becomes split up after the origin of the māṭṛkās which evolve out

¹ See *Pratyabhijñā-hrdaya*, p. 8.

of the nāda co-eternal with this Will. This split in icchā or svātantrya causes a separation between jñāna and kriyā, its constitutive aspects. This is practically identical with what is described as a divorce between svātantrya and bodha or vimarśa and prakāśa, which takes place on the assumption of atomic condition by the supreme Self. In this condition jñāna evolves into three inner and five outer senses, and kriyā into five prāṇas and five motor-organs connected respectively with the vital and reflex activities of the organism.

VI

The view-point of the dualistic Āgamas may now be summed up. Here the divine Essence or Śiva is conceived as inalienably associated with a Power or Śakti which is purely divine and identical with it. The Essence and Power, both of the nature of cit or pure consciousness, constitute the two aspects of one and the same divine principle. Śiva is a transcendent unity. Śakti too is really one, though it appears as jñāna or kriyā according to the character of the data on which it functions. It is the Will (*icchā*) of Śiva and is essentially one with Him. Bindu is the eternal material principle outside Śakti, and the three principles are usually described as the three jewels (*ratna*) of Śaivism and its holy Trinity. In creation (*in pure creation directly and in impure creation indirectly*) Śiva's place is that of an agent, Śakti's is that of an instrument and bindu serves as the material stuff. Śakti being immaterial never suffers any modification during action but bindu does. The modification of bindu, which follows from a disturbance of its equilibrium (*kṣobha*) under the stress of divine Śakti at the end of cosmic night (*pralaya*) gives rise to five kalās which appear as it were like five concentric circles with greater and greater expansion. These kalās which precede further progressive modifications called tattvas and

bhuvanas bear the names of *nivr̥tti* (*outermost*), *pratiṣṭhā*, *vidyā*, *śānti* and *śāntyatita* (*inmost*). This represents one line of the evolution of bindu, as that of the objective order (*artha*). The other line is represented by the evolution of sound or śabda. In this aspect we find nāda, bindu and varṇa as the threefold expression of bindu arranged in an order of increasing externality.

Bindu is synonymous in this system with Mahāmāyā and Kuṇḍalinī. It is pure matter-energy and is to be distinguished from māyā and prakṛti,¹ which are impure. It is the matrix of pure creation and is the source of two parallel lines of evolution, viz. of śabda and artha, so that it is to be looked upon as of a dual nature. The *Paṅskara-Āgama* says: Śabda-vastūbhayātmā'sau bindur, nā'nyatarātmakaḥ.

The order of Śabda creation out of the disturbed Mahāmāyā is thus given:

- | | |
|---------------|---------------|
| (i) Mahā-māyā | (iv) Sādākhyā |
| (ii) Nāda | (v) Iśa |
| (iii) Bindu | (vi) Vidyā |

In this scheme Mahāmāyā stands for Para-bindu in its undisturbed condition and nāda represents the same bindu when the Cit Śakti has acted upon it. As the action of Śakti upon bindu is in a sense constant, it may be assumed that (i) and (ii) are really two aspects (*logically successive but in actual fact simultaneous*) of the same principle, nāda representing the disturbed part of Mahāmāyā. If Mahāmāyā is Kuṇḍalinī in its essence, nāda is the same Kuṇḍalinī in its awakened and active state. Mahāmāyā as such has no relation with

¹ In the Śaiva-Āgamas of all the schools which recognize the thirty-six Tattvas, māyā and prakṛti are distinguished. They are identified in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (IV. 10). Māyān tu prakṛtim vidyān māyīnam tu mahēśvaram. In the Āgamas generally māyā is eternal, but prakṛti is not so. For prakṛti is evolved from kalā which itself is an evolute from māyā. But in some places in the Tantras they are differently conceived. Prakṛti stands for the material principle in a general way and māyā is one of the vikalpas under this category.

puṛuṣa or the human soul, but as nāda or Kuṇḍalinī it resides in every puṛuṣa, normal and super-normal.¹

The truth is that the evolution of Mahā-māyā into four-fold Vāc e.g. Parā or Sūkṣmā, Paśyantī, Madhyamā and Vaikhari and the obscuration of the inherent divinity (*śivatva*) of every human soul under the veil of mala or original impurity working from the beginningless past (*anādi*) are co-eternal phenomena. Transcendence of parā-vāc and removal of this veil of obscurity signify therefore a single act, which is only another name of the culmination of the process of divinisation of the human soul interpreted from the dualistic standpoint of the school as the restoration of its lost purity. We are thus in a position to understand why sometimes Mahā-māyā and at other times nāda is identified with Śiva-tattva. Understood in this light bindu (*iii*) would mean apara-bindu and be a name for Śakti-tattva. The next evolution, Sādākhyā (*iv*), which is held to comprise Sadā-Śiva-tattva, including the human Sadā-Śivas, Aṇu-Sadā-Śivas, five brahmās, ten aṇus (*pranava* etc.) and six angas, stands for aksara-bindu² and denotes nāda in its form of gross but undifferentiated sound (*dhvani*). The stage called Īśā (*v*) represents an intermediate state between the aforesaid aksara-bindu and vaikhari-vāc expressed as letters of the alphabet in all their permutations and combinations.³ The eight mantreśvaras and their śaktis (eight in number e.g. *Vāmā* etc.) fall under this class.

¹The gloss on the *Sarva-jñānottara-tantra* cited by Umāpālī in his commentary on a kārīkā of the *Svātāntara-tantra* (being the 24th kārīkā of his compendium), says Kuṇḍalinī śabda-vācyas itū bhujanga-kutīlākārena nādātmanā svakāryena pratipurusam bhedenā' vasthito na tu svarūpena pratipurusam avasthitaḥ. The original couplet runs thus.

yathā kuṇḍalinī śaktir māyā karmānusārīnī/
nāda-bindvādīkam kāryam tasyā itī jagatsthūh//

²Aghora Śivācārya identifies aksara-bindu with paśyantī vāc in his commentary called *Ulekhnī* on Śrīkanṭha's *Ratna-traya* (verse 74).

³The Īśā stage may be said to correspond to the madhyamā vāc, which is characterized by thought (*antaḥ-sañjalpa-rūpa*) and possesses an ideal order in its parts

The last (*vi*) named Vidyā which includes the final stage of sound evolution, embraces all the mantras and Vidyās, all the Āgamas and the so-called Vidyā-rājñīs (queens of vidyās, seven in number), in fact, all audible sensible sounds familiar to us.

It is interesting to observe that Mahā-māyā as described above is called Parā-Śakti and considered as the Ultimate Cause (*Parama-kāraṇa*) of the world. It is also of the nature of nāda and is distinguished from the nāda lower down as sūkṣma-nāda.¹

The dualists who maintain the doctrine of nāda repudiate the theory of Sphota and other allied theories of verbal knowledge and seek to explain the process of the origin of Śabda-bodha on the basis of this doctrine. Rāmakaṇṭha in his *kārikās* has tried to show that the doctrine of sphoṭa is unable to render an adequate account of the meaning of a word. The relation between a word (*śabda*) and its meaning (*artha*) is what is usually known as vācya-vācaka-bhāva-relation of what denotes or reveals (*vācaka*) with what is denoted or revealed (*vācya*) by it. But wherein lies the denotative character (*vācakatā*) of the word concerned? The object denoted by the word is external, but the word which denotes it is mental (*budhyārūḍha*), the two are distinct and incommensurate. No word is capable of denoting its sense by virtue of its own nature, but its denotative power makes itself felt only when it represents in thought (*parāmarśa*) the object (*vācya*) to be denoted which is external to it. This representation called parāmarśa-jñāna is of the nature of what may be called thought-form and reveals the object. Hence some thinkers are inclined to attribute denotative power to this parāmarśa-jñāna, in so far

¹ Sometimes the term sūkṣma-nāda is applied to bindu. The commentary of Bhoja's *Tattva-Prakāśa* holds that sūkṣma-nāda belongs to Śakti-tattva. This view is endorsed by Sarvañña Śambhu in his *Siddhānta-Dīpikā*. Aghora-Śivācārya in his commentary on *Ratna-traya* identifies sūkṣma-nāda with the first manifestation (called simply *nāda*) of bindu which is synonymous with Para-nāda (see *Ratna-traya*, *kārikā* 22).

as it reveals the object concerned. But the Tāntric philosophers are of opinion that though parāmarśa-jñāna as an intellectual act exists independently of the external object, it is a contingent phenomenon and arises under the action of some causal factors working behind. Such an act does not occur in the case of external objects not previously cognized by the senses, Rūpa, rasa etc. become objects of mental parāmarśa of the speaker. That through which the origin of such parāmarśa becomes possible is called nāda. Nāda giving rise to parāmarśa-jñāna (*antah-sañjalpa*), and not physical śabda possesses the denotative character (*vācakatā*). The physical śabda to which the vocal organ of the speaker gives expression manifests nāda. Nāda, as thus manifested, produces in the hearer the sense of the object meant. Nāda reveals all śabdās and arthas. Hence every act of discursive knowledge is impregnated with śabda.

Nāda is multiple, being unique in each individual, and is a product. Every animal soul, (*pasū-ātman*), having a nature of its own, experiences its own nāda which arises from anāhatā-bindu.

VII

The Śāktas believe in the importance of self-realization as a means to mokṣa. It is said to be of a determinate nature and expresses itself in the form of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*). The sequence of the preliminary state may be described as follows :

(i) Indirect knowledge of the Self through hearing of the teaching of Āgama on the part of a person gifted with all the qualifications necessary for knowledge, 'e.g. detachment etc.

(ii) Removal of doubts through reasoned thinking.

(iii) Direct knowledge or intuition of individual Self on removal of the false idea which has grown into a firm conviction regarding its identity with the body, etc.

(iv) Lastly, the recognition. It relates to the integral unity between the individual Self and the universal one made known through the scriptures. Recognition as thus produced is destructive of ignorance lying at the root of worldly existence.

The recognition is not erroneous but is a form of vikalpa like other acts of determinate knowledge.

The indeterminate knowledge following from samādhi and the aforesaid recognition have the same object. But their difference is due to causal elements. In case of recognition the instrument in mind turned away from all objects other than the Self and aided by the presence in consciousness of the two objects indicated by the terms "I" and "He" in the judgment "I" and "He." In knowledge from samādhi no such presence is needed. The recognition "It is the same jar" has for its object an integral substance. Thus the ordinary vikalpa having a jar, for instance, as its object and the recognition "It is the same jar"—have both the same object, but the result is different on account of difference in causal factors. The indeterminate knowledge is pure, is the support of all vikalpas and is in conflict with none, so that it is incapable of destroying a vikalpa, like ignorance.

The purity of indeterminate knowledge is due to its freedom from reflection. It is on the background of such pure knowledge that all possible determinations arise owing to appearance of different forms during saṅkalpa, just as on a clean mirror reflection emerges due to proximity of the object reflected.

The Śāktas view ignorance not as absence of knowledge like the Vaiśeṣika nor as inexplicable like the Vedāntin but as a form of sa-vikalpa-jñāna. The Āgamas hold that the Supreme Self being of the nature of pure consciousness, what differentiates it from matter is its self-awareness (*sphurad-rūpatā*) consisting in freedom (*svātantrya*), through which, as already shown, ignor-

ance (*avidyā*) is manifested and through ignorance the world.

Ignorance is two-fold, according as it is viewed as a cause or as an effect. As a cause it is non-manifestation of the fullness of one's own self. This fullness is characterized by freedom from the limitations of time, space and form, though it is true that even these elements which are manifested in the light of the Self cannot limit the latter. If the Self which is not limited by time manifests itself as so limited it is certainly a case of non-manifestation of fullness or *pūrṇatva*. This is the Śākta view of root-Ignorance as already observed. As an effect, ignorance is the manifestation as Self of what is other than the Self, e.g. body, etc. It is only a leaf (*pallava*) in the tree of Ignorance.

Knowledge of the integral Self may be indirect when it follows from a hearing of its nature from the Āgama taught by the Guru or direct when it is derived immediately from *samādhi*. Direct knowledge called *vijñāna* can alone destroy the basis of mundane existence. Sense of identity with the body grows into *vāsanā* and becomes tenacious on account of its long continuance and prevents direct knowledge, even when it flashes for a moment in an impure mind, from producing a firm will (*sankalpa*). But when it follows from perfection in *samādhi* the requisite firmness is attained and it destroys the above *vāsanā*. There being a strong sense of identity with the body the direct knowledge of pure Self too is unable to overthrow ignorance and to effect *mokṣa* if it is obscured by doubts and errors.

Direct knowledge or *vijñāna* is preceded by indirect knowledge. The place of *samādhi* is between the two. It is maintained that even indirect knowledge has its use, for *samādhi* cannot beget the desired result, i.e. direct knowledge as recognition in the ignorant who have had no direct knowledge. A man for instance, who has never heard about a gem and known it indirectly through

descriptions can not recognise it as a gem even when he sees it in the jeweller's shop. Only he who has seen it can recognize it, provided that he attends to it. Hence natural samādhi cannot produce brahma-jñāna in one who has not heard about Brahman.

Advaita-jñāna is very rare. It does not and cannot appear until the mind has been purified from the blinding effects of māyā through the propitiation of one's own divine Self, by means of meditation or upāsana. The importance of divine grace descending on the soul and purifying it can not be overestimated.

There is an order of progression in spiritual experience. Svatantrānanda in the *Mātrkū-cakra-viveka* points out that on the rise of pure knowledge the knowables become one with the senses in consequence of which the knowables as such begin to disappear. But as the world still continues, the sense of "thisness" as something external to the knower does not altogether vanish. The next position is that of Īśvara when the motor-organs in which the movable objects are similarly absorbed become one with the cosmic body with which the subject as the agent is identified. The Yogin in this stage is associated not only with an individual body but with the entire universe. In the state of Sadā-śiva which follows, the senses, in which the knowables have been absorbed, become one with the Self, the true subject. It represents a state of omniscience. In the Śakti stage, the universe body and the omniscient Self become unified—this is a condition of undisturbed equilibrium between spirit and matter (*cit* and *a-cit*).

THE PHILOSOPHY OF TRIPURĀ TANTRA

It is a truism that every system of theocratic culture in India has behind it a consistently evolved system of philosophic thought. It is difficult, in the present state of our knowledge, to have a definite idea of the number of such systems in ancient and medieaval times and even of the extent of literature comprised under each. Continued progress in researches in this field is likely to yield fresh materials favourable to the better understanding of the true history and philosophic value of these systems. The work known as under the name of '*Tripurārahasya*' (*Jñāna khanda*) forms indeed a highly important document in the history of Indian philosophy, so far as the system of a section of the Śākta Tantra is concerned and should be appreciated from that point of view.

The systematisation of Tāntric philosophy, on its Śākta side, does not seem to have yet been seriously attempted. The *Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha* of Mādhavācārya ignores the Śākta school altogether. So do the other compendia, earlier and later (e.g. *Ṣaḍdarśana Samuccaya* of Haribhadra, *Sarva Siddhānta Samgraha* of Śaṅkarācārya etc.). There are different lines of Śākta culture still in existence and we have reason to believe that some at least of these have preserved the philosophical tradition. The literature associated with the third Mahāvīdyā, named Sodaśī or Tripurasundarī, is very extensive and presents several interesting features of Tāntric literature. It is possible to construct a regular philosophy of the school out of the materials available to us and in this work of reconstruction the present treatise will, it is hoped, prove to be substantially helpful.

The *Tripurārahasya*, which claims to treat of the secrets of the Tripurā culture in all its aspects, is said to consist of three sections viz. *Māhātmya*, *Jñāna* and

Āryā. The *Jñāna khaṇḍa* has been published at Benares in a new edition.¹ The *Māhātmya khaṇḍa* of which (as of the *Jñāna khaṇḍa*) we have an original manuscript in the Government Sanskrit College Benares, was entrusted for publication to the publishers of the Chowkhambhā Sanskrit Series, Benares. The third section is apparently lost, no trace of it having yet been found. It is an extensive work of which the first two sections contain 2163 and 6687 verses.

The work is attributed to one Hāritāyana and the commentary called *Tātparyadīpikā* is from the pen of one Draviḍa Śrī Nivāsa, son of Vaidynātha Dīkṣita, resident of the village of Mahāpuṣkara in the Draviḍa country. The commentary was composed in 4932 Kali Era (1831 A.D.). The text is in 22 chapters.

The book is in the form of a discourse delivered by Hāritāyana to Nārada. This discourse professes to be a reproduction of the teachings of Dattātreya to Paraśurāma and claims to be based on personal realisation and reason.

The plan of the work may be thus summed up: Paraśurāma having heard Dattātreya's lectures on the greatness of the Supreme Deity Tripurā Sundarī as embodied in the *Māhātmya Khaṇḍa* expressed a desire to the Master to be enlightened on the methods of worship for propitiating the Goddess. He was subsequently initiated in due form into the mysteries of Tripurā worship and practised penances for twelve years, under instructions from his tutor, at a hermitage on the Mahendra hill in the South. In the course of his spiritual exercises the ultimate problems of life and reality began to trouble his mind, and being unable to reach a solution himself, he betook himself to the feet of his Guru for light and guidance. He had already heard a teaching on the sub-

¹ This section was originally published in open leaves. But the edition became scarce and the growing interest in Indian philosophical thought rendered a re-publication of the text necessary.

ject from Saṃvarta, the great Avadhūta, on his discomfiture by Rāmacandra in the Tretā age, but he had not been able to realise it at the time. He requested the Master to explain to him the secrets of Saṃvarta's lessons, so that his doubts might be dispelled for ever. Dattatreya's response to Paraśurāma's question, interspersed with Paraśurāma's cross-questions here and there, constitutes the body of the *Jñāna Khaṇḍa*. It would thus appear that the text of the *Tripurārahasya* which embodies the teachings of Hāritāyana to Nārada, represents an old traditional lore of secret science originally revealed by Saṃvarta and subsequently expounded by Dattatreya to Paraśurāma.

The name Paraśurāma stands eminent among the votaries of Tripurā. The *Kalpa Sūtra*, treating of the secrets of the Tripurā worship in ten khaṇḍas and containing 335 Sūtras, is attributed to Paraśurāma who is described as a scion of the family of Bhṛgu, a disciple of Śiva and the son of Jamadagni and Reṇukā. This description of Paraśurāma implies that the Paraśurāma of the *Tripurā Rahasya* is believed to be identical with the author of the *Kalpa Sūtras*, though Pandit A. Mahadeva Śāstri has, perhaps, rightly questioned this identity.¹ The tradition has it that Dattatreya was the author of a Saṃhitā work in 18000 verses which was known under his own name (viz. *Datta Samhitā*). Paraśurāma studied the extensive work and to bring its contents within easy reach of students, summarised it in a body of Sūtras distributed into fifty sections (*khaṇḍas*). This contained 6000 Sūtras. The Saṃhitā and the Sūtra were both summed up, in the form of a dialogue between Dattatreya and Paraśurāma, by Śumadhā (pupil of Paraśurāma). This tradition is found recorded in the *Tripurārahasya Māhātmya khaṇḍa*.

¹ Preface to the edition of the *Kalpasūtras* of Paraśurāma as published in the Gaekwad's Oriental series, No 22, in 1925 (p. VIII).

It is evident that the work of Sumedhā, who was of the Hārīta family and consequently known as Hārītāyana, is really to be identified with the *Tripurārahasya* itself rather than with the *Kalpa Sūtras* of Paraśurāma as Lakṣmana Ranade has done,¹ because the *Paraśurāma Kalpa Sūtra* is not in the shape of a dialogue between Datta and Paraśurāma and is not attributed to Sumedhā, whereas the *Tripurārahasya* has the form of a similar dialogue² and is ascribed to Sumedhā Hārītāyana.

The line of Tripurā worship is represented by several teachers. We have already referred to Dattātreyā and Paraśurāma. The names of Durvāsas, Agastya, Lopāmudrā and several others may be added in this connection. Durvāsas is associated with the authorship of a *Mahimnaḥ Stotra* of the Goddess, where he is described in the colophon as Sakalāgamācārya. Nityānanda, who wrote a commentary on the above stotra, says that Durvāsas alias Krodha Bhaṭṭāraka is really identical with Śiva Himself, who is the Master of the teachers of all the Āgamas (*sakalāgamācāryacakravartī*), born from the womb of Anurūpā.³

The Supreme Goddess is variously named as Tripurā, Sundarī, Lalitā, Ṣoḍaśī, Śrī Vidyā, Kāmeśavri³, etc. She is called Tripurā, in as much as Her body consists of three Śaktis, viz. Brāhmī, Vaiṣṇavī and Raudrī.⁴ The *Tripurārahasya* speaks of Her in the following term :

tripurānantaśaktyaikyarūpinī sarvasākṣinī/
sā citih sarvataḥ pūrṇā paricchadavivarjanāt//

¹ Preface to *Paraśurāma Kalpasūtrās*, p. X.

² P. Laxmana was well aware of the weakness of his arguments, for he admits that the *Kalpa Sūtras* is not in a dialogue form. He adds however that the concluding passage of the work shows that it is a dialogue between the Master and his pupil. (Ibid).

³ But it must be pointed out that there appears to be nothing in the text of the *Sūtras* to warrant this inference,

īha khalu sakalāgamācāryacakravartī sākṣāt śiva eva.

anurūpāgarbhasambhūtaḥ krodhabhāṭṭārakākhyā durvāsā mahāmuniḥ.

⁴ See *Paraśacāryāmāva Sundarī Stāva*, (p. 20)

kadācid ādyā lalitā purūrūpā kṛṣṇavigrahā/

The partial appearance of the Self as thus occurring is known as *vāhyāvabhāsaḥ*, because such appearance implies the manifestation of what may be described as empty space which is other than the Self. Remembering that Caitanya is all-embracing and can have nothing outside it—for if there were any such thing it would not shine out and would, therefore, be non-existent—what is popularly called the external is indeed only a reflection on Caitanya as on a mirror. When the universe comes into being it does so only as an image within the unique Self. The universe as such is varied but underlying it is pure and simple unity of Caitanya revealing itself to the eye of diligent search (*anusandhāna*). The manifestation of the universe,—due to the Free Will (*svātantrya*) of the Absolute,—is thus a process of Ābhāsa and for the initiation of this process nothing beyond the play of the Will is needed. The material and efficient causes, supposed to be necessary for every product, are held unnecessary.

The peculiar metaphysical position of the Tantra consists in the theory of Ābhāsa, which is consistent with this position. It rejects the Vivartavāda of Neo-Vedānta, because the world is not originally a false appearance due to Error. It is real in the same way as an image is real, but it has no existence apart from the medium in which it is manifested. Its existence is only the existence of the medium. To the Vedāntist the world appears as such to the ignorant owing to his ignorance and in the last analysis it is resolved into Māyā which is not identical with Brahman and is material; but to a Tantrist the world is real and is the expression of the Cit Śakti or Free Will of the Lord and is really spiritual in essence like the Lord Himself. In the last resort it turns back into the Cit Śakti which is never withdrawn, for the Will (*svātantrya*) remains, even after the world has disappeared. The Vedānta system has had to fall back on the doctrine of Vivarta, because it denies in a sense

svātantrya to Pure Caitanya. The first stadium of creation is thus an *Ābhāsa*. The second stage which represents the subsequent condition shows how the Cit Śakti, already appearing (*abhāsamāna*) in the Pure Caitanya, further progresses. Māyā emerges on the scene now and the Vivarta is the logical outcome. The third stage marks how Māyā becomes productive. This is the Parināma or Evolution which gets on till the bhūtas spring into manifestation. The fourth stage which represents creation out of the bhūtas is known as *Ārambha* or physico-chemical process of genesis. From the supreme standpoint of Tantra, however, the entire creation is an *Ābhāsa*.

As thus realised She is the external and supreme truth beyond all limitations consequent on time and space. She is the essence of Caitanya and is called Lalitā owing to transcendent charms. The *Śakti-Saṅgama Tantra* observes that it is this Lalitā which assumes the form of Kṛṣṇa as Purusa.¹

Sundarī is one of the ten Mahāvidyās (*Muṇḍamālā Tantra, Paṭala-1*). It is said that the ten vidyās combined form a Mahāvidyā, but Ṣoḍaśī is a Mahāvidyā by Herself. The *Toḍala Tantra (Paṭala-1)* calls Mahā-Tripurasundarī by the name of Pañcamī with Śiva (five-faced) as Her Bhairava. The *Śakti-Saṅgama* however (*Puraścaryārṇava* pp. 13-14) makes Laliteśvara Her Bhairava. This is different from Tripurā Bhairava (or Vīkarāla, the companion of Chinnā) and Ghora Bhairava (i.e. Kāla Bhairava the companion of Dhūmāvatī).

The system teaches that the Supreme Reality is of

¹ This is the view of the *Śakti Saṅgama Tantra*. But in the Vaiṣṇavism associated with the name of Sri Caitanya, Lalitā is represented, not as identical with Kṛṣṇa—which position is reserved for Rādhā—but as a Śakti, whose function is to preside over Nikuñja, where the eternal sport of the Divine couple takes place and from where all are shut out. cf. *Rādhātattvasudhānidhi* for further particulars.

the nature of Pure Intelligence, which is self-luminous and unaffected by the limitations of time, space and causality. It has absolute freedom (*puṛṇa svātantrya*) in as much as its Power or Will (*saṅkalpa*) is unrestricted. This Power is really identical with the Essence of Caitanya and remains either involved in it or expresses itself as its inalienable property. In the technical phraseology of the Sāstra it is known as Vimarśa or Kṛpā and is an eternal attribute of Caitanya. The freedom referred to above implies that the Essence of consciousness is free from vikalpas and is fundamentally distinct from matter. The Caitanya is free as it does not depend on anything else for its own revelation of matter.

The power exists in a two-fold condition. What is generally known as creation or dissolution is in reality consequent on the manifestation of this Power or on its abeyance. It always functions, but its function is sometimes (e.g. during the creative period) expressed as the manifestation of the universe till now absorbed in and identified with the Essence of Reality and at other times, expressed as self-manifestation alone.

The Supreme Reality of the Āgamas would thus seem to differ in a sense from the Brahman of Vedānta. Though both are essentially of the nature of Intelligence there is a fundamental distinction between the two. The Absolute of the Tantra is endowed with Power which is held to be identical with itself and by virtue of which It is described as the Free Agent (*svatantra karttā*). Freedom to act forms the essence of Caitanya. In other words, according to the Tāntric viewpoint, Śiva and Śakti are aspects of one and the same reality. But in the current non-dualistic school of Vedānta, Brahman, which as in this Tantra is described as of the nature of Pure Consciousness, is no better than an actionless Locus (*Adhikarana*) on which the Power, which is attached to It mysteriously and is neither identical with nor distinct from It, plays. It is conceived as a pīṭha or passive

background in relation to the active power operating on It. The Śakti, called Māyā in the Vedānta school, is not thus of the nature of Brahman but is material (*anirvacanīyā*), though it is held to be, of course mysteriously, subservient to it. But as conceived in the Tantra, Śakti or Pure Freedom is absolutely non-material. The term Cit Śakti used to denote this power implies its spiritual essence.

What in the Tantras is known as Vāhyābhāsa, or the manifestation of a non-ego (*anahambhāva*) within the Pure Ego (*Śuddhātmā*) but appearing as external to it, is the Radical Nescience (*Mūlāvidyā*) of Vedānta. This non-ego is the so-called Avyakta (Unmanifest) or Jaḍa Śakti (Mattêr). But the Freedom or the Spiritual Power (*Cit Śakti*) of the Lord, as described in the Tantras, is beyond the Nescience referred to above, and to this Power the Advaita Vedānta seems to be a stranger.

In as much as the Avidyā itself or the Material Power is a product of the Spiritual Power which is the ultimate source of all existence, there is no discrepancy in the statement, often found in Tāntrīc literature, that this Power has three distinct states of its existence:—

(a) During the universal dissolution when the Self is free from all vikalpas, the Śakti exists as Pure Cit Śakti or Cit Prakṛti.

(b) When the vikalpas are on the point of merging—when though there is no vikalpa as such there is yet a tendency in the direction of vikalpas—the Śakti is called Māyā Śakti or Jaḍa Prakṛti.

(c) But when the vikalpas are fully developed and materially become dense the Śakti appears as Avidyā.

It has already been observed that the appearance of the universe follows upon the self-expression of the Divine Power and the Cosmic End follows from the withdrawal of the self-same Power.

After the period of Cosmic Night is over, the Will of the Lord, in co-operation with the mature adṛṣṭa of Jīvas,

manifests only partially, as it were, the essence of the Self, whereby the Self is revealed as limited.

The appearance of limitation is thus the emergence of not-self, known as Avidyā or Jaḍa Śakti, called also by the name of Void (*śūnya*), or Prakṛti, Absolute Negation or Darkness (*tamaḥ*), or Ākāśa. This is the first stage in the order of creation and represents the first limitation imposed on the Limitless.¹ The erroneous belief, generated through the Freedom of the Lord—the Self—that the Ego is partial (*aikadeśika*) and not full and universal (*pūrṇa*), is responsible for the appearance of this something which being a portion of the Self is yet outside of it and free from self-consciousness and is described as not-self or by any other name as shown above.

Thus the Supreme Reality splits itself spontaneously, as it were, into two sections, one appearing as the subject and the other as the object. The Pūrṇāhantā which is the essence of Supreme Reality disappears after this cleavage: the portion to which limited egoism attaches being the subject and the other portion free from egoism the object. The object as thus making its appearance is the Unmanifest (*Avyakta*) Nature from which the entire creation emanates and which is perceived by the subject as distinct from itself.

It has been observed that Caitanya is of the nature of Self-luminous Light (*sphurat prakāśa*), which may shine on itself (*svātmā*), in which case it is known as *Ahantā*, *I-ness* or may rest on non-ego (*anātmā*) and express itself as *Idantā* or *This-ness*. The essence of Caitanya consists in the fact that the light (*prakāśa*) is always confined to itself. This universal Ego or 'I' stands behind all dualism. The Supreme Ego is universal, as there is nothing to limit (*pariccheda*) or to differentiate (*vyāvṛtti*) it, and the entire visible universe exists in

¹ It should always be borne in mind that the Absolute suffers no change, not even when through its power it assumes limitation. It remains always pure and undivided, although to those whose vision is dimmed it appears as multiple.

identity with it. But this characteristic by its very nature is absent from Matter (Jada), which is not self-manifest. Just as light and heat co-exist in fire, in the same way universal Ahantā and Freedom or Śakti co-exist in Caitanya. This freedom is Māyā which though essentially identical with Caitanya (*cidekarūpa*) brings out varieties of an infinite kind, but in bringing out this variety it does not in the least swerve from the Essence.

The appearance of the universe in Pure Caitanya is the action of Avidyā, which has three distinct stages :

(a) The first is the germinal state (*bijāvasthā*), when the material power, which is still in its earliest phase of manifestation, is pure. Matter does not assert itself at this stage and consequently there is no differentiation in experience. In other words, it does not yet appear as distinct from Caitanya, though potentially it exists. This stage is represented by the five pure Tattvas, viz., Śiva, Śakti, Sadāśiva, Śuddhavidyā and Īśvara.

(i) The Avidyā, which has been described above as being the Caitanya in its limited appearance as an object external to the subject is called Śiva. In pure Caitanya, owing to the play of its own Will, an infinite number of limited aspects (*svāṅśa*) arises. These are mutually distinct. From this point of view to every limited aspect of Cit there is a corresponding object external to it (*vāhyābhāsa*), but to the Unlimited Cit or Pure Self (*Pūrṇa Ātmā=Paraśiva*) there is no externality. The universal (*sāmānya*) common to all the pure and limited Cit aspects referred to above is called Śiva-tattva. This tattva is thus a *sāmānya* holding within it all the *viśeṣas* but Para-Śiva or the Pure Self is transcendent and above both *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*. Hence Śivatattva may be more properly described as Pure Caitanya in its general but conditioned form, free from all *vikalpas* and is to be distinguished from the Absolute proper.

(ii) The appearance of Śiva (*paricchinnanirvikalpa-cit*) as Aham is called Śakti. Although this self-presenta-

tive character (*ahaṃbhāsana*) is in the essence of Cit, so that there can be, in fact, no differentiation between Śiva and Śakti as such, the Cit is nevertheless known as Śiva in so far as it is free from all viśeṣas and as Śakti by virtue of its characteristic self-awareness (*ahaṃbhāsana*).

(iii) When the self-presentation (*ahaṃbhāsana*) is no longer confined to the Self but is extended to the not-self or the object (*mahāsūnya*) external to the Self it is known as Sadāśiva. This state marks the identification of the Self with the not-self in the form "Aham eva idam" and indicates predominance of spirit over matter.

(iv) But when matter prevails and the consciousness assumes the form "idam ahaṃ" the state is technically called Īśvara.

(v) The term Śuddha Vidyā is reserved for the state which represents an equality in the presentation of the subjective and objective elements in consciousness.

(b) The second stage in the evolution of Avidyā, described as aṅkurāvasthā, represents a further development of difference or materiality, when the subtle products of matter and spirit make their appearance. In this mixed condition both spirit and matter are equally predominant and the seven mixed (*miśra*) tattvas, viz. Māyā, Kalā, Vidyā, Rāga, Kāla, and Niyati reveal themselves.

(i) The confirmation of difference due to the Free Will of the Supreme, which characterises the second stage, has the effect of reversing the normal relation between spirit and matter. Thus while in the first stage described above Spirit or Cit Śakti dominates matter or Jaḍa Śakti which exists in a rudimentary state, merged in Spirit or Self, the second stage shows the preponderance of matter over spirit. Consciousness loses its supremacy and becomes a quality inherent in the material subject. All this is due to the emergence and development of bhedaśamkalpa in Caitanya. This material subject—

which is matter prevailing over spirit and related to it as a substance to its quality—is called Māyā.

(ii-vi) The five aspects of Māyā are the five so-called *kañcukas* which are the five eternal Śaktis of Para Śiva in a limited form. The obscuring power of Māyā acts as a veil, as it were, upon the Omnipotence, Omniscience, Self-Contentment, Eternity and Freedom of the Supreme Self and thus acting is known as Kalā, Vidyā, Rāga, Kāla and Niyatī respectively.

(vii) The Pure Self as obscured by Māyā and its fivefold activities appears as Puruṣa with its limitation of action, knowledge, contentment, eternity and freedom.

(c) The third or grossest stage in the evolution of Avidyā is represented by the dense products of the mixed tattvas, where matter is overwhelmingly strong. This stands for the group of the twenty-four tattvas, from the Primary Prakṛti down to Prithvī, constituting the material order.

Prakṛti with which the lower creation begins, is indeed the assemblage (*samaṣṭi*) of the vāsanās of all persons with various and beginningless karmans: it may be fitly described as the body of the Karman Samskāras of the Jīvas, considered as inhering in Cit Śakti or Self. This Karma-Vāsanā or Prakṛti is three-fold according as the experience, which is the moral outcome of this vāsanā, is pleasant or painful or of the nature of a comatose condition in which neither pleasure nor pain is felt.

The Vāsanās exist in a twofold condition, as Avyakta when they lie unmanifest in dreamless sleep or as Citta when they manifest themselves in dreams and wakeful states. In the dreamless state there can be no experience of pleasure and pain, because the mature karmans having been worked off through experience, the others which are not yet ripe are not ready for fructification. It is a fact that karmans, when they are matured by time, cause the Jñāna-śakti of the conscious Self to move outwards and have contact with the objective world. In a state of

sleep such movement is naturally absent. But the process of time, during which the sleep continues, acts on the karmans and matures some of them, so that the Jñāna-śakti is allowed to come in touch with the external objects or with their semblances and sleep is over. The Śakti as thus qualified by the body of Karma-Vāsanās leading to contact with the objects and consequent enjoyment (bhoga) is known as Citta.

The Citta differs according to the difference of Puruṣa but it is one with Prakṛti in dreamless sleep. Thus the Citta may be viewed as Puruṣa or as Prakṛti according as the conscious (*citi*) or unconscious (*avyakta*) element prevails in it. It is not, therefore, a distinct category, but falls either under Puruṣa or under Prakṛti.

THE SYSTEM OF CAKRAS ACCORDING TO GORAKṢANĀTHA

The system of mystic culture introduced by Gorakṣanātha does not seem to have spread widely through the educated classes, so that although about a millenium has passed since this great man appeared, his preachings have remained till today almost a sealed book to many. The *Gorakṣa Sataka* and *Gorakṣa Paddhati* are two of the few Sanskrit works published which profess to give an exposition of this teacher's instructions. The *Hathayoga Pradīpikā* also belongs to his school, but it deserves to be supplemented.

We propose to deal in a separate paper on the basis of mss. and printed books (in Hindi and Sanskrit), with the entire system of mystic culture associated with Gorakṣanātha, both historically and philosophically. Here we must confine ourselves to the system of Cakras or intra-organic centres of spiritual energy recognised by Gorakṣanātha. Our description will be based on a manuscript of *Vairāṭa Purāna* and on an old coloured chart (obtained accidentally from a local gentleman interested in this Panth representing the human body containing the spinal column with the various centres painted and duly located. It will be found that this arrangement differs widely from the current notions both of the Hathayoga school and of the Tantras.

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First of all in the perineum we have the ādhāra cakra (coloured red) presided over by Gaṇeśa-nātha with his two powers, viz. siddhi and buddhi. This is identical with the well-known mūlādhāra of the Tantras. But the next centre, called mahāpadma cakra controlled by Nīlanātha is unknown elsewhere. The third, the svādhiṣṭhāna

cakra (coloured yellow), is in the genital region and has Brahmā for its deity and Sāvitrī for the power.

Between this and the maṇipura there are three distinct centres, viz. ṣaḍdala (called also the *suṣumnā cakra*), garbha (in the *garbhasthāna*) and kuṇḍalinī (in the region adjoining the waist and presided over by fire). Besides bare names and vague localisation we do not find statement of any further detail about these psychic vehicles. The maṇipura is situated in the navel and has Viṣṇu for its devatā. Above this is supposed to exist the so-called līṅga cakra, of which, again no particulars are given. Higher still, in the pericarp of the anāhata, is the seat of mind (*manas*).

The anāhata itself is the heart and looks like a lotus with twelve petals, emitting a white radiance around. The presiding god of the cakra is named Mahādeva (Rudra Nātha in the ms.) and the power is Umā. The ṛṣi is called Hiranyagarbha. This corresponds to the causal body, dreamless sleep, paśyanti vāk and Sāma Veda.

The next higher cakra is of course viśuddha in the throat. It is a sixteen-petalled lotus, with smoky colour, presided over by Jīva and Ādyā Śakti. The ṛṣi is Virāt. It corresponds to the causal body, dreamless sleep, parāvāk, Atharvana Veda, Jālandhara-bandha and sāyujya mukti.

The prāna cakra which is a thirty-two petalled lotus of bright hue (*uddiyotavarnaprabhā*) and is controlled by Prānanātha and Paramā Śakti, is seated near the region of the throat (*galasthāna*).¹ It forms the tenth aperture of the human body. Of the four cakras above viśuddha and below ājñā the second one is abala cakra, furnished with thirty-two lobes shining like the rising sun (*arūnodyotaprabhā*) presided by Fire. The exact site of the cakra is not mentioned. From what is said

¹ This apparently is the so-called kanthakūpa mentioned in the *Yogasūtra*, 3-30.

it appears that it is seated where the three granthiṣ viz. Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra, unite (*trigranthiṣthāna*), and is very intimately connected with kāla cakra and yoginī cakra. The civuka cakra is somewhere in the facial region, apparently near the chin, and is formed like sun-like lotus of thirty-four lobes, presided by Prāṇa and Sarasvatī. All the devas have their seats within the lotus. Its ṛṣi is named Krodha. All languages, indeed human speech itself, are supposed to have their origin here. The balavān cakra is just below the ājñā, in the nasal region and looks like a three-petalled lotus of red, white and dark colour. This place is described as trivenī, being the confluence of the three streams of Gangā, Yamunā and Sarasvati represented in the body by the three nāḍīs, viz. iḍā, piṅgalā and suṣumnā. The presiding god of this cakra is Praṇava and the power Suṣumnā. The statement that this place is associated with the three mātrās of Praṇava (viz. a-u-m) becomes thus intelligible. The name of its ṛṣi is given as Mahāhankāra.¹

The famous ājñā cakra (called also aṇi cakra in the ms.) which is in the centre of the space between the two brows, is a diamond-like (*māṇikyavarnaprabhā*) lotus of two petals, presided by Haṃsa devatā and Suṣumnā śakti. It corresponds to the vijñāna state and anupamā vāk, and to the half mātrā of Praṇava.

The karṇamūla cakra within the auricular region, is a thirty-six lobed lotus of mixed colour (dark and yellow). The presiding god and power are Nāda and Śruti respectively. It is the seat of the thirty-six mātrkās.

The Trivenī cakra, above the brows, is a twenty-six lobed circle with Ākāśa as its ṛṣi. This is the real trivenī, but how this place is connected with the balavān cakra lower down is nowhere stated.

¹ Could this term mean the Purṇā'hantā or Parāhantā of the Trika and Tripurā systems of philosophy?

The Candra cakra is in the forehead and consists of thirty-two¹ lobes with a colour between white and red.² It is presided by the Moon and Amṛta³ Śakti. The ṛṣi is Manas (mind) with its sixteen kalās. It is said that the sun goes to this lunar mansion to drink nectar.

This centre is very closely related to another cakra—amṛta cakra almost in the same region, probably a little upwards. Its devatā and śakti are identical with those of the preceding cakra but the ṛṣi is Ātmā rather than Manas. It is from here that nectar is constantly flowing, this place is described as the abode of Gāyatrī named Kāmadhenu (lit. wish-giving cow), figured like a milch cow with four teats, viz. ambikā, lambikā, ghaṅṭikā and tālikā. It has a human face with intoxicant look (*mada-netra*), a peacock's tail, a horse's neck (*grīvā*), an elephant's tusk (*śunda*), a tiger's arms (*hastāśārdūla*), a cow's horns, and wings consisting of Līlā Brahma and Haṁṣa. It is a strange figure. It is from the udder of this 'cow' that nectar is perpetually streaming down. The Khecari, Viparitakarani, and other mudrās are some of the devices intended to check the downward flow of this blissful current. The Yogin who has obtained access to this cakra and abides here becomes immortal and is free from the effects of Time.

Next is the brahmadvāra cakra, located above the forehead and shining with its hundred petals like the many-coloured rainbow, and beyond this is the seat of the akula kuṇḍalinī—a lotus of six hundred petals bright like the newly risen sun.

On crossing this, one comes up to the Brahmaṛandhra in the cranium (*mūrdhāsthāna*), with its multi-coloured thousand petals. This is the so-called Sahasrāra of the mystic literature—aim and end of all spiritual progress. It is here that the Guru and the Caitanya-Śakti reside.

¹ Sixteen lobes, according to the *Serpent Power*, p 146.

² White only according to the Ms

³ Amadā Śakti according to the Ms.

One would naturally expect that the series of cakras would come to an end here. But the picture on which the above account is based mentions six cakras more beyond the sahasrāra, viz. (a) ūrdharandhra, (b) bhramara guhā, (c) akuṅṭhapīṭha punyāgāra, (d) kolhāta, (e) vajradanḍa, and (f) nirādhāra paramajyotiścakra. The ūrdharandhra called tālucakra in the ms. is seated in the tālimā and is a sixty-four lobed cakra, presided by Gorakṣanātha and Siddhānta Śakti. This statement is interesting as it gives us an idea of what the followers of the path thought in connection with the founder of their school. The bhramara-guhā also called alakha i.e., alakṣya cakra (called brahma cakra¹ in the ms.) is the place where samādhi-yoga ensues, and prāṇa and manas cease to work. The lotus is described as furnished with ten million of lobes and wonderfully brilliant. The presiding god of the centre is Alakṣyanātha, the Śakti called Māyā (=Mahāmāyā? Akalā in the ms.) and the ṛṣi Mahāviṣṇu.

The next higher cakra, with an equal number of lobes, has Akalanātha as devatā, Akaleśvarī as Śakti and Akala as ṛṣi.

The kolhāṭa cakra is in the śikhāmaṇḍala and corresponds to the Vaikuṅṭha of the Vaiṣnavas and Kailāsa of the Śaivas. Both the devatā and the śakti are named Ananta.² The ms. calls the region a road to the highest void (*paramasūnyamārga*).

The description of vajradanḍa is not very clear. It is said to be, as I understand it, in the form of a column, vast (*mahaviśāla*), lustrous (*tejahpuṅjaprabhā*) and long (*dirgha*).

The final cakra is in the nirāmbasthāna, with an

¹ According to the Ms. Brahmacakra is really within the Bhramaraguhā and consists of 108 lobes in which the great Maunins are incessantly occupied with the repetition of Ajapā.

² The Ms. calls the Devatā Acṁtyanātha and the Śakti Avyaktā.

infinite number of lobes, colours, mātṛkās, devas and worlds. This is the highest seat of the Gurudeva.

Beyond this is a series of twenty voids of which nothing is said. The ms. observes that the final liberation takes place in the great void (*paramaśūnyasthāna*) above twenty-one brahmāṇḍas. Transcending the great void the Yogin becomes eternally free from 'coming and going' i.e., the wheel of birth and death.¹

We have tried to reproduce above with as much fidelity to the understood meaning of the chart as possible the account of the Gorakhpānthis concerning the arrangement and function of the various cakras. But as the chart was on an old canvas with the figures rendered indistinct by time and the notes appended generally vague, illegible and sometimes totally unintelligible, it is quite likely that mistakes and in some places even confusion have been left unnoticed. It is sure nevertheless that the general presentation of the scheme is unimpeachable.

Taking it as we find it there is no doubt that the ideas of this school differed in many points from those of the Tantras on the same subject. The question of the total number of cakras may be left aside for the present.² For we are aware that there are several hidden (*gupta*) cakras which are not ordinarily counted; and very often a certain number of cakras, considered minor from one's own point of view, is supposed to form a connected whole. There are other reasons also which would explain the difference of the number in different systems. The actual description of a particular cakra is more important to a student for purposes of comparative studies. But even

¹ sa ca yogī tisthāti yuge yuge jyotiḥ sametya.

² The *Svacchanda Sangraha*, according to Bhāskara's report (*Lalitāsahasra-nāma-bhāṣya* p. 53) speaks of 32 cakras, cf. also Advaita Mārtanda as reported in Avalon, *The Serpent Power*, pp. 169-170, and in *Shakti* and *Shākta* (2nd Edition), p. 409

here there are certain fatal limitations. For instance, the same cakra may not look exactly alike to different sādhakas. The personal sankalpa of the aspirant, either conscious or sub-conscious, and that of his Guru go a great way towards determining the nature of the vision. The reality observed is, *in a certain sense only ideal*.

Entering into details we may observe that the sahasrāra is not supposed to form the highest limit; there are stages beyond. With this we may compare the accounts of the Rādhāsoāmi sect who also hold more or less the same views.

The manaścakra as described here embodies thirty-two lobes, while elsewhere it is said to be six-petalled (Dr. B. N. Seal—*The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*, p. 221; Avalon: *The Serpent Power*, p. 145).

Regarding akulakuṇḍalinī it may be said that the Tantrists locate it within the moon of consciousness which forms the pericarp of the downward-facing sahasrāra and is situated in the transcendent heaven (*para-vyoman*)—a technical term for a part of the cerebral region.¹ The contact of kula with this akula is the immediate cause of the flow of nectar (*sudhāsrāva*). While Gorakṣanātha holds that the nectar flows from the amṛta cakra above the moon, Bhāskara considers that it flows from the akula which is within the moon.

The name of bhrāmara guhā is to be found mentioned in the literature connected with the names of Kabir, Rādhāsvāmī etc., but nowhere is its function clearly stated. The *Sūtasamhitā* and *Bodhasāra* use the term vaguely in the sense of brahmarandhra. This so-called cave is in reality a hole or rather a hollow which appears to view when one gazes into the centre of the 'kūtastha'. The entrance to this hollow is brilliantly

¹ dvādaśāntam lalātorḍharī kapālordhvāvasānakam/

dvayangulordham środeśam param vyoma prakīrkitam//

Quoted by Bhāskara in his *Varivasyā Rahasya* (comm. on Verse 51), p. 94 (Cal. Edition).

dark, but it is surrounded by a luminous ring of rays. The powers of obscuration (*āvarana*) and dissipation (*vikṣepa*) are said to guard this entrance, so that they try to screen up and throw off the gazer. It is only when the power of introvision is produced after the generation of pure magnetism within the body through strict continence, pure food etc., and through the cultivation of the moral virtues of selflessness, forbearance etc. and through the action of *prāṇa* that one can expect to gaze at this hollow without fear of *āvaraṇa* and *vikṣepa*. At this state mere gazing makes the mouth of the cave wide open and every tattva is illuminated.

In the chart, the *prāṇa cakra* is described as the tenth avenue of the human body. This aperture is usually closed in men, so that the body is, as a rule, likened to a "city with nine gates" (cf. *navadvāre pure dehī—Gīta*) only. But a steady process of psychic discipline helps to open this avenue through which the *jīva* of the *krama-mukti-upāsaka* passes away along the ray of the sun into the solar region called also *Brahmaloka* and thence with the dawn of knowledge is absorbed in Brahman. The *medulla oblongata* (*mastaka granthi*) above the *viśuddha cakra*, is one of the sites where the three *nāḍis* are united. From here the *suṣumnā* enters into the skull, and the other two *nāḍis*, viz. *idā* and *piṅgalā*, pass along the right and left sides of the forehead and meet together and are joined with the *suṣumnā* between the two eyebrows. From there the *idā* goes to the left nostril and the *piṅgalā* to the right. From the medulla the *suṣumnā* is bifurcated: (1) one line passes below the brain and in a rather oblique course comes to the eyebrow whence with a slightly upward bend pierces the pericarp of the *ājñā* and unites with *idā* and *piṅgalā*. Then it comes out, and running straight up crosses a very subtle hole within the interior of the central region of the forehead and hanging down to some distance takes a curve and goes right up penetrating the *sahasrāra* and entering the brahma-

randhra.¹ (2) Another line goes up direct from the medulla and through the interior of the skull extends to the śikhara. With a slight curve it enters the brahmarandhra. The mouth of this line of the suṣumṇa which is in the brahmarandhra remains usually closed, while that of the first line is open. Consequently the hollows of the two lines are not in union. While passing away from the body the Yogin gets the closed mouth of the suṣumṇā opened, on which the two holes mentioned above become unified. This is what is usually known by the name of the "tenth avenue". In the *Amaraugha Śāsana*, however, the tenth aperture is identified with the mouth of the śaṅkhinī which is a hollow behind the front-tooth (rājadanta); and the *Kankālamālinī Tantra* locates the brahmarandhra just below the śaṅkhinī.²

¹ See introduction to the *Pranava Gītā*. In the *Serpent Power*, p. 130, the suṣumṇā is said to terminate at the twelve-petalled lotus in the pericarp of Sahasrāra. The *Maṇḍala Brāhmaṇopaniṣad* and its *Rāja Yoga Bhaṣya* refer to the suṣumṇā as ending in the brahmarandhra (Mys. Ed. p. 9).

² tasmin randhre visargaṃ ca nityānandam nirañjanam/
tadūrdhe śaṅkhinī devī sṛṣṭisthityantakārṇi//
brahmarandhraṃ tataḥ smṛtam//

VIRGIN WORSHIP

The *Mahākālasaṃhitā* says that the best way of propitiating Śiva is to worship a virgin (kumārī) and to feed her. The Kaulas are to worship her in the night and the Smārtas in the afternoon. The virgin should be well-bathed, well-draped in a piece of multi-coloured cloth and well-decorated. She must be one whose heart has not yet been even touched with passion and who has not fallen into love. She must be of 7, 8, or 9 years of age, of fair complexion, of noble birth, and with her parents living. She must not be deformed in body, long-haired, with protruding teeth or betrothed to anybody (vāgdattā).

In the *Yāmala*, a virgin is said to be of three kinds, viz. Parā, Aparā and Parāparā. The virgin was the sole Existence before the creation of the universe and is therefore known by the name of Ādyaśakti or Primal Energy (Ādyā).

Names of the virgin from the 1st to the 16th year are as given below—Sandhyā, Sarasvatī, Tridhāmūrti, Kālikā, Subhagā, Umā, Mālinī, Kūbjikā, Kāla-Samgharshā, Aparājitā, Rudrānī, Bhairavī, Mahālakṣmī, Kulanāyikā, Kṣetrajñā and Candīkā.

As for the mode of her worship the *Mahākālasaṃhitā* says that the virgin is to be conducted respectfully with music and entertainments to the door of the hall of worship. The number of virgins to be worshipped must be an odd number, either 5 or 7 or 9 or even 11. Of these the fairest one is to be considered as the primary (Mukhyā) one, but if many maidens are not available one will do. In kāmya and naimittika pūjās only one is needed, while in the autumnal worship a large number is a necessity. They are to be kept standing in a row with their eyes cast down. The worshipper is to regard

the mukhyā as identical with the Goddess herself, take up a cup of wine, and go through the process of prāṇāyāma,, bhūtāpasāraṇa (expulsion of evil spirits), obisance to Guru and Gaṇeśa and digbandhana. He is then to wash her feet, place the water on his head and rub her feet with the corner of his own wearing garment. With unbroken rice (*akṣata*) he should then perform the ceremony for removing the obstacles (*vighnotsāraṇa*). The ceremonies for expelling the evil influences (*bhūtāpasāraṇa* and *vighnotsāraṇa*) have to be performed once again, the reason being that many minor gods and goddesses enter the hall of worship together with the Virgin Goddess to see her; and very often they create disturbances. The worshipper has to take with his left hand the right hand of the maiden, step forth with his right foot planted first on the ground and lead the line of the maidens on into the hall, uttering five verses in her praise: Tvam amba jagatām ādye jagadādhārarūpiṇi &c.

The worship of the mukhyā is enough to please the rest. This is followed by an act of offering to the minor gods. Then follows kumārīnyāsa. The names of the 18 maidens and their respective seats in the body: Mahācandra Yogeśvari, Siddhikarālī, Siddhivikarālī, Mahāntā mārī (??), Vajrakapālīnī, Muṇḍamālīnī, Aṭṭahāsīnī, Caṇḍakapālīnī, Kālacakreśvari, Guhyakālī, Kātyāyanī, Kāmākhyā, Camuṇḍā, Siddhilakṣmī, Kubjikā, Mātāṅgī, Caṇḍeśvari and Kaumārī. Their respective seats: head (śīrah), face (mukha), eyes, ears, nostrils, cheeks, lines of teeth, shoulders, heart, arms, belly (jaṭhara), back, thighs, knees, hips (jaṅghā), legs and the entire frame.

The worships of nine goddesses viz. Śuddhā, Kālīkā, Lalitā, Mālīnī, Vasundharā, Sarasvatī, Ramā, Gaurī and Durgā and of two gods viz. Baṭuka, a boy of 5 years, and Gaṇeśa of 9 years, are enjoined. So also of 8 Bhairavas viz. Asitāṅga Bhairava, Ruru, Caṇḍa, Krodha, Unmatta, Kapālī, Bhīṣaṇa and Saṁhāra and

of 8 Devis viz. Mahāmāyā Kālarātri, Sarvamaṅgalā, Damarukā, Rājarājeśvarī, Saṃpatpradā, Bhagavatī and Kumārī. The 6 Śaktis attendant on the Devīs are named: Anaṅga Kusumā, Manmathā, Madanā, Kusumāturā, Madanāturā and Śīsīrā.

The worship of the Mukhyā being over, the remaining maidens should next be attended to. They should be allowed to eat of the food offered up to them in silence. No sound of any instrument should be made to disturb them at their meals. The worshipper with folded hands should sing in their praise a hymn called Kumārīstotra (16 verses in anuṣṭup metre, from the *Mahākāla Samhitā*). After they have taken their food they should be served with betels in due form. This is followed by the offering of dakṣiṇā, and finally the ceremony of visarjana.

The leaving of their dishes should be given to jackals or buried in the earth.

The worship of the virgin is recommended during the Navarātra festival for 9 days in succession. The names of the nine Durgās to be worshipped on the nine days are: Hrlekhā, Gaganā, Raktā, Mahocchuṣmā, Karālikā, Icchā, Jñāna, Kriyā and Durgā. Last of all we find the following remarkable expression:—

yadi sā kṣobham āyāti svayam eva vilāsinī/
 tayā saha nayed rātriṃ vāsaraṃ vā niśītadhīḥ//
 kumārīm na sprīed eva bhāvayuktena cetasā/
 anyathā mṛtyum āyāti no ced devī parānmukhī//

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